LARGEST CIRCULATED ENGLISH FORTNIGHLY OF J&K
April 1st--May 31st, 2001
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The changing
Kashmir scenario
Mistakes lead to a messy situation By T.V. Rajeshwar The Gujarat earthquake is, no doubt, the most important challenge facing the country since January 26, and the attention of the entire nation is focused on it. Kashmir, however, is not far behind and it looms large more than ever, calling for constant attention. India
fought wars with Pakistan in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999, after the Kargil
intrusion. Though the 1971 war was not linked to Kashmir, the other wars
were indeed so. The 1971 war concluded with the Simla Agreement between
Indira Gandhi and Z.A. Bhutto on July 2, 1972, where, inter alia, "a final
settlement of J&K" was mentioned as one of the items of the pending
agenda between the two countries. Bilateral negotiations were agreed upon,
and for India at least bilateralism became a sort of
mantra. However,
the bilateral discussion during the next two decades took the Kashmir dispute
nowhere near a solution. Because of the perennial impasse in the bilateral
process President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan hit upon the idea of arming the
Kashmiri youth and brainwashing them with Islamic fundamentalism along
with military training and funding through the ISI. The explosion of violence
in the Kashmir valley has continued ever since. Prime
Minister Vajpayee undertook the pathbreaking Lahore bus trip in 1998. The
understanding reached there on the various issues between Mr Nawaz Sharif
and Mr Vajpayee was not fully endorsed by Pakistan's powerful military
machine represented by the three Service Chiefs and the several intelligence
agencies headed by the ISI. During the brief post-Lahore phase, Track-II
diplomacy was active and it was whispered by some of the Indian participants
that Mr Nawaz Sharif had almost agreed to accept the LoC as an international
border, which Bhutto had promised in 1972 but refused to talk about it
later. That this was a daydream was demonstrated soon after by the Kargil
intrusion by the Pakistan army and foreign mercenaries. Later events made
it clear that Mr Nawaz Sharif was fully aware of General Musharraf's Kargil
operations and his attempt to shift the entire responsibility on the top
General, followed by the withdrawal of the armed forces behind the LoC
on President Clinton's pressure, was something the army could not put up
with. General
Musharraf, who took over after ousting Mr Nawaz Sharif, has followed a
tough policy towards India from day one. He has carried forward ahead,
with no qualms in supporting "jihad" in Kashmir. India's stand on General
Musharraf's frequent pleas for the resumption of talks on Kashmir is well
known. However, the talks cannot be permanently stalled on the ground that
General Musharraf has not agreed to arrest the infiltration of militants
like those of the Lashker-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad have the "fidayeen"
elements
consisting of suicide squads and human bombs. Intelligence agencies have
unearthed a number of plots and arrested several militants and infiltrators
but all this would not be adequate to prevent the "fidayeen"
attacks
on their chosen targets in Delhi and elsewhere. After
the brief phase of cease-fire announcement by the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen in
Kashmir and its abrupt cancellation at the instance of its Pakistani counterpart
as well as the Pakistan government, the Hurriyat leadership in Kashmiri
has come into increasing focus. The All-Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC)
has been invited by the Pakistan government for consultations, and Hurriyat
spokesman Mirwaiz Umar Farooq has stated that the APHC has its own agenda
aimed at evolving a policy of coordination with the Mujahideen and Pakistan
after holding discussions with PoK leaders and militant elements who constitute
the United Jihad Council. Any impression that the Hurriyat is going to
Pakistan to tell the Mujahideen to surrender in response to the cease-fire
call is totally incorrect, the Mirwaiz added. The question, therefore,
is: why is the APHC being allowed to go to Pakistan, and more importantly,
what does India expect out of the Hurriyat's deliberations with these militant
groups and General Musharraf? Do
we also concede that the APHC is the sole representative of the people
of J&K? Are we not thereby conceding that the problem is almost exclusively
of the Kashmir valley and the Muslim majority areas of J&K? Why did
India not think of asking some representatives from Jammu and Ladakh to
be included in the delegation of the APHC? That the APHC might refuse to
include them is a different issue, but at least an effort could have been
made to make the delegation a more representative body of various sections
of the J&K people. The
APHC will come back with nothing that could give any hope of a peaceful
settlement between India and Pakistan. What the militants and fundamentalists
in Pakistan and General Musharraf expect of India, before hard negotiations
begin between the two countries on Kashmir's future, have already been
spelt out by Syed Salahuddin, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Commander-in-Chief,
based in Pakistan: "India should publicly declare that Kashmir is disputed
territory, stop all forms of operations by security forces in Kashmir,
release all jailed militants and political prisoners and reduce troop deployment
in Kashmir to the 1989 level". Salahuddin added that the militants would
end their attacks in case all these were implemented. And what would be
the agenda during the trilateral discussions between India, Pakistan and
Mujahideen? He said the people of Kashmir, namely the Muslim-majority areas,
should be given the option to merge with Pakistan or India or choose to
become an independent country, and this dispensation would also apply to
the people of PoK. Slahuddin concluded with the threat that if New Delhi
did not agree to all these demands militants would take the war out of
Kashmir to the rest of India, that India was surrounded and was fighting
the last battle and could not sustain the Kashmir war. All
this is very ominous but real. We have pushed ourselves to this stage and
there are no clear prospects of getting out of this messay situation. On
reflection, have we not moved far away from the 1972 Simla Agreement which
contemplated the resolution of the Kashmir dispute by bilateral discussions
between India and Pakistan? The proposition of treating the LoC as an internationalborder
to settle the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan is now almost
dead. The issue of the will of the people of Kashmir has come to the forefront,
and it is this factor which is going to decide the fate of the people of
J&K. It is so particularly because of the American political establishment,
whether of Mr Bill Clinton before, or of Mr George W.Bush now, which insists
on the will of the people of Kashmir being taken into account before a
final settlement of the dispute. Eventually, it could indeed be the replay
of the proposals of Sir Owen Dixon of 1950-51 which effectively suggested
the partition of J&K into three parts on communal lines. The
Track-II participants who returned from Pakistan last month, after their
aborted attempt to discuss nuclear strategy concepts of the two countries,
had declared their bewilderment over Pakistan's all-pervasive obsession
with Kashmir. Indeed, the impression there seems to be that Kashmir is
almost within their grasp and that there is no way for India to hold on
to it much longer. In this context, the brief announcement on February
4 from Washington that a bipartisan US Congressional delegation would visit
India and Pakistan to discuss the Kashmir issue is important. The delegation
is likely to visit Kashmir and meet local leaders. Their visit to Kashmir
would no doubt be met with processions, protests and demonstrations against
Indian security forces and their alleged abuse of human rights and indiscriminate
violence against the common people. The
way events are unfolding, the Kashmir scenario is clearly heading, sooner
or later, towards a UN-supervised referendum in J&K, most probably
on the Dixon lines. What would follow thereafter could be foreseen, but
I would rather desist from mentioning it in so many words. *The
writer is a former Governor of West Bengal and Sikkim. Source: The Tribune
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