General Musharraf, has perfected what should now be called ‘Jehadi diplomacy’. In this diplomacy there are no truces but only subterfuges. No agreements but only blackmail. No respect for diplomatic norms but only commando-tactics. Audiences are not the enlightened nation, but the lumpens and religious warriors on the streets.

  Musharraf used Pak intransigence as an instrument of diplomatic blackmail. He used summit opportunity to address his constituency—the army hawks, Jehadis, Saudis and the Islamic world, besides the Pro-Pak segment of Muslim opinion in India. He tried to whip up Jingoism to counter the growing disillusionment in the separatist camp in the Kashmir valley. Musharraf tried to undermine Indian sovereignity by Talking to those waging war against India state. He violated all diplomatic niceties and used Indian soil to launch a psychological proxy war. Musharraf tried to play a) so-called Advani-Vajpayee, Jaswant Singh divide and b) left-Muslim divide against the country. Post-summit media reaction by the Indian left and Muslim elite put Musharraf strategy in perspective.

  Error of Judgement

  The million-dollar question is, why did India in the first instance provide an opportunity to him to launch his Jehadi diplomatic campaign. Did Vajpayee commit a serious error of judgement in inviting Musharraf, condoning cross-border terrorism as a pre-condition. Wasn’t India addressing vague cliches of international opinion, which do not exist? The preferable option, in the wake of revoking cease-fire was to wait and watch the summer months, peak season for Jehad and test Pak commitment on cross-border terrorism. NDA government has been blundering repeatedly on Kashmir. Its ill-conceived unilateral cease-fire worsened the security scenario in J&K. Its political thrusts have only served to confer legitimacy on Hurriyat and Pakistan. NDA’s policy on Kashmir has been one of directionless, vacillation and soft compromises.

  Compulsions

  Though Americans say that it was the threat of nuclear war that drove India and Pakistan for the meeting, the fact remains that the two governments had also their own compulsions. The Union Home Minister, Mr LK Advani and the external affairs minister Mr Jaswant Singh were concerned that with the end of cease-fire, Pakistan would escalate violence along LoC and in turn, this would provide excuse to US to go back to its interfering ways over Kashmir. Mr Advani had already convinced Mr Vajpayee about the risks in extending the non-combat insurgency operations. To neutralize its impact and address the left-Muslim Constituency, Vajpayee chose the timing. NDA government also thought that dialogue offer will buy time to engage Pakistan and Kashmiri separatists. Pakistan left NDA government with no option but to talk by sabotaging centre’s dialogue with Hurriyat. Indian leadership was also convinced that sinking economy and international pressure would force Musharraf to be more responsible. There is another view that says that invitation to Musharraf was the logical consequence of the directionless policy being pursued by Vajpayee government towards Kashmir. It has been opportunistically trying to engage Americans, Pakistan, Hurriyat and the National Conference at different times.

  Flawed Assumptions

  NDA govt’s decision to invite Musharraf was based on flawed assumptions. It overestimated Musharraf’s domestic strength and read too much in his reprimanding Jehadis. Despite sinking economy, Pakistan has been pursuing proxy war relentlessly, even upgrading it as and when desired. NDA leadership, has yet to come out of the illusion that US is genuinely trying to help India on Kashmir. This despite the fact that US has been brazenly suggesting third party mediation, reference to the “wishes” of Kashmiris in any solution and emphasising “disputed” character. It has also refused to brand LeT as a terrorist group. UK has already demonstrated its seriousness in this regard. US think-tanks have so far been demanding concessions only on Indian portion of J&K. US has been actively helping Kashmiri separatists and floating balkanising models on Kashmir. It is reluctant to acknowledge the communal character of the separatist war in Kashmir. Has the US been serious about nuclear threat or menace of Islamic fundamentalism, it would have used its leverage in forcing Pakistan government to rein in Jehadis and stop cross-border terrorism. America is using continued violence in Kashmir as a pretext to undermine bilateralism in Indo-Pak relations and Indian sovereignity over Kashmir. US leadership has been silent on Saudi connivance and also drawing sinister comparisons between Kosovo and Kashmir. US concerns on Islamic fundamentalism have been only Osama bin Laden specific. It has elevated him to a demigod. US has been trying to put on India onus of responsibility for not only defusing Kashmir crisis but also rescuing Pakistan as a failed state. US has been talking about restraint only on LoC as if terrorism was only a LoC phenomenon. It did not allow India to cross LoC during Kargil war and has been opposing the hot pursuit policy to smash terrorist camps in PoK. Today there is wider consensus in India that US intentions for pressurising India to hold dialogue with Pakistan are essentially based on the premise that faced with continued war India may resort to hot pursuit and push Pakistan to state of collapse. US officials have been arguing that failed state of Pakistan was neither in the interest of US nor Pakistan. US government at no stage supported India in not talking to Pakistan till cessation of cross-border terrorism.

  Pakistani Constraints

  Pakistan had its own limited objectives in engaging India. For nearly two years Pakistan faced censure internationally, due to India’s principled approach not to talk to Pakistan till it abandoned support for cross-border terrorism. Pakistan wanted to break this logjam. How isolated was Pakistan was recapitulated by Mr LK Advani during his recent visit to UAE. In an interview to Gulf News, he said, “when any incident of violence took place in J&K, the issue of Kashmir would be internationalized, but because of the stand taken by India in the post-Kargil period, we found this was not happening. After Chitti-singhpora and Amarnath, it was not Kashmir but cross-border terrorism that got internationalized”.

  Somehow Pakistan was led to believe that in the present situation and under US pressure it was possible to wrest concessions from India on Kashmir. Planted stories in Pak media talked about the Indian fatigue and escalating cost for India of facing proxy war. These stories cited public pressure (read Indian left-Muslim elite) in India as the cause for rethink. Pakistan convinced itself that India in its urgency to become a world power and secure a seat in Security Council, was prepared to yield concessions on Kashmir. Musharraf also wanted to build legitimacy for army by demonstrating that army was the only institution serious in pursuing hard-line agenda on Kashmir. Statements came that Pak politicians were not serious about Kashmir. “They weren’t even reading the briefing papers on Kashmir”, one statement added.

  Wrong Signals

  Some of the statements made by Gen. Padmanabhan and few retired Indian Army Generals, emphasising political solutions sent wrong signals that Indian Army was fatigued. Pakistani approach developed stridency in demanding concessions. Likewise Indian efforts to engage Hurriyat were misread as  a tacit recognition of tripartite character of the dispute. By far the maximum damage was caused by the statements of Mr Vajpayee, particularly his Kumarakom musings. In the musings (time when Musharraf expected invitation), the Prime Minister remarked, “In our search for a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem, both in its external and internal dimensions, we shall not traverse solely on the beaten track of the past. Rather, we shall be bold and innovative designers of a future architecture of peace and prosperity”. Earlier, Mr Vajpayee had said he was prepared to hold dialogue with separatists beyond the limits set by Indian constitution. He called it “within the framework of insaniyat”.

  Chinese Views

  By agreeing to dialogue, Musharraf thought that he would be able to convince international financial institutions that Pak was serious in reducing the defence burden. According to Lt. Gen. Talat Masood (Retd) known for his balanced views, compulsions were “Chinese premier advocating peace on his visit to Pakistan and the ensuing nervousness in Washington at Islamabad and Beijing cosying up prompted the Bush administration to nudge Delhi”. With around $1.6 billion of Chinese money pouring into Pakistan’s economy to build the Gawador port as well as a soft $ 1 billion loan, Islamabad can hardly ignore Chinese sensibilities. China has been asking for freezing Kashmir issue for ten years and has not been supporting Pak position on Kashmir and Taliban out of fear that India may be pushed to join US in containment of China.

  Insincere Approach

  While agreeing to dialogue, Pakistan had no intention in reaching a settlement, because it could lead to release of terrorist pressure on Valley. Through summit Musharraf wanted to plug any loosening of control over Jehadis. For Musharraf, summit was an opportunity to establish his credentials as a Punjabi rather than as a Mohajir. Even today, Punjabi-Mohajir mistrust runs deep in the Pak army.

  For the summit Musharraf delineated his objectives. These were a) to rubbish Simla and Lahore accords, India signed with civilian leadership. Musharraf wanted to redefine the bilateral framework, b) to establish centrality of Kashmir dispute and link its resolution as pre-condition for improvement in Indo-Pak relations c) to persuade India to decrease its security forces in Kashmir d) to change status quo on Kashmir and e) to wriggle out of any commitment on cessation of cross-border terrorism by claiming that he is not in a position to fully guarantee the end of terrorism and secessionism in the state.

  Pakistan believed that Vajpayee’s invitation was a diplomatic triumph for Pakistan and belated acceptance by New Delhi that its Kashmir policy has failed to yield tangible results.

  Musharraf even outlined what he would demand in step-by-step approach. First step was to establish bilateral dialogue. In the second step India was to accept that Kashmir dispute was a reality and it is an issue which can be taken today itself. Next steps were negation of proposed solutions which are not acceptable to either party and lastly to discuss the remaining possible solutions.

  Pre Summit Stance

  With this baggage Pakistan approached the summit. It evolved a well-crafted policy to send mixed signals to Indian leadership. Pakistan refused to agree for a structured agenda, to keep way out for sending a signal that Musharraf fought tooth and nail for Kashmir. There was also a belief that Vajpayee can be made to agree something, what bureaucrats would not agree.

  Initially Pakistan sent positive signals. While Musharraf, Brig Rashid Qureshi, has right hand man and official spokesman, ambassador Jehangir Qazi and foreign secretary, Inamul Haque adopted soft approach, while leaving hard-talk to the known India-baiter, Abdul Satar, the Foreign Minister. On June 5, Musharraf in a speech admonished religious extremists and asked them not to make irresponsible statements against India. Musharraf went in the company of Lt Gen Aziz to Muridke, headquarters of LeT, asking them to hold their tongues till the summit was over. Foreign office made Maulana Fazlur Rehman (see box), the patron of Jehadis talk to a press gathering, comprising representatives from local English press and international media. His speech, prepared at the behest of foreign office, would sound music to even the extreme hardliners in India. Maulana, responsible for kidnappings of European tourists (Al Faran group) in Kashmir even claimed Musharraf can rein in Jehadis if he so wished. On June 8, Musharraf told a select panel of Journalists that he would be meeting Hurriyat only with Indian permission. Hurriyat leaders same day in New Delhi said that they were sceptical about the meeting. On June 18, Brig. Rashid Qureshi said, “General Musharraf is coming to India with an open mind and he will have no objection to whatever India wants to talk”. Foreign Secretary, Inamul Haq commented, “The summit between India and Pakistan will make every possible effort to continue the talks without indulging in rigidity”. Dawood Ibrahim was shifted out of Karachi. One report even said, he has been asked to stay in Saudi Arabia for the time being.

  Satar set the real agenda. He told Tim Sebastian of BBC TV that “the problem should be solved by taking into account the wishes of the people. That’s the new idea, the settlement of the Kashmir issue is linked to the Kashmiri people”. A day before, on June 15, India had protested strongly to Satar’s remarks that, ‘the region was sitting on a nuclear time-bomb’ due to unresolved Kashmir question. He had also asked India to come out of the “time-warp”. Earlier on June 4, Satar had opposed the proposal to freeze LoC. He told The News that ‘Status quo is the problem. It cannot be a solution. Solution to 50-year old Kashmir dispute had to be responsive to aspirations of Kashmiri people”.

  Stridency

  Subsequently, as the summit drew near Pakistan became more strident in its pronouncements. On June 23, Pakistan said the issue of granting most favoured nation status to India depended on the resolution of Kashmir question. Pakistan also said time for reining in Jehadis has not come as yet. On June 27, Musharraf claimed that India invited him for talks because of US pressure and attacks mounted by Islamic militants in Kashmir. He harangued that he would have no secret deal on Siachen, Kashmir or any other option and ruled out independence option. Musharraf added that he would try his best to meet Hurriyat leaders but there would be no confrontation with India over this issue. Musharraf also claimed that in his three telephonic conversations with Mr Vajpayee, the latter had given him to understand that Kashmir would be the main issue of agenda. He added that he had decided to go after sensing Indian leaders’ realisation to resolve Kashmir issue, which, as per him, was missing on earlier two occasion.

  Referring to the statements emanating from Indian leaders stating that Kashmir belonged to India, Musharraf said this vitiated atmosphere. He said Mr Vajpayee assured him the media was distorting statements. Musharraf continued that Vajpayee was categorical that at summit it would be Kashmir and all other issues and not vice versa.

  CBMs

  On Indian unilateral confidence Building Measures, Pakistan responded by raking up bogey of “sharp escalation in incidents of rape and molestation of women in Kashmir. It accused Indian forces of resorting to unprovoked firing at demonstrations, using human shields and clearing mine fields with ‘civilians’, including minors.

  “On summit eve, Musharraf resorted to demoggery again. He said, “LoC is the problem and not the solution. How can the problem be the solution. Kashmir is the only Confidence Building Measure. India was trying to deflect attention from the core issue by announcing the Confidence Building Measure’. He also called for inclusion of “Kashmiris” in the talks.

  So exasperated was Mr IK Gujral that he used the harshest language to snub Musharraf. Mr Gujral, whose Gujral doctrine justifies unilateral surrender of Indian interests to its neighbours, said, “He is talking as if he is marching in. He is not coming to a defeated country and it will not help matters if he adopts the tone and gestures of a commander-in-chief. He is holding pistol on India’s head”. Mr Gujral said Musharraf’s meeting with Hurriyat was an affront to hosts.

  Psychological Warfare

  Pakistan’s two other strategies were to a) launch a media blitz that summit was going to finalise demilitarization of Siachen, Chenab plan proposal and withdrawal of troops in Kashmir b) step-up the militant violence in Kashmir.

  Gulf News (June 18) said a secret deal on Kashmir was agreed on the lines of Dixon Plan. The Nation (June 22) wrote Islamabad was actively considering various proposals on Kashmir, including the so-called “Chenab Formula” and may go in for a ‘give and take’ to find a lasting solution to the long pending dispute with India. On June 29, Jamaat-e-Islami daily, Jasarat reported that three possible options would be considered to resolve the Kashmir issue during the coming summit meeting. It claimed that the foreign ministers of the two countries had also taken the big powers into confidence regarding these options during their recent visits. The paper said the summit could prove to be the beginning of a major breakthrough, Dawn quoted GHQ, Rawalpindi, saying that the initial focus will be on withdrawal of troops from Siachen and halting skirmishes on LoC. It added that General Musharraf was ready to ‘sell anything’ and ‘buy anything’ to achieve peace and cited defence burden in this context.

  Pakistan stepped up violence as the summit approached. Reports said that Pakistan was pushing more Pak army regulars and battle-hardened mercenaries. In the fortnight preceding summit there were as many as 197 incidents of violence, in which 108 militants and 38 security forces’ men were killed, 44 civilians also lost their lives. In June alone 217 militants were killed, highest in a month so far. Amarnath Yatra was attacked seven times. As per Ministry of Home Affairs there was massive infiltration in Kupwara, Poonch and Rajouri sectors during the last one month. The same reports confirmed that ISI had set-up new training camps for terrorists in PoK and mercenaries had been asked to build fortification in higher reaches of Valley and the PoK. At an ISI sponsored meeting in Islamabad, Jehadi outfits were promised lavish funds. To mount pressure on India on the day of summit, Pakistan triggered 16 bomb-blasts in Akhnoor sector alone and engaged Indian troops in heavy firing at 9 places. During the three days of summit, violence graph was 76 killed (49 militants, 20 civilians, 7 security forces’ men). On July 11/12 there was a major infiltration bid to infiltrate dozens of militants in Hanjikoot in Tulel sector. Drass-Kargil sector was also activated for the first time since Kargil war. Suicide groups of Jehadis were also sighted on the outskirts of Jammu city. Heavy security bandobust foiled terrorist game-plan to stage massacres.

  ‘Possessed’ Man

  General Musharraf, during the summit behaved like a man ‘possessed’, pursued single point agenda and displaying what Indian foreign office was to characterize as ‘unifocal approach’. Musharraf during the six-hours sessions he had with Vajpayee talked only Kashmir. Even during one of the sessions, Pakistan staged drama of passing a note from Lt. Gen. Aziz to Musharraf, to allow Musharraf to claim that army hawks were against any concession on Kashmir. Pakistan, in the true essence of Jehadi diplomacy used media to the hilt to mount pressure on Indian side and to address the domestic crowd. Unabashedly Satar was to justify its use as ‘contemporary diplomacy’. Musharraf harangued liberally, while talking to editors of Indian newspapers. He compared Jehadi campaign in Kashmir to campaign of Palestinians thrown out from their homeland. Musharraf said, “why have we fought wars. It is all for Kashmir. We can’t live in a make-believe world and illusion’. He justified Kargil saying of what transpired during Bangladesh war in 1971. Musharraf, according to Indian delegation, even told Vajpayee that Pakistan would be forced to use ‘other methods’ to step up pressure if he did not yield on Kashmir.

  Cheap Tactics

  Pakistan even played the cheap tactics of bringing Advani vs Vajpayee-Jaswant Singh divide. Brig Rashid Qureshi talked of ‘invisible hand’ in an attempt to divide Indian opinion, and old Satar game. Musharraf sang praises of Vajpayee and Jaswant Singh saying, “Those leaders who look to a better future. It is unfortunate that the conclusion of the exercise was aborted. I now believe that Mr Vajpayee is hostage to the hardliners in his government. We will get nothing from the Indian government”. Even seasoned columnists like Ayaz Amir toed the official line. He wrote in Dawn, “The hardliners wanted to give nothing on Kashmir and even though Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh twice agreed, on both occasions he, and his Prime Minister, were vetoed by the hawks”. Pakistani journalists too made their contribution to Jehadi diplomacy. They did not spare even a lady official spokesman, when Indian government expressed its inability to make arrangements for Musharraf’s press conference. Indian journalists, then had to remind these journalists that they were in India and not in Pakistan. At Agra India had to taste the wrath of even ‘Jehadi’ journalists.
 

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