‘Operation Sarpvinash’

Hill Kaka - A military or a political failure

KS Correspondent

The disclosures, made in the wake of launching of ‘Operation Sarpvinash’ regarding the extent of subversion well inside Indian territory, is a matter of shame and agony for all Indians. How the second largest army in world allowed a terrorist enclave, spread over hundred square kms, to come up, has shocked Indians. Hill Kaka represents a colossal military and a political failure. Many have drawn parallels between Hill Kaka and Kargil intrusion. Are there many more Hill Kakas that have still to engage the attention of the Army top brass?

Media reports said that the Intelligence Bureau had been warning Army continually to clear off the area, of nearly four hundred foreign mercenaries camping at Hill Kaka. The Army, as per these reports, had been ignoring these advisories. Terrorists had been ruling the area. The neighbouring nomadic population had been following their diktat out of fear or other considerations. Intelligence Bureau is further reported to have taken higher-ups in confidence about many such other areas, where terrorists hold total sway and were impairing troops' mobility along the major national highways. On Shopian, recently, an IB team was attacked, when its members were returning to their base camp.

The locals in terrorist-infested areas of Poonch-Rajouri and other places had been complaining that Army was no where to be seen during night hours. It would remain in bunkers and refuse to come out till morning. The general grievance is that soldiers do not respond at the time of crisis and take hours to reach. It has even been alleged that at times the soldiers allowed columns of terrorists to pass by their bunkers and ambush areas for they do not want to court trouble. Army would play safe to avoid casualties, was the general local assessment.

Officers commanding field units say that they had brought the matter to the notice of superior officers, but no counter measures were taken. The Army top brass discounts all this. It says the intelligence on presence of ultras in Hill Kaka was not backed by definite information. It has been trying to pass the buck to the political leadership, blaming it for withholding the use of air-cover for 'seek and destroy' operations and not meeting its demands for increased troop deployment. This fortnightly, in its November and December issues, had focussed on how abandoning of Pir Panjal areas by the Army, had multiplied security threats. Hill Kaka is thus a larger lapse, denoting the failure of strategic vision and political will. In a country, where elections are not contested, on the basis of security policies, political leaderships, even after committing major blunders, emerge unscathed.

Hill Kaka busted:

Hill Kaka base was busted by the Army in operations on April 21. It was only a month later that Army publicised details of the operation and its successes. The Army recovered 7000 kgs of stored rations, besides huge stockpile of weapons, ammunition, anti-personnel mines and explosives. The Army also laid its hands on sensational documents, which detailed the wider contours of subversion. Sitting in Hill Kaka, the terrorists communicated over satellite phones with their masters sitting across the border, and also with their agents in Aligarh, Mallapuram, Ahmedabad, Mumbai, Kolkata, Kanpur and Salem. Recovery of 20 kgs of urea and Internet IDs, as well as telephone diaries from killed terrorists indicated how the terrorists used to communicate and get orders from their bosses, as wireless messages are tapped by interceptors.

Rations were brought from the Surankote town, where the dealers and the porters were paid many times more to maintain the confidentiality. It is amazing how all this escaped the field intelligence units. Even the nomads who frequented the area had been paid handsomely to remain silent, sources claimed. Among other things the Army discovered full-fledged surgical facility for managing the casualties and a seal of a Kulgam magistrate to stamp forged identity cards.

The documents recovered included receipts of grocery shops and PCOs frequented by terrorists in Surankote. Among them is of a call made to Gandhi Nagar on September 23, 2002, a day before the attack on Akshardham temple. A killed terrorist had even photographed himself, while on 'sight-seeing' trip to Parliament House. Other documents recovered from Hill Kaka base include a register of accounts, giving details of money transaction worth Rs 1.87 crore between October 2001 and May 2003. Funds were being distributed from the base to various terrorist tanzeems.

Hill Kaka was a terrorist enclave that lorded over 100 square ksm. of strategic area, which comprised thick jungles and snow-bound ridges at 4,000 metres. It was a hub-where terrorists of all 'tanzeems' (groups) infiltrating from Pakistan were assembling before being sent off for missions unhindered. Several terrorist organisations, most notably, Lashkar-e-Toiba, were jointly using bases for planning, co-ordinating, transit and safe-keeping of arms. Meticulous records were kept documenting the arrival of infiltrators, their addresses, expertise, training, education and weaponry. A seized register revealed 183 arrivals of LeT alone in a seven month period in 2002. Of them 80 percent were Pakistanis. Many of the terrorists were post-graduates. Terrorist manuals found there suggested that the infiltrators were being trained in the handling of explosives and poisoning water sources. There were also sensational details on how Hill Kaka terrorists intended to engage in large-scale subversion in Mumbai, particularly in commercial nerve centers. The base was also being used for indoctrination of Kashmiri youth before they were exfiltrated into Kotli and various other terrorist training camps in PoK. The sheer magnitude of terrorist operations at Hill Kaka left the security forces stumped.

Fortifications:

Fortification built were military like and could be compared with similar ones built by Bin Laden near Jalalabad. The bunkers could with stand aerial and artillery attacks. Two bunkers had been constructed at the snowbound point 3689 at Derawali Ridge to take any challenger approaching from the Doba Gali access. One of the bunker measured 60 ft x 20 ft,  big enough for 50 terrorists. This area remains snow-bound until April. The Army also found signs of active involvement of Pak regulars in creating these fortifications. Terrorists fortifications were spread out on mountain tops to ensure they dominated the angle of fire. Concrete bunkers were also found in dense forests of Hari Budha, Faisalabad, Sangal, Shindra top etc. Terrorists would slither out of their remote Hill Kaka base to strike at their targets. Having wrought havoc, they would quickly retreat to their fortified underground hideouts in high hills. Hill Kaka dominates Surankote bowl and was a launching and strategic area for terrorists for disrupting communications and fomenting subversion in Kashmir valley.

A month after launching of 'Operation Sarpvinash' the Army claimed that it had only cleared 30 percent of the area and smashed 94 hideouts. 60 terrorists were killed, 290 escaped and three were captured. A command post 'Dhok', where all groups coordinated activity was also busted at Ban Labda. Army casualties were just two men killed.

Urgency:

Why did the Army wake up late? There has been some debate. It is said that in the context of ongoing Indo-Pak dialogue, to escape international censure, ISI is trying to shift the command and control of Jehadi infrastructure, well inside Indian territory. This could affect Indian manoeuverability in negotiations. Secondly, there was a looming threat of Pakistani army joining terrorists in Hill Kaka and adjoining areas to cut off supply lines to strategic Poonch area and snap the road link between Surankote and Poonch from one side and on Indian troops in Krishna Ghati that connects Poonch with Mendhar.

Frequent forays of Unmanned Air vehicles from across the LoC alerted Army to the threats that Pakistan may paradrop' its regulars and also provide aerial support to terrorists. Choppers can reach Hill Kaka from Cobra Hills on LoC in less than five minutes time. The Army top brass visualised that the threat was real and acted.

For last six years Army, despite precise information, sat quietly. Since 1989 Poonch-Rajouri served as transit points for infiltrators and exfiltrators. Hill Kaka is linked with Surankote, Bafliaz, Thanna-mandi on one side and on the other side it is linked via Chor Ghali to Shopian, Gulmarg and Yusmarg. In 1996-97 terrorists set up bases and bunkers here. Two and a half years back in 2001, 17 RR of Army had launched a similar operation. Even though 196 terrorists were killed, the army too suffered heavy casualties. It retreated subsequently. This emboldened the terrorists. They reoccupied the hideouts and their bases multiplied. In Poonch-Rajouri, conservative estimates put the terrorists' strength at 1100-1200.

In Hill Kaka area, the terrorists had bases spread to 35 villages. At the time of operation there were 350 terrorists.

‘Operation Sarpvinash’

Initially, at the time of launching of the operation the Army was unsure about its success. Utmost secrecy was maintained. It successfully persuaded the Central government to allow the use of Helicopter gunships, and increased deployment. The services of Srinagar-based Victor Force, which eliminated 20 of the 65 terrorists were enlisted. The State government was approached for stopping grazing population to black operational areas. A liberal compensation of Rs 7.5 crore was settled with nomadic Gujjars.

‘Operation Sarpvinash’, devised by Maj. Gen. Hardev Lidder of Rajouri-based Romeo Force, was planned in four phases. In Phase-I three helipads were built at 10000 feet. Mule tracks were laid over a distance of 16 kms. Supplies were stockpiled. This phase lasted from January 29 to April 1.

In phase-II the Army laid siege and firmed up bases, occupied on fringes of Hill Kaka. This continued until April 20. The Phase-III, which included assault began on the night of April 20. The operation started with 10,000 men, mobilised from ten battalions. The borders with neighbouring states were sealed. More security forces were deployed at Doda-Chamba border. The Phase ended on April 30. The Last Phase, to pursue 300 terrorists, who had escaped, began from May 1. This included search and combing operations. In the 'Operation Sarpvinash', Army used Bofors artillery and Helicopter gunships to smash the fortification of the terrorists. Chetak Helicopters were used to identify militant fortifications, hideouts and other places in hills. On May 31, Lt. Gen. TPS Brar, Commander 16 Corps disclosed that Army had plugged all escape routes of Pir Panjal range. He informed that the Army would lay roads to the would-be-hideouts and keep its men stationed permanently at the bases destroyed. He added six new Battalions of border youth would be raised to meet the terrorist challenge. The Army claimed that there could be ten Hill Kaka type enclaves in Pir Panjal ranges. Besides this, there were 80 odd rocky vestitudes and 120 natural cave hideouts, housing 1500-2000 terrorists. Presently, the Army said it was targetting 17 rocky vestitudes for clearance. It would be a long haul for Army to re-control Pir Panjal ranges, sources added.

Phase-III

Sources said when the first helicopter attack took place on April 15 by 13 RR, five terrorists were killed and there was absolute panic. A thirteen year old local boy, Mohammad Altaf, captured by the Army said, same night LeT “Divisional Commander” Idris convened a meeting and terrorists were instructed not to move out of bunkers. Within three days the terrorists changed their hideouts and shifted essential goods to a new place.

On April 21 night, 30 terrorists were killed and two local boys captured. Others fled to take refuge in local villages. The terrorists dumped their weapons and equipment to avoid detection. Many of them were Pakistani regulars and highly-trained mercenaries. The terrorists disguised themselves as 'Gujars'. The Army warned locals not to provide shelter to the terrorists and inform security agencies immediately. Intelligence agencies have recruited spotters to trace out terrorists.

Mohammad Bashir, a resident of Surankot and "Divisional Commander" of Jamiatul Mujahideen, arrested from Hill Kaka told Army that he escaped after 35 terrorists were killed, and others fled to Rajouri and Pulwama. This notorious terrorist had undergone seven months training in subversion in Afghanistan two years back and had also received training at Kotli where, he disclosed, 4500 terrorists were undergoing arms training at the hands of ISI experts.

Successes:

The Army during ‘Operation Sarpvinash’ achieved notable successes. Border guides, with whose help terrorists' infiltration was going on, went into hiding. Many hard-core terrorists were eliminated. This included a “District Commander” of HUJI, two hard-core Jaish terrorists, a a HUJI “Divisional Commander” and coordinator for Poonch, Rajouri and Udhampur, HUJI “Commanders” for Poonch and Rajouri.

Revenge Killings :

The terrorists, before the launch of operation had been targetting innocents, branding them as informers. One document seized listed ten “spies” from Poonch, whose throats were slit. This included two women and three children. One Choudhary Ghani, was cut to pieces in June, 1999. The launching of ‘Operation Sarpvinash’ has also seen decrease in the number of revenge killings. As compared to two incidents of revenge killings in Poonch sector, in the period May 6 to June 6 this year there were nine gruesome massacres/torture killings in Chingus-Budhal sector where there is heavy infestation of terrorists.

The Prospect:

The Defence establishment is slowly waking up to the challenge, posed by the domination of Pir Panjal ranges by terrorists. There are reports that terrorists even possess shoulder-fired stinger missiles. The Defence Minister, Mr George Fernandes, declared recently that Hill Kaka-like operations are to be carried out everywhere. Doda, Shopian, Kulgam, Tral, Lolab, Kupwara, Kokernag, have been targetted as the new areas for ‘Operation Sarpvinash-II.  Thrust of the new operations would be Wadhawan and Marwah, where terrorists even impart military training to locals. Ground-Sensors and hand-held thermals have been ordered to be issued to every battalion. Instructions to use Helicopters and special commando units have also been given.

Efforts are on to re-activate the disbanded SOG force and attach it to Rashtriya Rifles Units, engaged in counter-insurgency operations. Phasing out of BSF has been deferred till December. The success of ‘Operation Sarpvinash-II’ demands far greater political will and hard perseverance. 

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