Recent media reports including one in this
newspaper, indicate that an intelligence failure of Himalayan proportions
has taken place in the Surankote areas of the sub-Pir Panjal region in
J&K. If these reports are correct, the failure to know that jihadi
terrorists had infiltrated into a vast area more than 30-km deep behind
the Line of Control over the past few years amounts to a gross dereliction
of duty by the people concerned. The agencies responsible to a large
extent are obviously the State Police intelligence, the Intelligence
Bureau (IB) and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). The army's
intelligence services have no role in internal intelligence although their
signals intelligence assets were either inadequate or inefficient in
locating terrorist operations launched from this area.
It is true that everywhere in the world it is
intelligence failure that comes into spotlight far more than intelligence
successes. But that makes it all the more important to reduce the
potential errors and blindspots. Regrettably, intelligence failure had led
to the Pakistan army's aggression across the LoC at Kargil going unnoticed
for months and the need to vacate the aggression had cost hundreds of
young lives. The Kargil Review Committee had clearly highlighted this
aspect, and came under extensive criticism for its efforts. A task force
had been set up to look into the changes needed in our intelligence
system. This, in turn, had led to a range of recommendations of the Group
of Ministers to improve the management of national security. The Union
government had adopted the recommendations more than two years ago. These
reports, understandably, were not made public, but the common citizen has
the right to expect an improvement in the system after Kargil. The recent
revelations clearly belie those expectations.
What is perhaps equally worrisome is that our
policy makers seem to have ignored the true dimensions of the nature of
the war through terrorism that we have been facing for two decades. For
years, Pakistan, its intelligence agencies and jihadi groups have used
terror as a conscious strategy. Of late, Islamabad has come under severe
pressure to curtail infiltration across the frontiers. The inevitable
direction of policy by the jihadis then would be to shift their command
and control infrastructure inside India, especially in J&K. Such a
move provides Islamabad the basis for denying any role in the violence
perpetrated in the state. The government must immediately institute a
high-level inquiry into the latest evidence of the failure of its
intelligence and arrive at an assessment of Pakistani strategy. You just
cannot hope to fight terrorism without good intelligence.
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