The whole system has collapsed, says Rafiq Sadiq

Mr Rafiq Sadiq, vice-president of J&K PCC-I, is a disillusioned man today. His family dominated the state's political scene for nearly five decades, leaving behind a distinct mark on it. He belongs to the old school of politics, where politics meant service for the people and commitment to cherished values. Mr Sadiq believes that politics has degenerated beyond redemption. He is deeply pained by the ongoing turmoil in Kashmir and does not see any immediate end to it. His father, late GM Sadiq ruled the state for eight years from 1964 to 1972. Mr Rafiq Sadiq recently spoke to Kashmir Sentinel about men and matters in Kashmir's contemporary history. Excerpts of the interview:

'Karras' has been a political family. They have remained in the thick of politics both before and after 1947. How was this legacy transmitted to you?

RS: My grandfather Haji Abdul Gafar Wani and his brother Kh. Ahmedullah Wani were ahead of their times. They were politically conscious people and wanted Kashmiris to walk with their head high. The two were deeply concerned about the self-respect of Kashmiris.

A few year's prior to 1931 agitation there was a famine. Haji Abdul Gafar organised relief-work and at his own cost purchased grains, Karra. He may have organised some protests too. Maharaja's government ordered a 12 cane-charge punishment for him. As our family was a leading merchant family, dealing in Pashmina wool, he was able to influence leading notables of Maharaja. The punishment was condoned. In 1924 on silk-factory strike also, he had composed a poem. He knew Persian well. His takhlus was Farik. Later my father and uncle Mohidin were also actively involved in the anti-autocratic movement. Kh. Mohidin was a pioneer in the trade union work in Kashmir. He was the first to organise Municipal Workers' Union.

Later during Quit Kashmir Movement our house became the hub of political activities. Mohidin was chief dictator of the War Council. He remained underground for the entire duration of Quit Kashmir Movement. He was all the time at home only but the police could not locate him. Maharaja's troops would often come at 5 AM, lay a cordon of the locality and then go for searches. When they would leave, children would start drum-beating, to make fun of them. Children would also handle posters. My aunt, Zenab Begum first came in politics through Quit Kashmir Movement and delivered a speech at Khanqah. Two of my father's cousins, Kh. Abdul Rashid Wani and Kh. Ghulam Rasool Wani remained in jail for 18 months during this agitation. They were tortured and later shifted to Hira Nagar and Kathua jails. Politics thus became an integral part of our family. I grew up in this atmosphere.

KS: Where was Sadiq Sahib during the 'Quit Kashmir agitation'?

RS: Before the agitation was launched, Sadiq Sahib and Bakshi Sahib had been deputed to Lahore to mobilise the political support. Punjab unit of the Communist Party was a strong unit and father was quite close to the Punjab Communists. They had also to mobilise the press and raise funds from the friends to sustain the agitation in Kashmir. Some families, whose male members were in jails needed urgent financial help. Many NC workers, which included Sham Lal Watt, JN Zutshi, RC Raina, Sri Kanth Raina, Prithvi Nath Raina, Habibullah Zargar (Braroo), Ahsanullah, and others visited Lahore of and on to keep Sadiq Sahib and Bakshi Sahib in touch with the ongoing agitation. Late Dwarka Nath Kachru, who became Private Secretary to Pt. Nehru, would also go to Lahore on behalf of the party. Father returned to Kashmir only after the end of the agitation.

KS: How was Sadiq Sahib drawn to left politics?

RS: In 1930, my father went to Lahore to pursue higher studies. There he came in contact with the communist intellectuals. Balraj Sahni, Krishan Chander, Mr IK Gujral etc were all there at that time. After graduation, he went to Aligarh University for LLB. Messers Gh. Mohammad Chicken and Mirza Afzal Beg were his class fellows there. The latter was his room-mate as well. He returned from Aligarh in 1934 and fought elections to the Praja Sabha. He was elected as MLA alongwith Amashah Shahdad, Mirza Afzal Beg and Mian Yar.

KS: On the eve of accession Sadiq Sahib was deputed to Pakistan to hold talks with Muslim League leadership on State's future. Can you throw some more light as to what sort of discussions took place there?

RS: I must confess my father never made public the discussions which took place between him and the League leadership. He may have taken some people in confidence. Sadiq Sahib was sent because he had direct access to Mian Iftikharuddin. A former left-leaning Congressman, Mian Iftikharuddin was a senior leader in the League government. Through his good offices, Sadiq Sahib was able to meet Liaqat Ali Khan. The League leadership refused to commit itself on anything. They impressed  upon him to bring the entire working committee of National Conference, including Sheikh Abdullah to Pakistan to discuss State's future. Raiders at that time were already in Lahore and were busy looting the people. They had turned into a nuisance. Khan Abdul Qayom Khan wanted to push them forward. A few days later there was tribal raid. Sadiq Sahib returned along with other refugees from Lahore. Pakistan's game-plan was exposed. They were trying to lure NC leadership to Lahore and make them forcibly sign the instrument of accession. I do not know whether Sadiq Sahib kept the record of his Lahore meetings. Our family papers recently got destroyed in a fire incident. Among these were many files of old newspapers.

KS: What was your family's role during the Tribal Raid?

RS: As raiders made advances towards the Srinagar city, Pro-Pak elements and other vested interests in the neighbourhood tried to demoralise our family. They would tell our ladies, "Pakistanis are coming and will slaughter you people. It is better you leave Batmaloo." The whole of Srinagar was in turmoil. Male members in the family were involved in organising resistance to the raiders. Our ladies would confront them, saying, "Come what may. We will not leave Batmaloo. We will die here." Political culture had already evolved in our family.

Sadiq Sahib's maternal uncle, Ali Dar was Numberdar of Palhalan. Kh. Ali Dar arranged safe place for keeping the belongings and other valuables of Pt. Kanth Ram and other Pandit families. When the raiders came they threatened Ali Dar and asked him to hand over the valuables Pandits had kept with him. He told them their information was wrong and challenged them, "If you want to kill me I am ready". The Raiders occupied his big house to set up their headquarters. After Pandits returned, he handed them over their belongings.

During the raid Sadiq Sahib was instrumental in creating J&K Militia to push back the raiders. He was appointed its Chief Administrator (Emergency). Freda Bedi, Zenab Begum, Sajida Begum, Krishna Misri, Mehmooda Ali Shah, Jana Begum took active part in Women's militia. Brig. Usman would also come here to help in the training of militia men.

KS: Sadiq Sahib parted from Sheikh Abdullah in 1953. What were the differences?

RS: National Conference leadership headed by Sheikh Abdullah was gradually drifting and reneging on its earlier commitments. In 1952, at the behest of Sheikh Abdullah five-six meetings of working committee were held. He asked the working committee members to give their opinion in writing on the feasibility of options--accession to India, accession to Pakistan or independence. Members of the working committee included Maulana Masoodi, Mohidddin Karra, Budh Singh, Sham Lal Saraf, Sofi Mohammad Akbar, Bakshi Gh. Mohammad, GM Sadiq, Mirza Afzal Beg. Some endorsed accession to India. Few supported accession to Pakistan, but majority of the members tried to play safe by maintaining ambigrity. Even Bakshi did not voice his opinion clearly. Sadiq Sahib was the only member, who not only endorsed accession to India but also gave enough reasons to justify it. He plainly told Sheikh Sahib that Indian Army's presence was a reality and only an army can throw it back. Sadiq Sahib added neither he nor Sheikh Abdullah were capable of doing that. He reminded him accession to India was a conscious political decision on the part of National Conference and asked him to strengthen ties between Kashmir and India. Deliberations of the working committee remained inconclusive.

Sheikh Sahib ignored Sadiq Sahib's dissent. Political situation was deteriorating and the NC leadership was following a policy of drift. Sheikh Abdullah's new stance of maintaining ambiguity on accession and creating doubts against the Centre among the people and NC leadership led to political-uncertainty. This created an opportunity, and Pakistan began fully exploiting the situation.

Then there  was Sahyar incident in July 1953. A National Conference meeting had been organised at Nawakadal. It is not clear at whose behest the meeting had been organised. Sheikh Abdullah had been watching the proceedings from a nearby school. When Mohidin Karra asked the audience, "What do you want". 50-60 people got up and said they wanted Pakistan. Mohidin told them he too wanted Pakistan. The people later formed a procession which finally terminated in Civil Lines area. It created commotion in the Valley and the Central leadership was perturbed. The same Mohidin Karra had opposed earlier reconversion of NC into Muslim Conference and scolded my father when he wanted to attend a reception for Jinnah in 1945.

KS: What was the impact of Sheikh Abdullah's dismissal? Was it avoidable?

RS: Its impact was disastrous. Majority of the rank and file and the leadership went with Sheikh Abdullah. They went to jail with him. It was only later that many of them were weaned back. The split led to a division among the pro-Indian forces. It took some time to repair the damage. For many days Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, the new Chief Minister did not dare to come out of his house. For the whole of August it was a curfew like situation. On 16th August, my father organised the first meeting of his committed workers at Grindlays Bank. They had come in a procession from Batyar, Alikadal. This created hope among those who were as yet reluctant to side with  the new government. Bakshi had no will to face the situation. Sadiq Sahib and his left group played a crucial role in reversing the situation. There was total polarisation. It was clash between the left and the pro-American elements.

Retrospectively I feel there could have been other ways to deal with the worsening situation. Centre could have shown more patience. Its mission to send Maulana Azad had failed due to cold-shouldering by Sheikh Abdullah. Still there was some scope to persist with the efforts. Sheikh's removal looked like a coup. Internal factional struggle also played a part in forcing the pace of events. I feel it was a hasty decision. Secondly, after the dismissal, where was the need to put him behind the bars for so long. It created hostility among people. Had Sheikh Abdullah been released immediately, he would have lost much of his popularity. We turned him into a hero.

KS: Launching of Democratic National Conference was a defining moment in Kashmir's contemporary history. It was the first attempt to introduce competitive politics in Kashmir, democratise it and bring people of the Valley closer to national mainstream. How do you look at DNC's role?

RS: Sadiq Sahib had clarity of political conviction. He was totally opposed to antidemocratic practices and arbitrary governance. Kashmir had no democracy. Freedom and the benefits which people enjoyed under Indian constitution were not available to Kashmiris. Judiciary was state sponsored and judges were appointed by the state government. The financial institutions and the election commission in the state had no accountability because there was no supervisory control of the Central institutions. This hit the common man hard. Rigging in elections crossed all limits. Majority of the candidates could manage uncontested return. State Election Commission had no credibility. Permit system had hit the shawl merchants hard. They had to seek certificate of good conduct from the local halqa president of NC. The merchant would be coerced to sell his merchandise at a throw away price to the halqa president. NC halqas became dens of corruption.

Soon after Sheikh Abdullah's dismissal, Sadiq Sahib and his group began voicing opposition to the corrupt and repressive policies of Bakshi. Concerns of Sadiq Sahib are eloquently reflected in the Sadiq-Bakshi correspondence. The left group stood for a humane governance that carried legitimacy with the people. This inner-party struggle was going on, when distribution of portfolios and the defeat of the official candidate GR Renzu forced Sadiq Sahib and his group to walk out of NC and float DNC.

DNC demanded financial integration, extension of Supreme Court, and labour laws to the state. It also called for abolition of Permit system and bringing State's election commission under the control of Central Election Commission. DNC members in the state assembly vociferously pleaded for these measures. Outside the assembly it built up a strong people's movement to put pressure on the state and the Central government. It was a people's movement. Kashmiris were demanding the rights enjoyed by other people under the Indian constitution. We were successful. Bakshi was initially hostile but later on yielded under pressure of the democratic movement. The bill to extend central laws was passed in 1962. People reacted very favourably. For closer integration at administration and economic level, political integration was essential. National Conference was rechristened as Congress and nomenclature of Prime Minister and Sadr-e-Riyasat were also changed.

KS: Sadiq Sahib ruled the state for eight years. What set his administration apart from others?

RS: He assumed Chief Ministership on February 28, 1964. There were three main elements in his governance. One, he was a liberal democrat, who respected political freedom of others. Soon after he took over he released Sheikh Abdullah and other political prisoners, including Maulana Masoodi, Mohiddin Karra, Mohd. Shafi Qureshi and Maulana Farooq. Hazratbal conspiracy case and other cases were withdrawn and free atmosphere was created. Curbs on the freedom of press were also lifted. Late Shamim Ahmed Shamim launched 'Aina'. It wrote powerful articles against ministers and the government, yet there was no political pressure.

Secondly , Sadiq Sahib had clear vision on the role of bureaucracy. He did not want it to become a law unto itself and favoured its accountability to the political leadership of the government. At the same time he made their authority strong by insulating the officials from local pressures for doing a wrong action. After he took over, he called all the DCs and SPs and issued clear instructions, "Don't  tolerate any interference by local MLA. Only leader of the legislature can issue orders." This gave authority to DCs and SPs. It was on the strength of this administration that he could rely to defeat Pakistan's game-plan in 1965. Sadiq Sahib also had great respect for institutions. Once a youngman came weeping to him for redressal of grievances. Sadiq Sahib told him "Males don't weep. You speak with courage. I will try to redress your grievance. If I am unable to do it, you can knock at the doors of the court for justice." Thirdly, Sadiq Sahib made administration responsive to the needs of the people and tried to limit the scope for corruption.

In the wake of Holy Relic Theft agitation, the administration was in shambles. Within a few months he put it back on the rails and restored the authority of the government. It was not a simple task. Shopkeepers replaced the faulty weight measures due to the fear of the government. Feature programme 'Zoona dab' was started to get the feedback from the people. Sadiq Sahib himself gave directions to late Som Nath Sadhu to make the programme a link between people and the government. He would listen every morning to 'Zoona Dab'. People wrote their problems to 'Zoona Dab' and the programme would highlight these. Immediate remedial action was taken by the administration. 'Zoona Dab' programme became extremely popular. People felt the impact of administration. Justice was speedy. They appreciated positive political interference. Sadiq Sahib tried to see that honesty values percolated down and succeeded to some extent. As the head of the administration was honest, no official dared to indulge in corruption. Sadiq Sahib never compromised on the issue of corruption or favouritism, even when it involved his ministers.

KS: How could state government so easily defeat Pakistan's game-plan in 1965?

RS: There was strong political leadership in the state government which was clear about the tasks. Sadiq Sahib had created an administration that knew its responsibility. JKAP played a commendable role in nabbing Pak saboteurs. Sadiq Sahib's and DP Dhar's sound political leadership made it possible to defeat the Pak game-plan at a very low cost. DP Dhar assumed the task of guiding Indian Army, while Sadiq Sahib worked on the political front. The notable role was played by Mir Lasjan, Rehat Mir, Abdul Ghani Namthali and Mir Mustafa among others. They personally moved with the army as guides and due to this notable successes were achieved.

In 'Operation Gibraltar' Plan, it was the Pak army in civies which had to do the fighting, while Kashmiris had to arrange only food and transport. Sadiq Sahib launched a political campaign to educate people. Late Bansi Parmu organised painting shows. Political rallies were organised to make people aware about the real designs of Pak infiltrators. As a sound administrator Sadiq Sahib ensured that supporters of infiltrators are crushed with a heavy hand. He also did not want to leave any scope for hearsay. He told the people that if they passed on wrong information based, on hearsay, they will be punished, and rewarded in case they came up with reliable information. This approach worked wonders. There was immediate action because of correct information. Pak infiltrators were eliminated within no time.

Sadiq Sahib during his tenure contested politics of both, Jamaat Islami as well as Plebiscite Front. During his time also Jamaat Islami ran its Darsgahs. He called their leaders and firmly told them to limit the role of these schools to just imparting religious education. Sadiq Sahib did not encourage Jamaat and told its leaders that he will not allow them to spread the poison of fundamentalism. After Sadiq Sahib's death, Syed Ali Shah Geelani delivered a speech highly  critical of him in the State Assembly.

Similarly he did not allow politics of Plebiscite Front to go unchallenged. In 1966 Sadiq Sahib decided to hold Panchayat elections. Mirza Afzal Beg threw a challenge that Plebiscite Front would not allow the holding of these elections. Syed Mir Qasim was unnerved. Sadiq Sahib announced, "We will hold elections. Anybody who creates hurdles will be dealt according to law". This silenced the Plebiscite Front. Panchayat elections took place as usual.

By and large the national press took a very positive view of Sadiq Sahib's reign. Initially, Indian Express wrote critical stories but as things settled down, it too wrote positively.

KS: Can you throw some more light on your father's differences with DP Dhar and Syed Mir Qasim. What was Centre's role in all this?

RS: Differences and dissent are part of democratic functioning and there is nothing unusual about it. After 1967 Pandit agitation, Sadiq Sahib changed DP Dhar's portfolio from Home to Education. This was not liked by DP Dhar. He called on Sadiq Sahib and told him, "I have served enough in the state. I have a desire to go somewhere as an ambassador". Father asked him if he was speaking from his heart. Dhar Sahib replied in affirmative. Sadiq Sahib talked to Mrs Gandhi and Dhar Sahib was appointed as Indian ambassador to Soviet Union. When orders were issued, DP Dhar developed cold feet but Mrs. Gandhi did not relent.

Syed Mir Qasim is responsible for sowing the seeds of dissidence in Congress. The other disservice he did was to bring Jamaat Islami in the Legislative Assembly. Our own candidates were got defeated. It was a major tactical mistake. Mr Qasim had argued with Centre that India would be on a better footing if Jamaat Islami countered fundamentalist politics of Pakistan in State Assembly. This was a bizarre logic. Due to this alliance Jamaat cadres in large numbers gained entry into Civil Secretariat and other offices. The problem today is with this administration how can you fight the subversive war. Sadiq Sahib and Qasim Sahib often went for morning stroll together. He would try to convince Qasim Sahib about  Jamaat's politics and policy of liberalisation.

Differences between Sadiq Sahib and Qasim Sahib cropped up when the latter developed ambitions of replacing Sadiq Sahib. I cannot say with certainty which side Mrs Gandhi supported but CPI's threat on the change put her on guard. When dissidents went to meet her in Delhi, she told them, "the question of the change of leadership would be decided inside the Congress Legislature Party and in J&K". Sadiq Sahib also conveyed his unhappiness to Mrs. Gandhi when Plebiscite Front leaders were externed in 1969. He told her, "you did not ask me. Sheikh Abdullah had to come here. I could deal with him here".

KS: Was 1975 Indira-Sheikh Accord a step forward or a step backward. Please Comment?

RS: I don't understand what we gained from it. Militancy emerged only after that. When Plebiscite Front worker, who had been shouting, "Yeh Kashmir Mera Hai, Iska Faisla Hum Karengeh" turned into National Conference worker, there was no change of heart and mind. He continued to believe in old politics. The only difference was that now he was part of the power structure.

Secondly, accord did not strengthen the democratic tradition. It would have been better had there been elections in which NC and Congress would have been the rival contenders. Alternately, Sheikh Abdullah could have joined the Congress and become the leader of Congress Legislature Party. We did not play our cards positively.

KS: What do you think contributed to militancy? How far is NC responsible?

RS: At the local level there are three factors responsible. Patronage to fundamentalist politics by Qasim regime helped Jamaat Islami to spread its political network and make strong inroads into the administration. Secondly, bad governance with corruption, nepotism and favouritism as its main principles, led to widespread resentment among the people. Merit was totally ignored.

Thirdly, National Conference ignored the ongoing subversion. Sheikh Abdullah was a towering personality. As long as he was alive, everything remained hidden. After his death, pro-Pak elements defied the state authorities openly. It is unfair to put the blame on NC for involvement in militancy. Other parties are not saints. All parties are guilty on this score.

KS: Do you have a road map for normalcy in Kashmir? What has been the Centre's role?

RS: I do not see any ray of hope, because the whole political system has collapsed. Corruption has taken deep roots at all levels--administratively, politically and socially. Nobody is interested in serious positive work. There has also been a collapse of ideology. Every government wants to pass time and push the buck to its predecessors. There are quarrels over the berths and portfolios. Politics, which implies service of the people, does not exist anymore. Forums and NGOs have become part of big business and political corruption.

The Centre is equally guilty for the drift in J&K. Whenever we tried to bring home to Central leaders, the dangerous situation that was developing they would ask us to 'give in writing'. Who would like to endanger his personal security? Immediately after 1986 and formation of Muslim United Front, a delegation of State Congress leaders met the Union Home Minister and apprised him about the situation. The Centre had no will to act nor any understanding of the problem. Mr Narsimha Rao, after the expiry of his term as Prime Minister told me, "I was mislead". He did not visit Kashmir valley even once. Central government's interaction remains restricted to state government and few high officials. They have no ears to the ground to know how the common Kashmiri feels about everything.

KS: What are your views on greater autonomy to J&K?

RS: National Conference has been never serious about the autonomy demand. It has no politics and hence relies on these slogans. It has not been able to convince the NDA government of which it is a partner, as to how this demand helps the people of the state. If at all NC is seriously worried about the welfare of Kashmiris, let it come forward and play the role of responsible opposition by articulating the day to day problems of the people. It is simply not bothered.

KS: Who is responsible for Kashmiri Pandits' exodus? How can they be restored back to their homeland? Is the new government really serious about their return?

RS: In the wake of militancy the whole system, which could protect Kashmiri Pandits, broke down. How could they have continued to stay on? On one side they faced threats of militants, while on the other the government was incapable of protecting them. The second factor is that the fundamentalist political indoctrination over the years has created a communal divide, which facilitated the exodus. There were pro-Jamaat elements in political parties and administration. How could this system provide protection to Kashmiri Pandits?

Lastly, I must confess that we did not  play our role as individuals or as political activists. In 1947 at the time of tribal raid we mobilised people with slogans of 'Hamlavar Khabardar, Hum Kashmiri Hai Tayar'. This created confidence among Kashmiri Pandits and made the majority community conscious about its responsibility towards the minority. What has been our contribution this time? We said 'Pandits have left, OK'. Later on some Muslims also had to flee due to the militant threats. No political leader cared about Pandits or the consequences of exodus. Every party abandoned Pandits to their fate.

Kashmiri Pandits cannot return till there is complete restoration of normalcy. Every other day people in the Valley are being singled out and butchered. The yardstick for return of normalcy is when the Chief Minister can visit downtown Srinagar without his commandos and other security.

Return of Kashmiri Pandits at this juncture is not practicable. If at all people have to visit Khir Bhawani and Mattan, you can expand the infrastructure for extended stay during festivals. This return plan lacks sincerity.

Lastly, Pandits' return is not possible unless there is a social rapprochement. Fundamentalist politics has created a social divide. You have also to create stakes for Pandits' return i.e. jobs, restoration of property and business, etc. If you are serious about Kashmiri Pandits' return, then these issues have to be seriously addressed. I can assure you that at the level of common man there is yearning for return of Pandits. Their exodus has created a vacuum. The migration of teachers has caused a tremendous setback to the education system in the Valley. No Kashmiri can forget the contribution of Pt. Sat Pal Razdan in this field. But political activists are not interested. They confine themselves to issuing statements on Pandits' return. I again reiterate what are we contributing in facilitating return of Pandits? There is total collapse of politics, no inner party discussions. You visit the offices of different political parties. Except for the paid staff, you will find no political worker there. At the level of Centre, there is total lack of appreciation about exodus and the return issue.

KS: What is your message to Kashmiris?

RS: The difficult period we are passing through demands that all political activists, students, social activists should come forward to see that J&K comes out of this mess. Persons with clean image have to shoulder the responsibility of leading them.