While it is possible to cite any number so instances from history about our defensive mind-set, it would be more relevant to confine this discussion to a few post-Independence moves. During the 1947-48 Kashmir war (initial hesitancy to act apart) when everything was going well for us we rushed to the UN and what followed is too well known to be repeated. To this day we continue to pay a heavy price. During the 1962 war with China we were totally paralysed and could not even reinforce the positions at Bomdilla etc and halt the Chinese advance and, come winter, pay them pack in equal measure. Instead we let 4 Infantry Division be decimated. We were equally scared to deploy the IAF, based on some imaginary fears, which otherwise would have made all the difference. Neither in 1965 nor in 1971 was the army tasked to recover maximum territory in PoK. Even before Tashkent, Kosygin had made the Indian PM agree to hand back to Pakistan the strategic Hajipir pass and other areas. At Shimla in 1972 we behaved as if we were the vanquished party. There was no quid pro quo for giving back to Pakistan large captured areas and release of 93,000 prisoners, not even return of 50-odd Indian prisoners. Thirty years later we are still pleading for their release. 

It was Rajiv Gandhi who made repeated efforts for a pact with Pakistan, not to attack each other's nuclear installations, whereas it was Pakistan who should have been pleading for such a pact; worried as it was about India's ability to strike Pakistani nuclear facilities in a matter of few minutes flying time, while Indian nuclear facilities were deep inside the country and difficult to reach. At Kargil our dithering to deploy the IAF, even within our territory, where our own heaviest artillery was relentlessly pounding the enemy which had invaded into our territory is one of a piece. Some informed circles tell us that we were concerned and worried about escalation of the conflict. However, it is not clear if these were the IAF's self perceived fears or that of the Government of India. Under such ambivalence and timidity, crossing the border to strike severe blows to the invader to deter him from such violations in the future was out of the question. More likely it was the perceived fear of nuclear conflagration, a fear on which Pakistan seems to play and get away with every type of aggression. The world may have applauded our restraint, but it is we who paid and continue to pay the price in lives and wasteful expenditure. 

Pakistan had been restrained from creating mischief of the type and scale as crossborder terrorism in J&K due to the larger Indian capability in conventional forces and the will to deploy these. Pakistan tried to negate this by acquiring nuclear weapons capability and capitalise on the Indian fear of a nuclear conflagration. It is this fear in the Indian political mind and our self appointed nuclear experts which emboldened Pakistan to send terrorists across the LoC in Kashmir and commit large-scale aggression at Kargil without any fear of retaliation. Pakistan is well aware of the fact that it can never exercise the nuclear option because the Indian response would result in its extinction; mad mullahs and military leadership are fully alive to this essential fact. Pakistan knows what nuclear deterrence is all about and it has operated this lever agains India with adroitness and finesse. India gives further airing to these fears by seeking no first use of nuclear weapons and the confidence building measures related to nuclear safeguards. This Indian fear psychosis has deprived it of its only viable deterrence, that is the threat of conventional force application against Pakistan to inhibit it from undertaking crossborder terrorism. India has driven itself in that unenviable position where it has no alternative but to let itself be bled slowly through these thousand cuts. It is pathetic to see a large and powerful country in so hopeless and helpless a state. Kashmir is as much a political problem as one with Pakistan, J&K problem needs to be addressed in this setting. 

More recently the unilateral ceasefire in J&K was a purposeless exercise. A ceasefire offer to our own misdirected people or insurgents is understandable but a ceasefire against foreign mercenaries who come across the LoC to kill our men, women and children makes no sense and was perceived as a sign of weakness and fatigue. Besides it threw up a whole range of wrong signals to the security forces in J&K on the one hand and to Pakistan and jehadi groups on the other. 

When we finally decided to hold talks with General Musharraf, the anti-terrorist operations should have been stepped up to a feverish pitch and state of alertness at our installations increased manifold; something we had been advocating in these columns. This did not happen and the General arrived in Delhi harbouring the impression that it was crossborder terrorism (freedom struggle according to him) which had impelled us to seek a dialogue. Under these conditions General Musharraf would have been least inclined to reach any reasonable understanding to cease crossborder terrorism or link it to any agreement at this stage and consequently insisted on the centrality of the Kashmir dispute or perhaps an issue; with due defence to Indian penchant for legalistic interpretation of words. 

Much has been written about the Agra talks. Absence of a structured agenda, inadequate preparations, the role of the media, it's lack of briefing by the Indian side, it's mismanagement, Musharraf having the media mughals for breakfast, his playing to the home constituency of mullahs, jehadis and the army and finally the mohajir angle and what not. The basic fact relates to the mindset of Pakistani political and military leadership and its people which is the result of 53 years of single point focus on Kashmir even when it has resulted in impoverishment of that country and is driving it back to the middle ages. Given this background, to have expected Musharraf to suddenly relegate the Kashmir dispute to the background, concealing it amongst a host of confidence building measures and economic issues, was unrealistic. No amount of sophistry and rationalization of Pakistan's response should distract us from this basic fact. 

The pertinent question is, how to proceed hereafter. In any future dialogue, Pakistan will remain "unifocal" on Kashmir. We have to convey to it, our sincere desire to address the Kashmir issue and seek a fair and workable solution. General Musharraf must understand the Indian position and what is feasible. Though India's claim on the whole of Kashmir cannot be questioned, but over time this main issue has been diluted and diffused. The three wars, return of captured areas in PoK and the existence of a Line of Control for so long has altered the position somewhat. Even so nothing should distract us from taking up the central issue of Kashmir. Before that we have to move into a position of advantage and gain the upper hand in our fight against crossborder terrorism. It is essential to make crossborder terrorism a costly proposition for Pakistan. There exist fertile grounds for fomenting trouble in Sind, Baluchistan and Northern Areas in equal measure. While we can handle trouble being created in J&K by Pakistan, the latter will be hard put to cope with what could possibly lie in wait for it in these provinces. As India bleeds, Pakistan must bleed profusely in this game. In other words when we take a seat at the table and talk, it must be from a position of strength. This approach becomes useful when negotiating with an unreasonable, obdurate and intransigent party. 

We can make Pakistan desist from direct involvement in this endless mischief and misdeeds in Kashmir only if we are able to make it pay for these nefarious activities; making it a painful exercise for it. That is possible if we shed this fear of conflict escalating and call off Pakistans' bluff of nuclear dimension to this conflict. Pakistan's mullahs and military leadership must be made to realise that we have their equals in this country too and any resort to use of nuclear weapons will be the end of Pakistan. It cannot hold Indian response to crossborder terrorism hostage to threat of escalation of the conflict and its descent into a nuclear scenario. Pakistan must be disabused of its perception that fear is the key to Indian response, in appropriate measure, to crossborder terrorism. Only then will the deterrence potential of our conventional force capability will work in halting crossborder terrorism. 

*The writer is a retired Lt. General.
 

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