LARGEST CIRCULATED ENGLISH FORTNIGHLY OF J&K
April 1st--May 31st, 2001
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State must
fight terrorism industry
By KPS Gill One truth that has established itself over the years in India's political scenario is that, if you seek a short-cut to political prominence, all you have to do is pick up a gun, adopt some inchoate political ideology, identify a few "political violence"--killing, maiming or kidnapping according to personal preference or the dictates of profitability\. Sooner, rather than later, you will have the government talking to you, offering a multiplicity of benefits and sending down high-profile "negotiators" to secure a "political solution" that will give you a permanent and prominent position in the democratic processes of your State. In
case this is not sufficient, the option of entering into extended and inclusive
negotiations with the government, even while you consolidate highly lucrative
extortion and other criminal rackets, is always left open. The advantage
of not allowing the "negotiations" to break down is that they confer a
quasi-legal status on your activities, and leave security and police forces
reasonably confused, so that no effective action is taken against your
criminal networks. This is a pattern that has been repeated again and again,
in Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland, Assam (albeit substantially unsuccessfully
at present), Jammu and Kashmir, and earlier in Punjab. Many "successes"
have been proudly exhibited by their negotiators. Some of these, like Mizoram,
have been conclusive. Others have been more limited, securing the surrender,
pacification or containment of a particular militant faction, or sowing
discord between or within such factions. What has never been assessed is
the enormous and deleterious effect that these "successes" have had on
the body politic in general. The
most obvious of such consequences is the demonstration effect on the unscrupulous,
the impatient and the politically ambitious. Simply put, if murder, extortion
and political violence can elevate one person to the legislative assembly,
Parliament or even the chief ministership of a State, what prevents others
from emulating such successes? And retaining the very substantial profits
they make on the way after they have had their respectability officially
restored. To
those who do not believe in the impact and efficacy of such a demonstration
effect, one needs only point to the proliferation of militant groups in
India's North-East. General awareness tends to be limited to one or two
groups active in each State, but the actual numbers are simply astonishing.
Assam boasts of over 34 "liberation fronts and ideologies; Tripura has
over 30 such groups and a thriving "kidnap industry" that accounts for
over 70 per cent of all kidnappings in the entire North-East region, Manipur
has 35 groups. The
"peaceful" States of the Northeast, Mizoram, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh
have also witnessed the recent emergence or consolidation of a number of
militant groupings. Of course, in States such as Nagaland, where one or
two gangs succeed in establishing a monopoly, this proliferation is impeded.
But the route to political power through criminal violence under the garb
of "revolutionary" activities remains the same--though in such cases eminence
can only be secured through the organizational structure of the dominant
groups. One
aspect that is common to all such groups, whether they have monopolistic
position in a particular area, or whether they act in a "free market" of
many minor players is that their activities are extraordinarily lucrative,
and the incentives, both for existing players and for their imitators,
to keep the "business" alive, are immense, and far outstrip anything that
legitimate activities could offer. The tiresome route of conventional democratic
politics, through social work and mobilisation, obviously has no comparable
enticements. The
greater and more insidious impact of this regime of negotiation with terrorists
and their ilk is the effect it has on the very fundamentals of democratic
and constitutional governance. First, if a violent shortcut is available
to the legislative assemblies, why bother with the more arduous journey
of a real democracy? Related to this is the danger that those who are more
principled democrats--or who lack the stomach for violence--will simply
by muscled out of the political equation, by the threat of violence from
these groupings, and by governments eager to negotiate a "peace" with them. Most
importantly, while reams of newsprint are dedicated to the discourse on
the disastrous consequences of the creation of extra-constitutional centres
of power, these arguments have never been consistently applied to the processes
of negotiating with terrorists, which occur entirely outside the constitutional
sphere and both create and endorse such extra-constitutional foci, which
obstruct the implementation of the constitutional imperative of rule of
law, and which undermine and destroy the basic principles and processes
of constitutional democracy. Speaking of the impossibility of principled
negotiations with terrorists, Yussef Bodansky writes. "There can be no
reasonable outcome of negotiations under such circumstances. A government
committed to the safety and well being of its citizenry and an organisation
intentionally using the indiscriminate injuring of the same citizenry as
a negotiations tactic do not speak the same language." How is it then,
that after morethan half a century
of democracy, regime after regime in India chooses to initiate such unprincipled
liaisons, and does so without any political opprobrium--indeed, does so
with the general approval of most political parties? Many
factors contribute to the context of such contradictions. Among the more
important of these is the persistent ambiguity that attaches to counter-terrorist
policy and practice, and their legitimate limits. In the absence of a coherent
and communally accepted counter-terrorism doctrine, ad hoc measures, and
hence short-term expediency, is the only principle in play. Neither law
nor logic, neither ethics nor the long-term interests of the nation, have
a defining role in such determinations. Narrow and transient partisan political
interests, the ambitions of individual bureaucrats, negotiators and political
leaders, and the personal character and insecurities of the various players
constitute the defining elements in such policy formulation. Another
crucial element is the character of India's contemporary political leadership.
It is the case that a large number of political parties do, if fact, overtly
or covertly encourage or support terrorist groups, both on Indian soil,
and those acting in friendly countries such as Myanmar and Sri Lanka. In
a polity where a gentleman who tries to blow up a train becomes the hero
of the Emergency, and then risen to eminence as a Minister in more than
one Union Government, attitudes towards terrorism as a political weapon
remain extremely ambivalent. If
this general political propensity is to be reversed, it is imperative that
the present government take the initiative to define a clear and non-discriminatory
counter-terrorism doctrine, one that places the national interest and the
principles of constitutional governance and democracy above all other considerations.
It must then work to secure a national political consensus on such a doctrine,
and to define its own policies and practices strictly within its parameters.
"Accords" with terrorists and their over-ground representatives have become
the panacea of the day for extremist political violence. What is not remembered
here is that these accords are signed with individual terrorist leaders,
not with constitutional entities or agencies that would be bound by law
or any ethical standard. Such accords constrain only individuals, and only
to the extent that they perceive a greater benefit in adhering to their
terms than resorting to violence. They do not prevent a return to violence
even by these players, and place no constraint on any other free agent
from seeking to replicate the success of those who have already risen to
power along the route of terrorist violence. (Courtesy: The Pioneer)
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