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LARGEST
CIRCULATED ENGLISH MONTHLY OF J&K
A News Magazine of Kashmiri Pandit Community |
| | Home | August 1st-31st, 1999 | |
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VOL. 5, NO: 13-14 Part 1 of 2 Go to Part 2 of 2 EDITORIALOPERATION MUSHTARITHE descalation of War in Kargil has been followed by the worsening of the groundsituation in the Kashmir Valley. Terrorist groups have begun taking on paramilitary forces and army directly. During the last 10 days there have been more than 15 attacks on the camps of security forces, resulting in more than 30 deaths of the security personnel. These attacks had an element of surprise and point that the ISI has been able to build a highly efficient underground command structure for subversion. Planting of car bombs and IEDs have become a common occurence even in the high security zones of Srinagar city. Convoys of armed forces are being targetted under a definite plan. Counter-insurgents’ and political activists’ killings have also seen a sharp increase. Reports say that during the last two months ISI has pushed more than 2000 mercenaries into the Kashmir Valley, while another 3000 have been massed along the border for infiltration. It would be naive to think that the escalation of terrorist violence is simply aimed at disrupting the election process or is an act of desperation on the part of Pakistan in the aftermath of debacle in Kargil. A close look on the operation topac reveals that the new qualitative upgradation represents a higher phase i.e., Zarb-e-Kamil/ Operation Mushtari Phase. The main features of this higher phase have been outlined as repeating Kargil type intrusions in different parts of J&K to occupy lateral valleys, engaging Indian armed forces directly to create multiple fronts within, use of remote controlled land mines to make highways and movement of security forces unsafe etc. Pakistan under a plan is raising the political and military cost for India in this proxy-war. There are three imperatives for India to counter this Operation Mushtari. One to stop the infiltration of subversives from across the border. It means creating a 5 kilometer seucirty belt with effective mining of the borders. Second the strategic protection of the highways. And lastly the element of surprise has to be snatched from the terrorists. India must go on offensive against the foreign mercenaries on the pattern followed by Britishers in their Malaya campaign. Any dithering on these imperatives can be highly deterimental for our security stakes in Jammu and Kashmir. Minorities in J&KEVOLVE A ‘DOCTRINE OF SURVIVAL’By Dr. Ajay ChrangooSECESSIONISM IN BORDER STATESThe secessionist movements have been the characteristic of only the borderstates in India. And without exception such states either have a non-Hindu population as the majority social group or the dominant Hindu identity has suffered a crippling erosion over the years. The importance of the absence of secessionist tendencies in the main heartland in maintaining the Unity of India cannot be overemphasised. The political culture as has evolved in the mainland India has in many ways than one contributed to the growth of secessionism in the border states as also the marginalisation and exclusion of Hindu minority groups living there. While as the growth of separatism in North-Eastern states can be mainly attributed to socio-economic reasons as will as concerted campaigns to bring about dilution and cultural alienation of Hindu social groups, same does not hold true for the growth of secessionism in the northern border states of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. The patronisation and legitimisation by the Indian State and the mainstream political establishment of the religious-subnationalism in these two states has created a situation where secessionist politics has assumed international ramifications and an intense war from within. CLEANSING OPERATIONS IN J&KThe dimensions of this internal war have frightening proportionsparticularly in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Hindu minority in this border state has borne the main brunt of this war. Suffering a systematic process of ruthless marginalisation and exclusion since independence, the Hindus in the Jammu and Kashmir State are now face to face with an attrition of genocidal proportions. Terrorist operatives in this state, unlike Punjab, are of the nature of a demographic assault. Indian State as well as political mainstream have yet to acknowledge this stark reality. Kashmir valley has already been cleansed of its Hindu population. Continuing massacres of the Hindus in Jammu province are neither a diversionary tactic employed by the terrorists nor a sign of their desperation under the supposed pressure mounted by the security forces. They have a very clear cut objective of bringing about a blatant demographic change not just in some parts, but in the entire Jammu region. ‘Cleansing operations’ in the form of selective or mass killings of Hindus form only the obvious component of the demographic assault in the state. The less talked about, but not so hidden, components are engineered purchase of land and properties in targeted areas of Jammu region, fraudulent and illegal grab of Hindu properties and most significantly the demographic invasion, of Jammu city. Creating a ‘New Jammu City’ with a transformed demographic profile, relegating the existing city to the backyards, is no longer being talked in hushed tones. These demographic campaigns besides being crucial to the Islamisation of the state to facilitate extension of Muslim power further towards east have also immediate implications. Such machinations narrow down the social support base for India in the state, thus critically impairing the leverage of the Nation in any negotiated settlement in the light of mounting international pressures to settle the Kashmir issue. Efforts of the entire nation to stand up to concerted international pressures on the Kashmir issue stand nullified in the long run if the demographic character of the state is allowed to be transformed at a pace at which it is happening in the present time. Dispersal of displaced Kashmiri Pandits from Jammu to other parts of the country, regular internal displacement of Hindus from the vulnerable border areas of Jammu province to smaller towns as well as the main Jammu city should ring the alarm bills loud enough for evolving a more comprehensive thinking on the issue. Strategic thinking should take a serious notice of the fact that even though Indian security prowess may be able to enforce a status quo on the borders but as a result of this blatant change of demographic profile of the state the borders of the nation are very in-conspicuously receeding back. RESPONSE OF INDIAN STATEThe response of the Indian State to this serious development since 1989 canbe at the most termed as an approach of mere ‘physical retention’ of Hindus. The main features of this policy of retention are that: i) it seeks to maintain pluralism in the state only in symbolic terms. Attempts at the phased return of the displaced Hindus is a classical example of this symbolism. ii) it ignores the reality that Hindus in the state in general, and in vulnerable pockets were they are having not a significant presence in particular, are the basic targets of destabilisation. iii) attacks on Hindus in the state continue to be visualised in terms of attempts to vitiate communal atmosphere in the mainland rather than in terms of effecting a demographic transformation of that particular area and pushing back the civilisational frontiers of the nation. iv) it seeks to discourage fresh displacement only through administrative coercion in the form of presenting a fiat accompli to the victims that displacement may bring a worse situation of economic ruin and wilderness. The victim is presented a choice between devil and the deep sea. It is no exaggeration that Hindus in Jammu
and Kashmir constitute the SURVIVAL DOCTRINEIt is time that problems of minorities in the State of the J&K are addressednot in piecemeals and puny political posturings. Indian State can no longer afford to shy away from evolving a comprehensive ‘Doctrine of Survival’ for minorities in the Jammu and Kashmir State. Any delay in its formulation may only imperil the minorities with serious implications for overall security integrity and stability of the already weakened northern frontiers of the Indian nation. This security Doctrine should form one of the main components of India’s Kashmir policy and should be based on the specific threats to the minorities in the regions of the state they inhabit. It also should take into account the role of political elites in the state towards the survival and development of the minorities. The main presumptions for this security doctrine have to be as: a) No
protection measure for the minorities under assault in the state can The father of the nation had opined
helplessly in 1934 that a Hindu prince TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING THE WARBy Dr Ajay ChrungooKARGIL intrusion has raised an array of fundamental questions about thefunctioning of our intelligence set up, strategic thinking to political decision making. Terms of reference of the Committee declared by the Prime Minister to go into the various aspects of Kargil intrusion are broad enough to answer these questions. Only if the committee applies itself with integrity and the political leadership plays just a facilitator’s role. However the process of such an introspection may still fall short of the desired objectives of making nation wiser to evolve a comprehensive response to the Pak mechinations. The reason is the reluctance which the Indian nation state has been showing in qualifying the ‘war form’ Pakistan has unleashed. The nation has to come to terms with this ‘war form’ if the aftermath of Kargil intrusion, which marked the upgradation of Pakistani agression at all levels, is to be handled properly. WAR FORM AND DEFECTIVE STRATEGIC PARADIGMThe commonly used terminogologies for the Pakistani aggression of variousforms during last decade have been ‘Proxy-war’ and ‘undeclard war’. Prox-war term, which is more commonly used, squarely fails to qualify the nature of this war because it creates a misleading impression about the instrumentalities used in this war. The human factor involved through such a qualification, becomes an element devoid of any will, conviction as well as independence of action. Focus remains primarily on the external element. The ‘undeclared war’ terminology is also grossly inadequate, but does at least qualify one attribute of the ‘war form’ which is that the initiator of the aggression maintains a leverage of deniability and never formally owns the responsibility for the aggression. Both the nomenclatures are the product of the extant strategic paradigm of a low-intensity conflict which is neither able to perceive the gradual upgradation of the aggression at various levels from within nor visualise and pre-empt the quantum leap in the conflict from without. These commonly used qualifications of Pakistani war also do not encompass the various components of the aggression as well as its objectives long term or short term. In the aftermath of Kargil intrusion the experts on strategic concerns however, appear to be getting conscious of the limitations of the existing paradigm on security issues. They have infact become highly critical of it. ‘A Kashmir policy must be invented supported by an operational doctrine that will persuade Pakistan to respect the ‘sanctity of LoC’, comments major Gen. Ashok Mehta a military expert of repute. Another analyst on strategic affairs Raja Menon reflects similar concerns while trying to explain reasons for Kargil intrusion. “A range of faulty signals from India created not so much by bad nuclear strategy but absence of any strategy conventional or nucler”. QUALIFICATION OF THE WAR FORMThe deputy director of Institute of Defense studies and Analyses C. UdayBhaskar, one of the best known defense experts, describes the complexity of the war by Pakistan in Kashmir as, “Kashmir symbolises a large range of issues including terrorism, low-intensity coflict, concept of Jehad, Islamic terror and also the patterns of ISI’s destablising designs in different parts of our country.” This statement, even though a little overlapping in its content, takes into account the broadest spectrum of attributes of the Paki-war. More specifically the Pakistani aggression against our nation for last two decades constitutes three forms of assaults-subversive, demographic and territorial. The distinguished political scientist from Kashmir, Prof. MK Teng hits the core of the issue when he describes the undeclared war as the ‘War of Subversion’. The aftermath of Kargil intrusion provides the defense and strategic analysts of our country a very conducive national environment to go into various aspects of the failure which led to the intrusion in Kargil. It also provides a very excellant and crucial opportunity to understand the nature of the war being waged by Pakistan in its totality. Kargil intrusion constituted the interplay of all the three forms of assaults-subversive, demographic and territorial. Before the intrusion we have seen the interplay and impact of only the subversive and demographic assaults. Inspite of the much drummed up Shia-Sunni divide a very significant part of the logistics for the Kargil intrusion was provided by the subversives within. Kargil crisis had also a very significant implication of rendering the security and manitainance of Kargil town untenable creating the potential for a severe demographic pressure on the Buddhist majority Leh. The territorial implications of the intrusion have been throughly debated and the dangers to entire Ladakh region highlighted. The atypicality of the military operations in Kargil have been summed up by another expert on strategic analyses Sh Sreedhar, “for the first time in post independence India, the armed forces are fighting two types of armies of Pakistan. It is becoming clear that Pakistan’s regular army from Northern Light Infantry Divisiion is in action. At another level the Indian army is also fighting a regular-irregular army raised by Pakistan during the last two decades.” WAR OF SUBVERSION-ATTRIBUTESThe war by Pakistan as already discussed comprises of three main components- subversive, demographic and territorial. However, the subversive component constitutes core of the entire ‘war form’. a) Basic objective:- Basic objective of this war form is purely ideological. Pakistan is an ideological state with a proclaimed incompatibility with Indian nation state. This incompatibality is not Kashmir specific as commonly believed. Kashmir is only an alibi for expansion of Muslim power towards east taking the entire Himayalan barrier into its fold to ultimately overwhelm India. The Comments of one of the leading authorities on contemporary Islam John Laffin should make our strategic analysts stand up and ponder, while they formulate approaches to deal with the Pakistani aggression. Laffin says, “The Sunni Muslim code of civil legislation according to Hanfi School of Islamic Law expresses the matter clearly. The Jehad is the normal and permanent state of war between the Muslims and the people of Dar-al-Harb, the code points out. It can end only with domination over the unbelievers and the absolute supermacy of Islam throughout the world. All war like acts are permitted on the territory of the infidels ... As it is not feasible to fight against all the infidel people simultaneously, Jehad allows for the eventuality of a provisional suspension of hostilities. Such unavoidable truces constitute another form of holy war for they serve to reinforce the military potential of Darul-Islam.” b) Interim objectives:- This war of subversion, conditioned by its basic objectives, has interim objectives. The major flaw in our national discourse on security issues is that it continues to be territory centric. For an unconventional war we have been applying a conventional approach. This paradigm has lead to our failure to appreciate the non-territorial objectives of Pakistani aggresson in general and Kargil intrusion in particular. Strategic thinkers within this country and outside have regarded Kargil intrusion as a high quality military operation of ‘ingenuity’. Tony Clifton who had reported 1971 war between India and Pakistan on both sides comments, “Ironically it has really been a brilliant operation on the part of the Pakistanis, but they can never say so, that is horribly for their morale.” Indian military experts have also openly complimented this operation from the point of view of military standards. Ironically there is a simplistic generalisation being offered in this country that the Pakistani think tank behind Kargil Operation was surprised by the high intensity response from India. We are spending two crores a day for defending a very remote area of Ladakh - the Siachin Glacier, and even had successfully repelled more than a dozen bids to capture it in the year preceeding Lahore diplomacy. Yet we tend to believe that on the other side people were stupid enough not to judge our reaction even when the entire Srinagar-Leh axis was being jeopardised. It is time our strategic analysts accord due respectibility to such objectives of Kargil intrusion which have been articulated but only in a way that they appear to be incidental to the main objective of endangering the entire Ladakh region. These objectives are essentially non-territorial from the short term perspective. For example through the operation in Kargil, besides inflicting a heavy cost on India Pakistan has also probed various strategic thresholds. Specifically Kargil intrusion has lowered the threshold for international intervention and at the same time raised the threshold of Indian conventional reponse.But more importantly the intrusion has aimed to create a favourable environment for Dilution of Indian Sovereignty in Jammu and Kashmir. In the prelude to Kargil intrusion Pakistan’s support to district-wise plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir state and almost simultaneous floating of proposals for reorganising the Indian part of Jammu and Kashmir on communal lines with Indian control only on three subjects of defence, communication and foreign affairs, are perhaps not incidental happenings. During as well as after the Kargil operation we are witnessing the veering round of the so called moderate liberal opinion both in Pakistan and India around various variants of the Dixon-Plan advocated vigorously by US think tanks on Kashmir. Pakistani analyst Ayaz Amir’s remarks in Dawn provide a critical insight which is worth consideration. He while making a critical apprisal of Pakistani operation says, “to put the most charitable construction on what is going on in Kargil sector, if this was the opening move in a bid to liberate Kashmir by force, something could be said in its defence. It would be seen as part of a larger scheme of things even if this larger scheme was decried as foolish or foolhardy. But unless there are higher secrets yet to be revealed, the fighting in Kargil appear to stand all by itself... A war or even fighting of a limited kind as we are seeing in theKargil and Drass sectors, must have a political objective if the expenditure of blood and resources is to be justified. What is the political objective of the present fighting? It cannot be the conqest or liberation of Kashmir because we lack the strength for that. It cannot be the desire to internationalise the Kashmir problem because it is a quixotic venture to risk a war for so paltry aim.” Strategic security paradigm in India has to assimilate the fact that most important interim objective of ‘war of subversion’ in Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan is the Dilution of Indian Sovereignty over the state. Also what we are witnessing in the entire state is not a territorial surgery but territorial dissolution. Relentless Demographic assault has considerably narrowed down Indian social base in the state. This loss of demographic leverage is aimed to facilitate the process of territorial dissolution to critical levels where the front either will not exisit or there will be fronts all around. c) Response Control:- ‘War of Subversion’ through its subversive process has created, sustained and perpetuated a reference frame work in our counry which is crucial for its continuance and attainment of objectives. The contradictions between various nation building approaches in India are being used as the operating space . Military experts in India now admit that even without territorial gains Pakistani operations have attained a ‘strategic depth.’ With the upgradation of various components of Pakistani aggression, subversive assault has assumed a critical dimension which if not controlled can be catastrophic. Upgradation in subversion has further brought about a qualitative deterioration in the existing refrence framework of Indian responses. For example before 1989 and forced exodus of Kashmiri Pandits, secular approach of various political regimes in valley was judged not by the secular content of their politics but by their approach towards accession with India. After 1989, the demographic composition of the exodus became the hall mark of the state of secular affairs. In recent times the pressures of subversion have pushed the secular paradigm to rediculous cliches. Symbolic return of Pandits gave away to the tourism returning to valley as the basic parameter of the status of secularism in the valley. Theories of ‘alienation’ have helped in the dangerous internalisation of the crisis. Everything that happens gets attributed to the failures of the state thereby creating more alienation. Most dangerous implication of the subversive processes is their success in forcing a process of self-disinformation upon the Indian state. Kargil intrusion becomes a fallout of returning tourism and normalcy in the valley. And intensification of violence in the valley becomes a fallout of Kargil intrusion. Massacres in Jammu become a result of desperation of terrorists in the valley and the massacres in valley an outcome of their desperation in Jammu. Nation appears to have entered a vicious cycle of self-delusion and self-mortification. d) International Environment:- The ‘war of subversion’ is operating in a conducive international environment of unipolarity. India continues to be seen as a part of the other pole of the bipolar era which was dismantled. The international environment has restricted the healthy expression of our sovereignity. Kargil war took place on the terms and conditions of the enemy which we could not alter because of our continued isolation on strategic matters. The ‘war of subversion’ by Pakistan should be seen in complementary relations rather than contridiction with the international opinion which has restricted the expression of Indian sovereignity. American and western endorsement of Indian point of view came as late as when most of the military objectives were achieved by Indian forces at a very heavy cost. The belated support to Indian position in Kargil has not to be visualised as veering round of US and west to Indian view on Kashmir but only in the context of forestalling any new regional alignments. “No less extremist ones are those who have somehow convinced themselves that America’s abhorrrence of Islamic fundamentalism combined with terrorism, more particularly the nefarious activities of Osma Bin Laden, the growing attraction of Indian market and the realisation that in the Asian balance of power India matters, the US is now ready for a breakthrough in Indo-US relations even at the cost of its long term alliance with Pakistan”, these words of caution by Inder Malhotra are fully justified. The interim objective of dilution of sovereignty in Indian Kashmir of the ‘war of subversion’ by Pakistan is in perfect harmony with the positions taken by US and west on Kashmir. The vision of Asia in 21st century as revealed by the Pantagon Papers envisages creation of an Independent Kashmir. There are concrete reasons to believe that this vision has not been as yet disowned by the US Government. e) Economic support:- The war type by Pakistan is supported both by legal as well as illegal economy. Overemphasis on the state of affairs of official Pak economy may lead us to faulty conclusions. Illegal economy derived from the over all control of drug traffiking in particular and crime Mafias in general form the core of the support base of this ‘war of subversion’. It is mind-boggling that equal amount of Pakistan’s GDP in 1997-98-Rs 2,750 million was generated by the parallel economy. Sums generated by smuggling are at the disposal of armed forces and spending Rs 100 million or so for a Kargil type operation is not a problem. BEYOND KARGILThe realisation of the totality of the war by Pakistan is a pre-requisite incombating it. Approaches of self mortification have lead to the internalisation of the problems which Pakistan has created. Approaches of externalisation have to be part of the future operational doctrine. National sensitivity to Pakistani designs should not be only territorial. Subversive and demographic assaults are as crucial as the terrotorial one. Nation has to develop a threshold for these assault forms as well and let it be known to the world. There in lies the key to contain and defeat this agression. ‘OPERATION TURTUK’KARGIL ADVENTURE: DESTINATION WAS SIACHENSpecial CorrespondentTurtuk is the strategic underbelly of Siachen, being sandwiched between theNorthern areas of PoK and Aksai Chin/Karakoram frontier on the east. Over two-thirds of the route to Turtuk is the same as that for Siachen. Any Pakistani advance down the Shyok valley would put pressure on the flanks of the Siachen route. Also, Pakistani pressures in the Turtuk sector could have them control over the high altitude Thoise airbase and open up the possibility of establishing a direct axis to Batalik (via Chorbatla) and from there on to Kargil. Turtuk was captured by the Indian Army in the 1971 war under the leadership of Col Chewang Rinchin. Under Simla agreement it was delineated with India. Kargil aggression by Pakistan was a grand design to incorporate Turtuk and its adjoining areas. This has been confirmed from the interrogation of the arrested militants, who revealed that Pakistan had planned to execute ‘Operation Turtuk’. By occupying Turtuk and its adjacent areas, Pakistan wanted to make India’s retention of Siachen untenable. Pakistan has an obsession that occupation of Siachen by Indian troops threatens the Sino-Pak Karakoram Highway, which is actually at a distance of 180 km from the Siachen across severely broken terrain. In 1983 intelligence reports had warned India of Pak preparations to occupy the Siachen area. This move was forestalled by Indian troops in April 1984. They swiftly occupied the dominating heights and important passes on the Saltoro ridgeline. India fears that occupation of Siachen by Pakistan would provide an opportunity to Pakistan and China to operate in collusion and threaten Northern Ladakh. It is in this context that some seasoned Indian military experts have been talking of Chinese collusion in the Kargil aggression by Pakistan. “The airborne troop concentration and force accretion in Skardu point to a larger sinister design.. to grab a large area,” said the Director-General of Military Operations at a press-briefing in early June. Three-Phase Plan: Informed sources reveal that Pakistan’s Kargil game-plan was to be accomplished in three-phases. In the first phase, it attempted to weaken Kashmir’s link with Ladakh. Its intrusion in Drass was aimed to cut Ladakh’s supply lines from the Kashmir valley through the Zojila pass. Simultaneously Pakistan was making concerted efforts to entrench itself along the fulcrum of Chorbatla and Turtuk, northeast of Kargil. Pakistan was putting intense pressure on Battalik. Through its strategic hold on Battalik it could drive a wedge between north and south of the Indus. Pakistan would then have been in a position to delink the Kargil brigade, which looks after the area from two other brigades located to the north of the Indus. Chorbatla and Turtuk area, located north and north-east of the Indus, would be isolated. Having isolated the Chorbatla-Turtuk alignment from Batalik, Pakistan wanted to mount pressure on the Indian brigade at Chalunka on the river Shyok. Positioning of Pakistan’s forces along the Chorbatla-Turtuk sector also threatens India’s defence of Siachen Glacier on two counts. First, the pressure on the Chalunka brigade can mean the diversion of troops from the Siachen brigade headquarter at Partapur. This could result in lower concentration of forces for Siachen’s defence. Secondly, Pakistani troops at Chorbatla can hit the supply lines of the southern Siachen glacier. This can effect the Indian weapon and ammunition reserves for this segment. The second phase of Pakistani gameplan was to follow once consolidation in the Chorbatla-Turtuk area was complete. Pakistan then would have a good chance of fighting their way along the descent of the Shyok valley, overrun Thoise and sit at Khalsar on the junction of the Nubra and Shyok rivers. Any Pak consolidation at Khalsar would result in squeeze on the glacier since troops from Khalsar can be sent through the Nubra river, whose source lies in the Siachen glacier itself. In the phase three Pakistan intended to build pressure on Leh after the takeover of Khalsar. Entrenchment in Khalsar would make the road link between Leh and Kargil quite vulnerable through a pincer movement. While one body of troops advances from the Khalsar side, another force cuts through the Batalik alignment. The Pakistani objective for threatening Leh was two-fold a) capture Siachen-Turtuk-Kargil tract b) bargain in overall Kashmir settlement. Some arrested militants have as per media reports, revealed that Pakistan’s operation Turtuk was to be executed in four phases. In the Phase-I, the Pakistani Army had decided to infiltrate the area through militants in order to subvert the locals and initiate insurgency. This would be followed by the launching of operations to occupy critical areas around Turtuk and the adjacent areas. The logistics would be maintained by helicopters, with temporary helipads built across the LoC. An Army spokesman claimed that in the third phase Pakistan Army was to launch heliborne operations in the rear areas, to facilitate operations of the advancing ground forces. The last phase was to declare Turtuk and its adjacent areas, as part of their Northern areas. “Operation Turtuk”: Pakistan began implementing its ‘Operation Turtuk’ plan in 1994, when it hooked Ibrahim, a native of Turtuk. Ibrahim had been working as an undercover agent for the Intelligence Bureau. He crossed over to Pok with his family and got arms training at Hizbul Mujahideen centre in Skardu. ISI made him HM chief in Turtuk. In 1996, he is reported to have sent six local boys for arms training. Intelligence reports say that most of Turtuk population got training through Ibraham. He has now turned out to be a major conduit of arms and ammunition in Turtuk. Ibraham had stored these arms and sophisticated communication equipment stealthily at hill tops and in walls of houses and some religious places, to be used when Pakistan would give a go ahead signal. It was come to light that Pakistan had planned a major “mass” insurgency in the villages along the LoC, with Ibrahim running the show. Earlier intelligence reports had said that several young men of the border villages had crossed over to Skardu in PoK for arms training spread over several weeks. The arrest of 24 people hailing from the border villages of Thang, Tyakshi, Pachathang and Turtuk in the first fortnight of June by Leh police virtually created a sensation. It revealed much than was known about the ramifications of Pak subversion in Ladakh. The conspiracy came to light with the arrest of Ibrahim’s brother, Ali Bhutto. The police also seized a large cache of sophisticated arms and ammunition, including 25 AK-47 and 56 rifles, one LMG, one MMG, plastic explosive, one rocket launcher, three rockets, 15 hand grenades, three batteries, fuse wire and a sniper rifle. Most of the subversives arrested were in the age group 20-25, while a few were in their 40s. Significantly all the arrested people used to act as porters of Army and they were paid fake Indian currency between Rs 2000 to Rs 5000 by Pakistan. What is alarming is that these young men after receiving arms training in PoK would infiltrate the ranks of the armed forces, state police and other civilian agencies. Leh police arrested two constables-Mohammed Ali and Ahmed Shah from Thang village. The two are said to have been involved in hiding some of the arms and ammunition brought in by Ibrahim. According to police, Mohd Ali had been to PoK for training in 1997 before joining the force. Ibrahim would be in constant touch, as per reports, with his relatives and friends in Turtuk and other villages. He came often to the Indian side to meet them and supply them with arms. Among the arrested people were also an employee of Food and Supplies department-Abdul Hamid. The busting of this subversive group is significant. How did Ibrahim manage to infiltrate so much arms, ammunition and sophisticated communication equipment onto the Indian side without catching the eye of security forces? Why did people in Turtuk fall in Pakistan’s trap? People of Turtuk have the highest literacy among the surrounding villages. It has the maximum percentage of State government jobs in the entire Nubra valley. Turtuk always received the best attention of the State government. Whenever the Chief Minister visited Leh or Nubra, he made it a point to visit Turtuk. Obviously there was no scope of any alienation. And surprisingly, it were the illiterate Turtuk shepherds who were the first to report the presence of Pak intruders in the mountains. Also arrests in Turtuk have brought to attention the presence of “double agents” in the border areas of Ladakh district. Earlier, in Drass, radio intercepts made at the Army’s ‘Tropo Radio Intercepting Station’ ascertained the presence of torchmen. In Drass a mysterious torch light would be switched on and off from a remote village to direct Pakistan shelling on targets on Indian side. In Kargil also the Army and the police were baffled by the Pakistani shelling knocking out vital targets frequently and so accurately. Targets chosen were also significant-underground ammunition dump on Baru hills, residence of SP, and DC, office of SP, offices of ration and clothing depot, fuel dump of Border Roads Organisation (BRO) at Khurbatang Plateau. It was so badly damaged that it had to be shifted to Kargil. The shells also hit the office of ITBP. After the police launched an investigation, it found 20 local spies were directing the Pakistani firing from this side of the border. And most of them turned out to be Observation Posts (OPs) sources for various Indian intelligence outfits, double crossing the Indian agencies. The porters involved in the game would gather information about locations and in turn supplied it to Pakistan enabling it to go for its targets accurately. A special police team nabbed Ghulam Mohammad, a school teacher and Hassan, an army labourer on charges of spying in Batalik along with eight bundles of dynamite and two metres of special detonator wire, called cordex. A mole in the local telephone exchange was found directing the Pakistani shelling. END KARGIL INTRUSION - WAS IT PLAN - XSpecial CorrespondentIn 1987, immediately afterthe Exercise Brass Tacks, Pakistan governmentasked its Joint Chief of Staff Committee (JCSC) to Siachen glacier. After prolonged deliberations, JCSC submitted a comprehensive plan to make India recoil from the Saltoro crestline and Siachen glacier. The aim of this operation, codenamed Plan - X, was to seize and hold logistics support bases vital for maintenance of troops deployed on theSaltoro Crest Line, Siachen and Southern Glaciers by surprise attck with a view of trapping all Indian troops deployed in the glacier areas and enabling Pakistan to negotiate withdrawl of Indian forces from Siachen Glacier from a position of strength. The details of this plan were published in a leading Indian defence Journal in 1992. Plan - X visualised capture of forward positions of Partapur garrison along axis Siari-Tortuk and logistic support bases for Southern Glaciers by infiltration across the LC, capturing Thoise Air field Complex and Siachen base camp through heli-landing of troops, simulation of major attacks in Drass, Kargil, Tangdhar, Pooch to tie down Indan reserve formations and stepping up terrorist and guerrilla activity in the Kashmir Valley. Plan - X was shelved because of the prolongation of Taliban war in Afghanistan and Benazir government appeared to be totally against such military adventure in Siachen. Some Pakistani Generals did not agree with Benazir in postponement of Plan - X. They took India’s support to Dr Najilbullah’s regime in Afghanistan as an excuse to attack Siachen. On a note of prophetic warning, the author of ‘OP. Topac-Kashmir imbroglio’ warned, “these Generals may not have their way immediately but it cannot be assumed that they will not have their way in the future”. END KARGIL: THE WIDER RAMIFICATIONSBy Shailendra AimaThe wider conflict in Kargil seems to be over with the withdrawal ofPakistan troops and the mercenaries backed by it. The political observers as well as the strategic analysts have heaved a sigh of relief at the averting of a full-fledged military conflict between India and Pakistan, with a possible nuclear fall out in South Asia. There is a talk, now, of conflict resolution on bilateral basis in the spirit of the Simla Agreement. An opinion seems to be gaining ground that the support to the militants from across the border must stop forthwith. Another premise which is getting projected simultaneously is that LoC be converted into International Border, that the long standing promise of autonomy of Kashmiris be fulfilled and that movement of Kashmiris from the Indian to Pakistani side, and vice versa, be liberalised. It seems that the entire solution, in this case, hinges on the assumption that the bone of contention between India and Pakistan is Kashmir and once there is a resolution of the Kashmir problem, the hostilities between the neighbours will cease and that peace shall prevail in the sub-continent, giving both India and Pakistan the opportunities to utilise their resources on development and economic growth. An analysis of the claims and counter-claims of both India and Pakistan in the matter shows the Pakistani belief that a logical conclusion of the two nation theory (the basis for Pakistan’s creation) should have been accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan; it being a Muslim majority state. The Pakistanis also demand that Kashmiris be given the right of self-determination, as proposed by no less a person than Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru. The Pakistanis also say that the denial of the right of self-determination amounts to suppression of the people of Kashmir and therefore it shall continue to support popular movements against India in Kashmir. The argument put forth by the Indians is that the state of Jammu and Kashmir legally and constitutionally acceded to India when it was facing an aggression by the Pakistani regulars and its sponsored tribesmen. That plebiscite became impossible when Pakistan refused to vacate one third of Kashmir’s territory and that the people of Kashmir put their stamp of approval on accession by electing a popular government, by participating in elections from time to time and by the Resolutions of their Constituent Assembly. The Indians also argue that India is a secular state and the fact that India has a much larger Muslim population than the entire Pakistan, negates the two nation theory. For India, therefore, Pakistan is the product of a two-nation theory which it refutes and debunks; and for Pakistan, Kashmir is a logical corollary and continuation of the process of the two nation theory. In addition to these claims and counter-claims, there is a need to understand the nature of conflict between India and Pakistan. Creation of Bangladesh was a serious physical as well as an ideological setback to Pakistan. Ever since then, it renewed its attempts to annex Kashmir and to weaken the multiethnic, multilingual and secular fabric of the Indian polity. This would serve to avenge Bangladesh as well as to weaken the ideological basis of the Indian nation state. Pakistan after the 1971 experience started banking more on subversive, diplomatic and political machinations to achieve this end. As a consequence India is face to face with a proxy-war not only in Jammu and Kashmir, but through a strong network of ISI operatives, is being pounded in entire north-east and as far south as Tamil Nadu. The reverberations of Punjab are still producing tremors, not to speak of what is happening in Bombay, Coimbatore, Chennai, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh. As a diplomatic and strategic initiative, Pakistan provided a no-hold, free landing to the Americans for intervention in Afghanistan and diverted its spill-over to Kashmir. A low-cost involvement for Pakistan has developed into a festering sore for the Indian body politic and is demanding a heavy price. A pan-Islamic Jihad serves the imperialist as well as religio-civilisational imperatives of Pakistan and provides it an ideological basis for existence. Emboldened by these ventures, Pakistan visualizes itself as the eastern arm of the Afro-Arab Islamic fraternity with a well defined agenda of expansion in India and further eastward. The Himalayas and the Himalayan hinterland are crucial to its strategic and global interests. An so is its nuclear and missile programme. What happened in Kargil, therefore, is neither an isolated event nor any kind of a misadventure by Pakistan. The only difference this time is that India chose to confront it with its full might and the Pakistanis were made to vacate this side of the LoC. As the reports suggest, the Pakistanis during this period have succeeded in infiltrating about 1600 hard-core Islamic mercenaries into Kashmir who have renewed their attacks on the security establishments in J&K as well as selective minority killings. While the proxy-war stands upgraded, Pakistan is also renewing its peace offensive. It is expressing itself to talk to India for a final solution of the Kashmir problem and also regrets India’s putting preconditions for such talks. India on the other hand, struck up with a mid-term poll, finds its political leadership divided and the entire opposition demanding its pound of flesh. India moves into elections with prospects of a bloodier terrorists offensive. All claims of normalcy in Kashmir stand falsified, today. Pakistan has relentlessly pursued its agenda over the last two decades. It has achieved a decisive depth within the Indian system through subtle ISI operations. It has succeeded in creating a situation for India where India is engaged in self-containing exercises a situation for India where India is engaged in self-containing exercises at the cost of its own sovereignty. “India shall not cross the LoC even in the wake of grave provocation” reveals the state of Indian mind, where LoC is sacrosanct, granting autonomy to J&K is pious, toeing the American initiatives is a compulsion but where National sovereignty and integrity are matters of compromise. Peace in the present circumstances is impossible. India may decide on quantum of autonomy to J&K state, but that bears no relation to the Pakistani offensive; as it would neither prevent its agents from ethnic-cleansing of the minorities nor shall the militarised pan-Islamic groups relent in their pursuit of Jihad. On the contrary, if the Indian state persists with its misplaced priorities of package and concessions for the so-called “misled youth”, and refuses to acknowledge the war or the proxy-war or the war-like situation (whatever nomenclature it likes to give) and keeps on harping on non-issues like “autonomy”, the days shall no be far away when autonomy for LTTE in Tamil Nadu, Baabar Khalsa in Punjab, Nexalities in Andhra, ULFA in Assam and other militant outfits in Bihar, Nagaland and Tripura shall become inevitable. The time has come to get out of this mind-set, call a spade a spade and demonstrate the eye for an eye approach while dealing with the aggressor. In Kashmir, it is the national sovereignty which is under attack. Either we lose to Pakistani design and disintegrate or we preserve ourselves and defeat the enemy. KARGIL: THRESHOLD OF CRUSADESBy Prof MK TengThe war in Kargil, contrary to the view unexpectedly held by the Indiangovernment and which found favour with those who claimed expertise on Indo-Pakistan relations, was not an isolated eruption of a border conflict or a military expedition of the Pakistan army across the Line of Control. In India, a prismatic sense of self-mortification prevails in the government, as well as in the minds of those who run it that there is always, a cause which has its origin outside the Muslim community for whatever, happens inside its folds. Perhaps, the right of self determination which Pakistan alleged, had been denied to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, was also an alibi, which had its origin in India, and which was perhaps, devised for the convenience of Pakistan. For the fact, that neither the transfer of power in the British India, nor the lapse of the Paramountcy in the States, accepted self-determination for any of the peoples in India: those inhabiting the British India, which was divided and those inhabiting the India of the princely States. Indeed, the partition was a denial of the right of self-determination of the Indian people, who except the Muslims-a small minority in the Indian population, opposed the division of India. For whatever, was accomplished after the partition to locate the blame for the communal divide, the censure fell, partly on the British and partly on the Hindus of India, who were erroneously believed to have determined the policies of the Government of India, providing a clean chit to the Muslim League and the Muslims of India: the real force which brought about the partition of India. Pakistan cried hoarse and rightly that the Muslims in India and not the British had created the Muslim homeland for Pakistan, concieved as a major step in the direction of the freedom of the Muslim Umah. Indeed, the British acted as catalysts. The objective of Pakistan was delineated by the Indian Muslims. Sir Mohammad Iqbal and Mohammad Ali Jinnah provided the ideological content to the Muslim movement for Pakistan, a fact, which is clearly revealed by the correspondence Iqbal had with Jinnah till his death. The major tactical manoeuvre the Direct Action, which overwhelmed the Congress leadership, and brought it down to its knees to accept the partition, was envisaged by the Muslims of India. The British did not divide India. The Muslim of India divided it. Sooner than expected, however, a conscious effort was made, first, to put the blame for the partition of India on the British and after that was achieved, put a part of the blame on the Congress leadership. The Muslims in India could do no wrong, and therefore, they could not be accused of having done the wrong of dividing the country. The Indian perspectives continued to be warbled and the separatist demand for a Muslim majority state of Jammu and Kashmir, to exclude it from the secular constitutional organisation of India on the basis of the Muslim majority character of its population looked for its rationale, not in Muslim communalism, which it blatantly reflected, but in the quest for a sub-national identity which was claimed to represent a secular ideal. Much worse, the long secessionist struggle, spearheaded by the Plebiscite Front, in search for the self-determination of the Muslims, was insistently characterised as a movement which did not support Pakistan and the so-called two-nation theory of the Muslim League. The demand for a second Muslim state of Jammu and Kashmir, which the Plebiscite Front and the other secessionists organisation made, was justified as a secular movement because it did not underline this demand for the accession of the Jammu and Kashmir State to Pakistan, but claimed a second partition of India to create another independent Muslim state of Jammu and Kashmir. After the front leaders formally adorned the garb of secular patriotism in 1975 they were suddenly, hailed as the harbingers of a new age of secular history in India. However, they pursued their own agenda and as Afzal Beg, the President of the Front, had promised his cadres, that the Front would enter the government “to wreck India from within”, they followed their objectives with meticulous care and ruthless effect. The leadership of the militant flanks which launched the war of attrition in the state against India in 1989, came from the two generations of the Muslims, who were socialised to secessionism and Pakistan for two and half decades of the movement led by the Plebscite Front in the State. The Muslim international underlined by the Islamic revolution provided the secessionist movement in the state, with a new basis for pan-Islamic unity and a new thrust for the achievement of the freedom of the Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir. A self conscious Indian leadership, driven by compulsions beyond ordinary human comprehension, sought to camouflage the fundamentalist, communal and separatist content of the Muslim militancy by offering theoratical explanations, like the “alienation syndrome”, “poverty” “unemployment” and of course”, the inducement of Pakistan to misguide the Muslim youth”. The Janata government, which owed much to the most irridentist leadership of the Indian Muslims, for their support in the elections, blamed everyone, except the Muslims, for the militant violence in Kashmir. They blamed the Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir as well as in India for having scuttled the aspirations of the Muslims to autonomy, political participation and economic prosperity. They blamed the successive Congress governments of having rigged the elections in the State to userp political power and oppress the Muslims. The Congress which returned to power after the Janata broke up, gave its own version of the eruption of the Muslim militancy in Kashmir and with an abject sense of self-condemnation, blamed its own leadership of having deprived the Muslims in Kashmir of the autonomy which their illustrious predecssors had promised them. Some of the Congress leaders carried their argument to absurd extremes, claiming that the crusade carried on by the militants and their Muslim supporters in Jammu and Kashmir, did not support the two-nation theory, on which Pakistan was based and the version of the Islamic Revolution the militant regimes in Jammu and Kashmir advocated was basically secular in character, and upheld the “tradition of tolerance and amity”, of the Muslim society in Kashmir. The Congress government indeed, had no qualms to inform the National Human Rights Commission that half a million of Hindus had migrated out of their homes of their own volition, visibly seeking to convince the Commission that the Muslims in Kashmir were in no way involved in the ethnic cleansing of the Hindus from Kashmir. The Congress leaders avoided to refer to the genocide of the Hindus and their ethnic cleansing from Kashmir, lest they be rightly understood or misunderstood for what they said. For a long time, the Indian government and the Indian leadership, reluctantly referred to the complicity of Pakistan in the war of attrition in the State, using vague and often misleading chiches, to evade an indictment of the Muslims whether in Jammu and Kashmir or in Pakistan. The Indian Muslims, who had stakes in the secular integration of the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir in the constitutional organisation of India and who vigorously supported the secularisation of the state and society in the rest of India vigorously aplauded the demand for Islamisation of the State under the garb of its sub-national identity. They insisted upon guarantees to secure the Muslims in India against the religious precedence of the Hindu majority and demanded the enforcement of the right to equality and right to protection against discrimination on the basis of religion. But they opposed the secularisation of the Jammu and Kashmir State and its integration in the Indian political structure. While secularism was necessary to protect the Muslim minority in India, religious precedence of Islam was necessary to protect the Muslims majority in Jammu and Kashmir, the only Muslim majority State in India. The violence, with which the Muslims backed up their demand for Pakistan in 1946, when the League launched the ‘Direct Action’ campaign, was characterised by Jinnah himself as the Muslim struggle for freedom from India. The long war of subversion unleased by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, is not different in its objectives as well as its character from the ‘Direct Action’ campaign, which led to the partition of India. The Muslim struggle in Kashmir is relatively a wider phenomenon and involves the commitment of the Muslim international with Pakistan as one of its epicentries to force a second partition on India, and cut off its northern regions, Jammu and Kashmir, followed by the planes of the Punjab and hills of Himachal Pradesh and make way for the Muslims to expand eastwards. Expansion to the east which the Nazis in their time, claimed for Germany as the inevitable Drag Natch Osten’, has ominous forebodings for India. Pakistan is an ideological state, and not different from the ideological states, fascism, nazism and communism reared. India is on the frontline of the Muslim expansionist movements towards the east. The eruption of the military activity in Kargil, which Pakistan claimed was a part of the crusade in Kashmir, carried by the Muslim Mujahideen represented the Islamic international, should leave no one in doubt about its objectives. The Kargil war, is a part of the long war Pakistan is waging against India to grab the Jammu and Kashmir, with a measured purpose: the de-Sanskritisation of the Himalayan frontier to integrate the Himalayas in the Central Asian Complex, which is dominantly Muslim. The Islamisation of the warm Himalayan hinterland, would ensure the emergence of the Muslims as the main power in Central Asia. And once they establish their power over Central Asia, they will extend their sway over South Asia and South East Asia. Placed along the soft frontiers of Russia as well as the turbulent Muslim majority border states of Western China, including Sinkiang, they would be able to force a realignment of power in Asia. The de-Sanskritisation of the Himalayas is the most crucial achievement Pakistan seeks to accomplish. For if the Himalayas are lost, the entire northern India will lose its geo-strategic defences against the invasion from the north. Kargil is not an isolated act of military activity of Pakistan. For the ideological state of Pakistan, the soldiers of its army, the Afghan Taliban, the Sudanese and the Arab Mujahideen, are all pioneers of the Muslim crusade, indistinguishable from the Mujahidin raised from among the Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir. Kargil war is an integral part of the ideological war, which Pakistan has carried on against India for the last five decades. Crusade is the character of an ideological state and Muslim crusade in Jammu and Kashmir should be viewed as a real threat to the national security of India. Kargil is a warning of the growing danger, India is faced with in its north. Ideological crusades assume varied forms, and the liberation armies, which lead the crusades follow their own agenda. They are not subject to the civilisational values, which India claims to be the basis of its secularism. The genocide of Hindus and their ethnic cleansing from Kashmir has amply proved that END SIMMERING LADAKHBy Prof Hari OmIrrespective of their political leanings and religious beliefs, the Ladakhishad hailed the October 1989 tripartite agreement as the crowning triumph of their 47-year-long crusade, which included the threat of leaving India for Tibet to end the Kashmir valley’s hegemony over the State’s politics and economy. The agreement promised to achieve and exercise equal rights for Ladakhis with the Kashmiris in all spheres. Under the 1989 accord, the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC) was set up as a means to evolve and empower the Ladakhis to mould their future and compensate for their losses since 1947, owing to the discriminatory policies of the Kashmiri rulers. The belief of the Ladakhis that they would be armed with adequate powers to regenerate their socio-cultural and politico-economic life was not based on something abstract. It had stemmed from the President’s Act, 1995 itself, under which they were to obtain a modified dispensation. The language of the Act clearly stated that the LAHDC shall have unbridled “executive powers” to control fully the region’s land and administration, formulate and finalise the budget for the Leh area, generate employment and alleviate poverty, promote tourism in the cold desert, set up educational institutions and small-scale cottage industries, open up health centres etc. However, to say all this is not to suggest that everybody in Ladakh shared the same feeling that the President’s Act would harmonise inter-regional relations, and that the politics of confrontation between Ladakh and the Valley would become a story of the past. There was a section which then warned that the LAHDC was not a permanent solution to the kind of ills afflicting the Ladakhis. It stated that differences may surface again as soon as the President’s rule ended and power was transferred to the leaders in the Valley. In effect, this group told the Ladakhi Buddhist Association (LBA), who had been spearheading the “empower Ladakh movement”, that the key to the age-old Ladakhi problem lay not in a dispensation within the State but in a total segregation of the trans-Himalayan region from the Valley into nothing short of a “Union Territory status”. The developments in the Leh area after the end of President’s rule in 1996, leave no doubt whatsoever that the apprehensions expressed by the ardent believers in the concept of “Union Territory status” were legitimate. But some of the noteworthy things are the unambiguous resolve of well established political formations like the LBA, the LMA and the Congress, of taking extra-constitutional methods to revive their demand for Union Territory status. Total boycott of the officially organised Republic Day celebration at Leh in 1998 and 1999, massive strike throughout the Leh district in January 1999 and the rise of a feeling among comparatively more radical Ladakhis that they do not have any future in the present geographical dispensation are some of the disturbing developments in the recent past. All these developments point to the fact that the euphoria of 1989 and 1995 has given way to despair, and that a strong anti-Valley sentiment is sweeping the cold desert region. Known for its October 1989 unprecedented violence, these developments also suggest that the problem has serious dimensions. The question arises: what aggravated the Ladakhi political scene and provoked the people there to look beyond India? The most important of all reasons is what the Ladakhis call repudiation of their 13 immediate demands by the Valley’s “ruling elite”. They had even vehemently opposed New Delhi’s move of setting up an autonomous hill council at Leh, denouncing the step as a deliberate move to hurt the Kashmiri psyche and jeopardise the interests of the alienated people of the Valley. Some of the demands of the Ladakhis, which were put down by the Valley leaders were: A free hand to LAHDC to administer all the 45 subjects placed under its jurisdiction by the Presidential Order, 1995; Financial autonomy and more funds to the council to enable it to undertake developmental activities in the extremely backward area which remains cut off from the rest of the country for more than six months in a year; reversal of the policy being pursued by the Kashmiri leaders to undermine the authority of LAHDC and render it defunct; finalisation of some General Business Conduct Rules and Executive Council Rules; ratification of rules pertaining to land otherwise vested in the LAHDC and control over Government employees serving in the Leh district, including the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer of the Council; and implementation of the Master Plan notified three year ago. Besides this, they also demanded increase in the number of blocks in the Leh district from the existing five to nine; Cabinet Minister status to the chairman of the LAHDC on the Darjeeling pattern and minister of state status to its executive councillors; continuation of the pre-October 1996 practice under which the chairman of the Council used to take salute at Republic and Independence Day functions; reappointment of Bashrat Ahmad Dar as the Deputy Commissioner of Leh district, who was removed from office by the State government following boycott of the officially-held Republic Day celebrations by all Ladakhis; revision of the Councillors’ salary and allowances. It is obvious that the State government’s attitude towards the far off Ladakhis is apathetic and provocative. The fact is that it has practically wrecked the 1995 reform scheme as originally conceived and has systematically minimised the concessions made available to the Ladakhis to conciliate them and retrieve the situation in the sensitive border region. The generation of aggressive thinking among the Ladakhis has to be viewed in the context of the impatience with stagnation and an urge for developments as well as the difficulties which are created by the Valley-based leaders at every step and their unwillingness to shed off what may be termed as their archaic bias against non-Kashmiri. Chief Minister Dr Farooq Abdullah would do well to sit up and dispassionately review the political situation as it is developing in Leh and take appropriate steps to strengthen the LAHDC so that it is able to mitigate the hardships of the Ladakhis. The people of this region undoubtedly deserve a special treatment and extraordinary attention. For, they have been suffering since ages from abject poverty, illiteracy, endemic unemployment and, above all, depredations of the Valley rulers. Not to meet their demands (and these appear quite petty and non-preposterous) would be to play with dangerous tools in the sense that the suffering Ladakhis appear determined not to allow anyone to take them for a piggy-ride any longer. Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah must act before it is too late. The Centre should also step in as the developments in Leh have the potential of harming the national interests as well. Source: The Pioneer END HOW MUSLIM WORLD REACTED ON KARGILDiplomatic CorrespondentQazi Hussain Ahmad, Chief of Jamaat Islami, Pakistan, while speaking onKargil developments, said that Pakistan stood isolated internationally and OIC was almost dead. Given its highly sectarian agenda and dubious functioning, OIC has never commanded respect among the global community. Since 1990, with the outbreak of Islamist insurgency in Kashmir, the statements issued by OIC have been quite embarrassing to India and Pakistan exploited these for building the publicity focus on Kashmir. This year’s OIC meet at Burkino Faso was quite different. Strong indictment of Pakistan’s action in Kargil made OIC countries cautious. Two anti-Indian resolutions were passed but individually almost all OIC members assured India that they understood its position. At the same time they expressed their helplessness and lack of clout in breaking the consensus. Most of the OIC countries issued usual proforma statements of concern at the “escalating tension”. Egypt and Iran offered for mediation initially but preferred to remain silent subsequently. Egypt, itself plagued by the fundamentalist militancy called for peaceful settlement of the dispute. Iran’s role on Kargil is influenced by its own compulsions. Pakistan-backed Taliban regime is strongly anti-Iran and has conducted many programmes against Iranian population (Hazara) in Afghanistan recently. State-sponsored religious militias of Pakistan have been pursuing anti-Shia campaigns. This cannot be to the liking of Iran. Lastly, Kargil is a Shia-majority area. Iran would not like Pakistan, with a sectarian agenda to harass Kargilis. Reliable reports say that even Saudi Arabia, the traditional backer of Pakistan privately told it to settle its dispute with India by peaceful means. It conveyed that the use of force in Kashmir would result in large-scale human and material losses in both the countries. On Clinton-Sharif communique Saudis remained non-committal. Pakistan and Saudi collaboration has a history that dates back to late sixties and was dictated by commonality of interests. Both the countries have remained frontline states for Americans in the cold war and had common interest in fomenting Pan Islamist movements across Asia. In 1971 Gen Zia himself launched action against Palestinians in Jordan at the instance of Saudis. Pakistani elite commandoes guard Saudi monarchy. Saudis have financed heavily (one-billion dollars) Pakistan’s nuclear bomb. Currently the international community is concerned over a possible Pakistan-Saudi nuclear collaboration, which covers transfer of prohibited sensitive technology. Saudi Defence Minister recently visited Pakistani defence facilities. Does Saudi Arabia’s soft stance on Kargil mark a shift? And what was the purpose, behind Sharif’s holding of a full-fledged cabinet meeting in Riyadh around the time Kargil war was coming to close. Nearly ninety people, which included cabinet ministers, bureaucrats, Army chief, top brass of the Army, ISI chief and supremos of some militant religious groups had descended on Riyadh for a four day trip. This was an unusual meeting, where all the factions of Pakistan’s power structure were represented-Army, ISI, religious militias and the Prime Minister. In the Kashmir secessionist campaign, Saudis have been remote controlling, mainly through their linkages with religious militia groups based in Pakistan. This has been in full knowledge of Americans. As long as it served their interests, they remained silent. Since Americans did not want to push India into a tight spot, whereby they will lose all the leverage in influencing future diplomatic moves on Kashmir-the new missive to Saudis was to rein in the “Mujahideen” groups. Americans also warned Riyadh that it would not tolerate any situation, where renegade Wahabi-fundamentalist groups e.g. Bin Laden become threat to US interests. With reports coming in, that these renegade groups are in the process of managing dangerous chemical/biological/nuclear weapons, made available with break-up of Soviet Union, Americans have become quite cautious. Moreover, these renegade groups are anti-status-quoist. They have challenged the Saudi Monarchy as well. Clinton not only wanted Saudis to sort out the “Mujahideen” factor in Kargil but it also asked it to ensure the total implementation of US formula on Kargil. That was precisely the purpose of Sharif’s cabinet meeting in Riyadh END PAK OBJECTIVES IN KARGILDiplomatic CorrespondentPAKISTAN’s intrusion deep inside the Indian territory in Drass-Bataliksector was not a reaction by hawks in the army to sabotage the so-called peace process initiated at Lahore. Pakistan staked so much and had been putting logistics into action atleast and from the middle of 1998. What did Pakistan gain from this misadventures? Did it not anticipate the global isolation and the domestic humiliation in embarking upon this aggression? Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan Prime Minister had even punished General Jehangir Karamat for not agreeing to the adventure. What were the core objectives Pakistan wanted to accomplish through this action.? TAKBEER, an Urdu weekly published from Lahore describes Kargil aggression as the brainchild of Lt. Gen. Azizuddin. Since 1984, when India defeated Pakistani gameplan to annex Siachen, Pakistan has never been at ease. In May 1985 a serious conflict took place between India and Pakistan on the glacier. Gen. Azizuddin, then Brigadier was put in charge of a Brigade in PoK in 1985. He surveyed the entire area and drew a preliminary plan for capturing Siachen. General Zia-ul-Haque had already put OPERATION TOPAC in action. Meanwhile,Gen. Azizuddin was recalled back to the headquarters at Rawalpindi. In 1994 he was promoted and sent back to PoK as head of the Northern Command. It was during this tenure that he drew the final gameplan for making India’s position in Siachen area vulnerable. In 1998 he became Major-General. After 1998 nuke tests, conducted by both countries. Pakistan-Army leadership concluded in case Siachen annexation plan was put into action, India cannot retaliate through a full scale war. The selection of General Pervez Mushraff and putting Lt. General Azizuddin as incharge of Kashmir Operation is significant. Both are rabid fundamentalists and known for anti-India hate. General Azizuddin was the chief architect of Siachen annexation plan with vast experience of serving in PoK. It was he who developed, nurtured and implemented the Taliban’s war fighting docrine in Afghanistan. Gen. Mushraff and Azizuddin have spent their entire career working with one Mujahideen group or the other during the last two decades. From 1994, Pakistan had been probing Indian defences in Kargil and building infrastructure for subversion. It began enticing border youth in Kargil-Turtuk area since 1994 by cultivating one Ibrahim of Turkuk. Exfiltration and infiltration of terrorists had been going on since 1992 in this sector. In 1992, reports appearing in Tribune and Quami Azad spoke about the existence of a fundamentalist group, which was creating an anti-Indian atmosphere. This group, receivng foreign funds was also engaged in sending youth across for training. Cashing this situation, Pakistan tried to build a support structure for subversion. That Pakistan was seriously engaged in pursuing Gen-Azizuddin’s gameplan is clear from the sabotage activities, which took place in this sector regularly. On Sept. 30, 1997 Pakistan pounded Kargil leading to many losses. In October, there was a major flare-up. In April 1998 ISI-trained subversives put IEDs on Drass road. Army lost some vehicles and few Army officers were also killed. In this incident links of some local politicians with infiltrators were suspected. Since September 1998 attacks on Indian posts in Siachen have been taking place regularly. Only a week after Lahore talks Indian positions were attacked in Siachen. During Kargil war and recently on 11th August Pakistan launched full scale attacks in Siachen area. Mushraff a couple of months after being appointed during visit to Siachen said, “we are not talking of winning the war, we are taking of the degree of difficulties you can create for the other”. There is definite envidence that Pakistan’s basic objective in Kargil aggression was to threaten Siachen by cutting off Indian garrisons at Turtuk and Siachen before launching an all-out attack on Siachen. It wanted penetration into Indus-Valley through Batalik and Chorbatla and then enter into Shyok valley to recapture 254 sq miles of Turtuk and its adjoining five villages. Plan was link Kargil with Siachen. After Jhelum and Chenab-Valley, Pakistan’s aim is to dominate Indus-Valley. Gen. Mushraff’s elevation was linked with Kargil plan. He had served in the elite SSG Corpos twice. Mushrraf had stint in Siachen and had remained DG Military operations. Statements by Pakisan army officers and the Foreign Minister also point to a conspiracy to grab Siachen. Tahir Mehmood, a brigade commander operating in Kargil told Nawa-ie-Waqt that aim was to isolate Ladakh and destroy India’s strategic control in Siachen area. Lt. Col. Muhammad Nawaz, who commanded a battalion in Shingo sector along LoC told Dauid Orr of the Times that purpose of Kargil intrusion was to starve Indian forces on Siachen of supplies. Gen. Hamid Gul (retd) former ISI chief said if Pakistan could hold in Kargil for two months, India would lose hold over Siachen. General Aslam Beg, former Army chief also agreed that purpose was to sever line of communications and supplies to troops in Siachen. The Pakistan Foreign Minister told the visiting US mediator Gen. Zinni that respect for LoC means India should withdraw from Siachen. Second objective for Pakistan was to tie down Indian security forces along the LoC in order to defuse the intensity of anti-militant drives in hinterland and then stepping up miliant strikes in interior area, picking up soft targets as well as convoys of security forces. After the end of Kargil war Kashmir valley in particular has seen regular and dare-devil attacks on police stations, and army camps. The Central objective of Pak ISI is to bleed Indian military and state through hundred cuts. It implies forcing dispersal of Indian secuity forces over the wides possible area. Pakistan through Kargil aggression has compelled India to have Siachen type (Siachenisation) security for Drass-Turtuk sector also.This imposes an additional financial burden of Rs four to five thousand croes. ISI gameplan is to raise economic, political and military costs for India in the proxy war. So for India has been reacting from a defensive mode. Thirdly, Kargil operations, may have been a part of Pakistan’s ‘riposte doctrine’. It involves making thrusts through narrow corridors, advancing and holding Indian territory and bargaining afterwards. Pakistan wanted to isolate Kargil and thereby to strengthen her position for talks with India if that stage ultimately came. Then she would stake claim over Doda, Rajouri and Kargil. Paksitan belives that ultimate solution would be around LoC, so Pakistan was trying to question the validity of LoC politically and cartographically. Its aggression was also aimed at shifting the alignemnt of LoC further east into Indian territory. During Kargil war, Pakistan Foreign Ministry oficials repeatedly said that LoC was not properly demarcated. As part of the ‘riposte doctrine’ Pakistan made attacks on Nikkial (Poonch) Aknnoor, Uri, Gurez, Kupwara, RS Pura capturing lateral valleys also indicates that Pakistan’s proxy war has been upgraded. Wider anti-India conspiracy was also behind the intrusions. Big powers desirous of bringing India under NPT regime wanted Kargil to escalate into a nuclear flashpoint thus forcing India into an acquiscense to a treaty objective of Pakistan and its western collaborators was to internationalise the Kashmir dispute against the backdrop of a nuclear region after tactical gains have been made in Kargil sector. The statement of Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmed that “we will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity,” was sheer blackmail. Pakistan’s brandishing of Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint guaranteed to US a leverage it would not surrender Pakistan linked time bound talks on Kashmir with withdrawal from Kargil. Pakistan was also using intrusion as a probing exercise to assess the thresh-hold for Indian military and national response. It wanted to see at what point India will cross LoC and launch full scale war. Mr Brijesh Mishra Senior advisor to the Prime Minister on National Security said, “in Kargil a new situation has arisen where our capabilities are being tested.” In Kargil there was a firm reply by India that it will not tolerate any territorial inrusion. Pakistan miscalculated the Kargil plan. It did not visualise air strikes and total war with India. Lastly, through Kargil plan Pakisfan was trying to put Taliban factor to use in Kashmir. The methodology of the operation mirrored that of Pakistan led Taliban forces in Afghanistan where a 60:40 mix of irregulars and regular soldiers are employed with regular army providing leadership element down to sectional level.General Azizuddin, who conducted Taliban, operations in Afghanistan, his choice as incharge of military operations in Kashmir, needs to be viewed in this context END BEYOND THE INTELLIGENCE FAILURELAPSES IN LADAKHBy P.StobdanTHE Pakistani intrusion in Kargil is reminiscent of the Chinese intrusion of1962 in Ladakh’s eastern flank, when the PLA caught the incometently-led and ill-equipped Indians by surprise. Internally, the issue of intelligence failure was raised then too. The Chinese troops withdrew to positions north of the McMohan Line under strong international condemnation. The same way, the intruders may withdraw now to the LoC position. But questions will continue to haunt the people as to why Indian territory repeatedly gets encroached upon and the Indian security forces are caught napping. In 1948 also, the day was May 9, when the Pakistani Ibex and Eskimo Forces captured Kargil and Drass and advanced further up to Leh and pushed back towards the onset of winter in November. Military history since the 13th century has proved Kargil to be the most critical strategic point. The very name Kargil has a strategic meaning: kar (white) akhil (location/place) in Tibetan also spells as gar-gil meaning a cross-junction. The name signified its location at the cross-point between Skardu and Leh and Kashgar and Srinagar. Kargil has a unique strategic position which opens up four valleys (Drass-Suru-Wakha-Indus). The Pakistani military always considered Kargil a check-point for operation in Ladakh. The three-pronged strategy this time was to cut off Drass and Kargil from Leh and Srinagar, before Zojila is opened, enter the Indus Valley through Batalik and Chorbatla to capture areas upto Khaltse, and enter Shayok Valley to recapture 254 sq miles of Turtuk, comprising five villages, Chalungka, Thang, Tyakshi, Pharol and Turtuk. But for the early opening of the Zojila in April, the Pakistani Army would have certainly accomplished its objectives. Pakistan has been eyeing Ladakh for years, primarily to regain areas it lost to India since 1971. However, it has faced difficulties on two accounts. First, unlike in the Valley, Ladakh was not ripe for an Islamic revolution, though efforts had been made to communalise the region through subversive means. Secondly, the topographically feature (naked mountains) was not favourable for guerrilla operation. To overcome these, since the summer of 1997, Pakistan has resorted to large-scale occasional artillery shelling in Kargil. The aim was to terrorise the sequestered people so as to push and scare them away from the high ridges. This tactic has helped the Pakistani Army significantly in undermining Indian intelligence-gathering abilities. Pakistan has also been using the battle-hardened Afghan militia who fought the opposition in the Hind Kush and Pamir heights. Pakistan also has a militia raised locally to suit the terrain and climate. The objective was to disrupt communications, destroy supply dumps and gain the aid of the local populace in a hope-for general uprising. New Delhi’s assessment has been that the area north of Valley along the frontier with Baltistan is not prone to infiltration and subversion. On the surface, it has appeared that the Shia Purig-pa and Wahabi Shinas of Ladakh would be averse to Pakistani game plan. The situation on the ground, however, reveals as well-thought-out Pakistani plan for an Islamic uprising in Ladakh too-a plot hatched nine years ago. What made it worse was the Indian government’s own decision to separate Kargil from Ladakh as a separate administrative zone. This was done on July 1, 1979, a year after the Iranian Revolution. The step has helped the Pakistani cause considerably. By the early eighties, the Shias of Kargil not only refused to support a Union Territory status for Ladakh but also rejected the offer of an Autonomous Hill Council status, essentially to mark their solidarity with the Kashmiri cause. The communal division of Ladakh has created a host of issues with wide implication for national security. The Kargil crisis, therefore, is not a case of intelligence failure but an utter intellectual failure. The faulty military command and deployment strategy has been evident. To have left the entire stretch of over 75 kilometres of a vulnerable border to a sole brigade in Kargil was a criminal mistake, though the trend of the Pakistani thrust in the Ladakh sector was clear since 1997. While intruding into Kargil, Pakistan has opened qualitatively a new front vis-a-vis India. While gaining control over the mountain heights, it has managed politically to widen the scope of Kashmir conflict on the ground. Pakistan has also the impression, as evident from the broadcasts from Radio Azad Kashmir and Radio Skardu, that the Buddhist Ladakhis too are getting averse to India’s rule. In the absence of India’s inaction to regain the PoK through offensive means, the Pakistanis would only like to alter the existing LoC to their own advantage. Particularly in view of what is regarded as an erosion of India’s ability to checkmate Pakistan after the Soviet collapse. India has been pushed on to a geopolitically defensive position after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban. Pakistan has certainly managed to gain a “strategic depth” for its rivalry against India. The trend also indicates Pakistan’s ideological agenda beyond Kargil--and into China’s Xinjiang. The attempt by Pakistan-based Islamic militant outfits to penetrate western China has been foiled by Central Asian states, especially by Uzbekistan when it threatened Islamabad with severe consequence should it try to push the Islamic agenda beyond Afghanistan. There are reports about hundreds of Chinese Ughur militants trained by the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Tablik-e-Jamaat stranded in Pakistan due to China’s strict vigilance. The possibility of the militants looking for a passage via Kargil into Xingjiang cannot be ruled out. Clearly, the government’s naive policies with regard to Ladakh have contributed to Pakistani designs. New Delhi’s shortsightedness to bifurcate Ladakh on communal grounds will have disturbing implications for national security for a long time to come. New Delhi’s policy of giving a free hand to Srinagar to deal with Ladakh’s affairs has only compounded the security vulnerability. Reversing the situation may not be an easy task as Pakistan has devised sufficient ways and means to sustain high-altitude guerrilla warfare tactics in Ladakh ranges. If India is serious about defending Ladakh, it will have to reshape its policy not only by politically regaining the confidence of the people but also by gearing up military preparedness while raising and strengthening the existing local armed forces, the Ladakh Scouts. This could only be done if the Ladakh infantry units are conferred with a regimental status. After all, India can live with the Kashmir problem but neglecting Ladakh will be suicidal. The author is Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. GEN. PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: HIS PAST & PRESENTBy B.RamanIn an article (the “International Herald Tribune” of June 16) on Pakistan’sproxy invasion of Indian territory in the Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir, Mr Selig Harrison, the well-known American analyst, says:” Recent information makes clear that the newly-installed Army Chief of Staff (COAS), Gen Pervez Musharraf, has long-standing links with several Islamic fundamentalist groups.” Analysts, the attention it deserves, if one has to have a clearer understanding of his role in the proxy invasion. Gen Musharraf, a Mohajir of Azamgarh/Karachi origin, had subsequently settled down in the Gujranwala in Punjab and prefers to project himself more as a Punjabi than as a Mohajir He was commissioned in the Pakistan Army Artillery in 1964. He had an undistinguished career till the 1980s, when he caught the eye of Gen Zia-ul-Haq and Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, another Mohajir COAS. Gen Zia, who preferred devoutly Muslim officers in important positions, chose Gen Musharraf for advancement as he was, like Gen Zia himself, a devout Deobandi and was strongly recommended by the Jamaat-e-Islami. The first assignment given by Zia to him was in the training of the mercenaries recruited by various Islamic extremist groups for fighting against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. It was during those days that Gen Musharraf came into contact with Osama Bin Laden, then a reputed Civil engineer of Saudi Arabia, who had been recruited by the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CAI) and brought to Pakistan for constructing bunkers for the Afghan Mujahideen in difficult terrain. Usama Bin Laden initially made his reputation in Afghanistan not as a Mujahideen or terrorist, but as a civil engineer who could construct bunkers in any terrain. He also developed the technique of constructing long tunnels to isolated Soviet and Afghan military posts. The Mujahideen used to suddenly emerge from these tunnels and surprise the Soviet and Afghan troops. The links, which Gen Musharraf developed with Bin Laden in those days, have subsequently remained strong. It was alleged that Gen Musharraf also developed a nexus with the narcotics smugglers of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Even though the CIA valued his services in Afghanistan, the Narcotics Control officials of the US had reservations about him because of suspicions of his contacts with the narcotics smugglers. That is one of the reasons why of all the senor Pakistani Army officers of today, Gen Musharraf has had the least interactions with the US military establishment--in the form of nomination for higher training in the US, participation in seminars and exercises and visits to US military establishments. His bio-data issued by the Pakistan Army HQ. in October last at the time of his appointment as the COAS show that he has done two training courses in the UK. There was no mention of any course in the US. Gen Zia chose Gen Musharraf (then a Brigadier) in 1987 to command a newly-raised Special Services Group (SSG) base at Khapalu in the Siachen area. To please Gen Zia, Gen Musharraf with his SSG commandos launched an attack on an Indian post at Bilfond La in September, 1987, and was beaten back. Despite this, he continued to enjoy the confidence of Zia. Gen Musharraf has since then spent seven years in two tenures with the SSG and prides himself on being an SSG commando and projects himself as the greatest expert of the Pakistan Army in mountain warfare. When he recently received Gen Anthony Zinni, the Commanding officer of the US Central Command, he was dressed as an SSG Commando. In May, 1988, the Shias, who are in a majority in Gilgit, rose in revolt against the Sunni-dominated administration. Zia put an SSG group commanded by Gen Musharraf incharge of suppressing the revolt. Gen Musharraf transported a large number of Wahabi Pakhtoon tribesmen from the NWFP and Afghanistan, commanded by Bin Laden, to Gilgit to teach the Shias a lesson. These tribesmen under Bin Laden massacred hundreds of Shias. In its issue of May, 1990, “Herald”, the monthly journal of the “Dawn” group of publications of Karachi, wrote as follows: “In May, 1988, low-intensity political rivalry and sectarian tension ignited into full-scale carnage as thousands of armed tribesmen from outside Gilgit district invaded Gilgit along the Karakoram Highway. Nobody stopped them. They destroyed crops and houses, lynched and burnt people to death in the villages around Gilgit town. The number of dead and injured was put in the hundreds. But numbers alone tell nothing of the savagery of the invading hordes and the chilling impact it has left on these peaceful valleys.” Gen Musharraf started a policy of bringing in Punjabis and Pakhtoons from outside and settling them down in Gilgit and Baltistan in order to reduce the Kashmiri Shias to a minority in their traditional land and this is continuing till today. The “Friday Times” of October 15-21, 1992, quoted Mr Muhammad Yahya Shah, a local Shia leader, as saying: “We were ruled by the Whites during the British days. We are now being ruled by the Browns from the plains. The rapid settling-in of Punjabis and Pakhtoons from outside, particularly the trading classes, has created a sense of acute insecurity among the local Shias”. Zia became the first victim of the carnage unleashed by Gen Musharraf on the Shias of Gilgit. Though the Pakistani authorities have not released the report of the committee, which enquired into the crash of Zia’s plane in August, 1988, it is widely believed in Pakistan that a Shia airman from Gilgit, wanting to take revenge for the May, 1988, carnage, was responsible for the crash. During his days with the SSG in the Siachen area and in the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan), Gen Musharraf developed a close personal friendship with Lt Gen (now retd.) Javed Nasir, Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), during Mr Nawaz Sharif’s first tenure as the Prime Minister and now his Adviser on intelligence matters, Maj Gen Zaheer-ul-Islam Abbasi, then a Brigadier, Lt Gen Mohd Aziz, former No: 2 in the ISI till February this year and now the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), and Mr Mohd Rafique Tarar, then a Judge and now the President of Pakistan. All the four of them were devout Deobandis with strong links with Islamic fundamentalist parties and particularly with the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM, also known for some years as the Harkat-ul-Ansar), which was declared by the US as an international terrorist organisation in 1997. Along with the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the HUM is a member of Bin Laden’s International Islamic Front for Jihad against the US and Israel. Lt Gen Nasir was also an office-bearer of the Tablighi Jamaat, even while in service. In the late 1980s, Brig Abbasi was posted as the Military Attache in the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi. He was expelled by the Government of India in 1989 after he was caught by the New Delhi police while receiving classified papers from a government employee. On his return to Pakistan, Brig Abbasi was posted to the Siachen. Like Gen Musharraf, he had a reputation of taking rash and irresponsible actions without the clearance of his superiors. He launched an attack on an Indian army post, which was repulsed with heavy Pakistani casualties. The late Gen Asif Nawaz Janjua, the then COAS, recalled him to Rawalpindi and wanted to dismiss him for launching the attack without his orders, but Lt Gen Nasir saved him from any punishment. On September 8, 1995, the Pakistani Customs stopped a car carrying heavy arms and ammunition near Kohat in the NWFP and arrested its driver and Saifullah Akhtar, the then patron of the HUM. On interrogation, they reportedly told the Customs authorities that the weapons had been procured by Brig Mustansar Billa of the Pakistan Army at Darra Adamkhel for supply to the Kashmiri extremist groups. The Pakistani army then took over the investigation and arrested a group of 40 army officers and 10 civilians headed by Maj Gen Abbasi. Mrs Benazir Bhutto, then Prime Minister, alleged that this group had conspired to kill her and senior military officers, stage a coup and proclaim an Islamic state. They were secretly tried by a military court and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Sections of the Pakistani press had alleged that the plotters had wanted to instal Gen Musharraf as the head of the Islamic State, and that Gen Aziz was also involved in the plot, but no action was taken against them for want of adequate evidence. Mr MH Askari, a well-known columnist, wrote in the “Dawn” (October 18, 1995) as follows: ”It is said that the plotters had close links with Hizbul Mujahideen and the Harkat-ul-Ansar, which are known for their involvement in international terrorism. It is also said that the arrest officers wanted Pakistan to become militarily involved in the Kashmir freedom struggle.” “The Nation” (October 20, 19995) reported that Maj Gen Abbasi had close contacts with the Harkat-ul-Ansar. The “Khabrain” alleged that two of the arrested officers belonged to the ISI and that one of them had worked as the staff officer to Lt Gen Nasir, when he was DG, ISI. “The Nation” of November 15, 1995, reported: “Almost all the arrested officers are followers of the Tablighi Jamaat based in Raiwind.” Raiwind, which is in the Punjab, is the hometown of the Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif. It is also the headquarters of the HUM. Pakistani analysts were surprised when Mr Sharif appointed Gen Musharraf as the COAS on October 8, 1998, superseding Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan, a Pakhtoon, who was the CGS, and Lt Gen Khalid Nawaz, a Punjabi, who was the Quarter-Master General. Mr Sharif’s choice of Gen Musharraf was attributed to the following: l He was strongly recommended by President Tarar and Lt Gen Nasir l He had ingratiated himself with Mr Sharif by keeping the latter informed of the criticism of the government’s functioning by Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan and Khalid Nawaz at the Corps Commanders’ conference when Gen Jehangir Karamat was the COAS. l Though a Mohajir, Gen Musharraf disliked Mr Altaf Hussain and his Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). Mr Sharif, therefore, wanted to use him to crush the MQM in Karachi. Mr Sharif and Gen Musharraf got along very well till March. As desired by Mr Sharif, the new COAS set up special military courts in Karachi to try the MQM cadres on charges of terrorism. Several of them were sentenced to death and two executed before the Pakistan Supreme Court, acting on a petition, declared these courts unconstitutional. It was alleged that Mr Sharif was also planning to have Mr Asif Zirdari, the husband of Mrs Bhutto, tried as a terrorist by the military courts and sentenced to death for allegedly killing Murtaza Bhutto, her brother, in September, 1996. Mr Sharif also made the Army in charge of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) to put an end to corruption and labour trouble and to improve efficiency. After the visit of Mr Strobe Talbott, US Deputy Secretary of State, to Pakistan in the first week of February, Mr Sharif also approved a plan submitted by Gen Musharraf for shifting Bin Laden’s terrorist brigade from the Jalalabad area of Afghanistan to the Kargil area of India by taking advantage of the absence of the Indian army from this area during winter. It is reported that while Lt Gen Nasir strongly backed the plan, Lt Gen, Ziauddin, the Director-General of the ISI, expressed strong reservation over it and pointed out that it could create problems for Pakistan with the US. Gen Musharraf transferred Lt Gen Aziz from the ISI to the Army HQ as his CGS and made him responsible for its implementation through the Directorate of Military Intelligence. Lt Gen Nasir was kept in the picture about the implementation, but not Lt Gen Ziauddin. While outwardly supporting the Lahore Declaration, Gen Musharraf, with the backing of Lt Gen Nasir, went ahead implementing the plan. Bin Laden’s terrorist brigade was transported to Skardu in the Northern Areas and from there infiltrated into the Kargil area along with a large number of Pakistani army regulars. Mr Sharif was allegedly not kept in the picture about sending the army regulars into Indian territory along with the terrorist brigade. In the February-March, 1999, issue of the Pakistan “Defence Journal”, Lt Gen Nasir had written an article titled “Calling in Indian Army Chief’s Bluff’. While ostensibly supporting the Lahore initiative, Lt Gen Nasir wrote in the most contemptuous manner of the capabilities of the Indian army and said: “The Indian army is incapable of undertaking any conventional operations at present, what to talk of enlarging conventional conflict.” A perusal of the writings in the Pakistani media and professional journals since January, 1999, shows that these irrational religious elements in the Pakistan army headed by Gen Musharraf and senior retired officers who have been supporting Gen Musharraf have embarked on this adventure in the Kargil area on the basis of the following assumptions:- l The morale in the Indian armed forces is low due to the “bad leadership” of Mr George Fernandes, our Defence Minister. Lt Gen Assad Durrani, former DG of the ISI, has sarcastically referred to Mr Fernandes as the “best Indian Defence Minister that Pakistan can hope to have.” l The BJP is party of paper tigers, known more for their “verbosity” than for their actions. l Pakistan’s nuclear and missile capability has ensured that India would not retaliate against Pakistan for occupying the ridges in the Kargil area. l The fear of the possible use of nuclear weapons would bring in Western intervention, thereby internationalising the Kashmir issue. l Pakistan should agree to a cease-fire only if it was allowed to remain in occupation of the Indian territory. There would be no question of the restoration of the status quo ante. The interviews and speeches of Gen Musharraf since October, 1998, show his thinking to be as follows: l The acquisition of Kashmir by Pakistan can wait. What is more important is to keep the Indian army bleeding in Kashmir just as the Afghan Mujahideen kept the Soviet troops bleeding in Afghanistan. l Even if the Kashmir issue is resolved, there cannot be normal relations between India and Pakistan because Pakistan, by frustrating India’s ambition of emerging as a major Asian power on par with China and Japan, would continue to be a thorn on India’s fresh. And, so long as it does so, Pakistan would continue to enjoy the backing of China and Japan. From March, Gen Musharraf, to the discomfiture of Mr Sharif, started coming out in his true colours. He issued an order that the army, as the supervisory authority, would conduct all future negotiations with the independent power producers, thereby denying any role in the matter to the politicians and civilian bureaucrats. When Mr Sharif objected to this order, he declined to cancel it. The COAS made out a list of all payment defaulters of the WAPDA and leaked to the press that Mrs Abida Hussain, a Shia Minister of Mr Sharif’s Cabinet, was one of the major defaulters, thereby forcing her to resign. He has also been hinting to the press that the business enterprises of Mr Sharif’s family top the list of defaulters. He then insisted that he should be given concurrent charge of the post of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, even though it was the turn of Admiral Fasih Bokhari, the Chief of the Naval staff, to hold this charge. His argument was that since the army was the most important component of the armed forces, the Chairman should always be from the army. While not accepting this argument, Mr Sharif gave him concurrent charge for one year only, as against the normal three years. He also got himself nominated as the Strategic Commander of Pakistan’s nuclear force. By May, Gen Musharraf found to his surprise that the BJP-led government was reacting vigorously to the invasion and had ordered the Indian Air Force to go into action against the invaders. It was only then that he reportedly told a shocked Mr Sharif that he had sent in a large number of Pakistan army regulars with Bin Laden’s terrorist brigade and that the regulars were likely to incur heavy casualties. The demand of the US and other Western powers for the withdrawal of the invaders and for the restoration of the status quo ante came as another surprise to him. Despite this, he seems to be insisting that Pakistan should not agree to any unconditional withdrawal. BENAZIR’S ROLENEW US TROUBLE-SHOOTER ON KASHMIRDiplomatic CorrespondentRecently Mrs Benazir Bhutto, the former Pakistan Prime Minister had beenflexing her muscles against the regime of Nawaz Sharif. Her statements on Kargil and Kashmir have been welcomed by the Indian public opinion as reflective of the existence of a moderate political opinion in Pakistan. Mrs Bhutto in an interview to a Calcutta weekly described Kargil as the biggest blunder, nearly provoking a nuclear war in South Asia. She asked, “why did Sharif have to go on a bus diplomacy when this is what he had planned.” About the presence of Pakistani regular Army personnel in Kargil operation, Mrs Bhutto wondered, “can a democracy have unaccountable regime that operates in a secretive manner.” She disclosed that earlier during her tenure also she had given similar briefing, where by militarily certain objectives could have been achieved. Arguing that these could have triggered a wider conflict, she added, “I had vetoed them saying that Pakistan lacked the political and diplomatic support.” Earlier in a lecture at Woodrow Wilson International centre, Mrs Bhutto remarked that it was a mistake on her part to hold relations with India hostage to Kashmir issue. She said that she did it to pander to the Punjabi constituency and hawkish elements within the military. Mrs Bhutto said that she should have listened to the liberals who had urged her to seek reconciliation with India and cooperate on trade, commerce and such matters while keeping Kashmir as top priority on the agenda. Mrs Bhutto had been more articulate on Kashmir through her write-ups in the American press during the Kargil war. She had been floating baloons on resolutions of Kashmir dispute on the lines suggested by Americans. Holding camp David like talks on Kashmir and forcing India and Pakistan to concede greater autonomy to their respective parts as the first step is the real game-plan through which Americans intend to create a foothold in this strategic region. Michael Krepon, Head of the influential US think tank Henry L Stimson Centre, whose policies on Kashmir are currently the US unofficial view came out with outlines of solution in the leading daily, Washington Post. The three components of peace process, according to him should be: a) Greater autonomy to Kashmiris on both sides of LoC. b) An open border applicable to local residents. c) Investing bilateral talks with more seriousness. It is more or less a version of earlier US proposals on semi-independent Kashmir. This packaged is being touted as the road map to a permanent solution to Kashmir problem. Krepon warns that the alternative is “highly worrisome”. He said that otherwise Pakistan can always set up militant training camps, push insurgents and country (India) will be helpless to counter this without making war-like noise and lose the international goodwill it earned recently. As a thinly veiled comment, he adds that the bilateral talks have not progressed because Delhi has not been very enthusiastic about clinching the issue. The association of the leading newspaper and the sharp and unambiguous comment of the specialist are highly significant. In America it is a common practice to float new policy initiatives by administration through researchers. The leading Pakistan daily Jang in a special commentary on Aug 2, 1999 said Pakistan was seriously considering US formula for resolving its Kashmir problem with India. Solutions proposed by US according to the daily Jang were: a) Greater autonomy to Kashmir (minus Gilgat, Baltistan and Ladakh, which would go to Pakistan and India respectively) b) Open the dividing military line of control to Kashmiris living on either side of it. c) After five years of self-rule and free interaction, the Kashmiris on two sides should elect separate assemblies which should decide the future of the Himalayan state. The Jang said these “initial proposals” could be amended in the talks that Clinton promised to promote between Pakistan and India to end their fifty years of hostility. In its lead editorial, “War of Peace in South Asia”, the Washington Post proposed, “India can sustain this rigid posture, if at all only by systematically and credibly widening the openings for democratic self-government in the part of Kashmir that, with two-thirds of a million troops it holds.” What are Benazir’s new proposals on Kashmir? Like US she raised the ante of a nuclear war and demands, “It is time for the world, and especially the United States, to turn its diplomacy to crisis prevention”. Benazir invokes a parallel with Kosovo and says, “Kosovo warns us that the world should try to put out a potentially dangerous fire before it explodes”. Responding to “Dampening the Fires of Kashmir”, by an influential US think tank, Teresita Schaffer, in the Washington Post, Benazir presented her perspectives on Kashmir. These are: a) Satisfying the aspirations of the people of Kashmir is essential to solving the dispute and if the coalition representing the Kashmiri people were to accept internal autonomy under India with a representative political process, Pakistan would have no complaints. b) Instead of determining whether Kashmir should go to India or Pakistan, the Pakistani opposition suggests that India, Pakistan and APHC accept open borders between India and Pakistan. As a part of this peace package, India would withdraw its troops from Srinagar and Pakistan from Muzaffarabad. c) Pending a final solution, the two assemblies could meet independently and perhaps jointly. d) ...devolution of decision-making in our region would provide more effective government to our people. Greater regional autonomy also would help our people make the best use of available resources from within the country and from donors, in tackling the problems of poverty, illiteracy and backwardness”. Schaffer’s write-up saw autonomy for J&K as a first step towards expanded autonomy within other parts of India. In an interview to Sunday Benazir while reiterating demanded for open borders asked India to withdraw troops from Kashmir and begin a dialogue with APHC, whom she describes as the real representatives of Kashmiris from Pakistan’s perception. She is more explicit on US intervention and remarks, “if India and Pakistan cannot do it between themselves, then I think it’s a good idea to get some outside help, so that all of South Asia is not punished because of the political leadership of the two countries.” Benazir during her Europe tour had been talking of a spectacular return to Pakistan. What assurances has she received and from Whom? Ten years back US had arranged her return and helped her win elections. Is she acting as US’s new trouble shooter on Kashmir precisely for the same game again? If India is looking for a moderate opinion in Benazir, then it is heading for another round of self-deception END ROLE OF SHRIDHAR KAUL DULLU IN LADAKH WARLATE Shridhari Kaul Dullu lived in Rainawari, a suburb of Srinagar. He wastruly a renaissance figure in the contemporary history of Kashmir. Masterji, as he was popularly called was trained to teach. He admired Buddhism and became a Buddhist by conviction. Masterji knew that Ladakh was the ancient seat of learning and culture so far as Buddhisim was concerned and also Ladakhis were simple people. When he was transferred to this desolate region as ADI schools, he didnot grumble. He felt happy. Masterji loved Ladakhis, their culture and simplicity. He created educational awareness among them and till his last days many Ladakhi students used to stay with him at Rainawari and seek his help in admissions. Ladakh’s educational and political renewal is linked with his name. Masterji was gifted with unique insights into cultural and political processes of J&K. His magnum opus “Ladakh Through The Ages” amply reflects this. He was a good organiser for mobilising public and building public opinion on crucial issues. In May 1948, during Ladakh campaign, he prepared a report on the defence of Ladakh. Braving the inhospitable terrain of Leh-Manali track, Masterji presented this report in person to Pt Jawahar Lal Nehru, Prime Minister. So impressed was Nehru with this assessment that he prevailed upon Masterji to get in touch with Gen. Cariappa, then C in C and Sardar Baldev Singh, the Defence Minister of India. In 1947-48 Masterji found himself in a strange role. He had an appeal cutting across communities. This aspect and his great organising abilities made him the natural choice as organiser of National Guards for the defence of Ladakh. National Guards proved a decisive factor in turning the tide of war in favour of India. The fall of Gilgit had caused serious concern and fear among Buddhists of Ladakh. Actuely aware of the fate of non-Muslims in Skardu, Buddhists decided to raise their own defences for Leh till Indian Army could arrive. Masterji and the President of Young Buddhist Association, Mr K Poan Chewang Rigzin played a crucial role in this. They prevailed upon the emergency administration at Srinagar to take immediate steps for organising local people in a militia, irrespective of religious affiliation as National Guards. Fortunately DP Dhar was in-charge of Defence of Frontier. He had keen understanding of the frontier security and wasted no time in getting immediate State government clearance. Wazir was directed to take necessary steps to implement this scheme and the Garrison commander at Leh was ordered to train the recruits. These orders were sabotaged at the local level by the Tehsildar, Abdul Khaliq. A native of Skardu, Khaliq was alleged to be highly sectarian and a Muslim League backer. He tried to give it a sectarian colour. Subsequently the State government appointed Masterji as organiser of National Guards. Masterji in this mission toured extensively all over Ladakh impressing upon the people to enrol themselves as National Guards. He asked the people to realise the perilous situation and undergo necessary arms training to inflict heavy punishment on the enemy. Initially people were slow to react. Masterji utilised festival occasions to enroll them. His efforts soon bore fruit. In few weeks he raised about 500 volunteers. In the first week, fifty volunteers underwent arms training. Masterji’s persuasive skills saw even Muslims joining National Guards in the Ladakh countryside. While the campaigning of recruitment was in full swing, the legendary Ladakh campaign hero, Lt Col Prithvi Chand and his able assistant Jamadar Bhim Chand reached Leh. They had come to train the National Guards recruits. Their timely arrival infused new hope into the hearts of defenders of Leh. The persistent pressures of the Buddhist leadership and the personal efforts of Masterji in Delhi saw more military reinforcements reaching Leh. 2/8 Gorkhas, numbering 150 came via Leh-Manali route. It was Masterji who as organiser of National Guards arranged transport, food and looked after other logistics of this detachment. It was Masterji’s decision to shift the headquarters of the administration to Martselang, a village 25 miles south of Leh. This was to ensure its security. In those uncertain days Masterji’s presence in Leh had became synonymous with high morale of the people. Whenever he stepped out of Leh suddenly, serious misgivings would arise among the people. A community hall in Leh stands in his memory. We reproduce below here the note which Pt. Sridhar presented to Pt. JL Nehru Prime Minister of India. The note is an ample testimony of Master Ji’s grasp of the situation in Ladakh END COL CHHEWANG RINCHEN-THE SAVIOUR OF LADAKHIt was a touch and go situation in 1947 in Ladakh. The efforts of legendaryheroes-Brig. Sher Jung Thapa, Col. Prithvi Chand and Col Chhewang Rinchen made possible what looked impossible. Defence of Ladakh looked difficult because the only route i.e. Zojila was closed. Col. C. Rinchen, then a young boy of seventeen held the fort in Nubra and was instrumental in the defence of Leh. In 1971 he captured for India the strategic Turtuk-which is the tough underbelly of Siachen Col. Rinchen went on to win for his extraordinary valour double Mahavirchakra, the highest gallantry award besides a Sena medal. From a guerrilla warrior in 1947, Col Rinchen retired as a full Colonel in 1984. His younger brother, P Namgyal who also participated in 1948 campaign represented Ladakh Parliamentary seat many times and also served in the central cabinet. For his military skills, Col Rinchen has received rare tributes from top generals. Col Prithvi Chand says, “Rinchen turned out to be an inspiring leader. He was a fearless man and highly patriotic. He volunteered to take part in several battles and raids.” Lt Gen ML Chibber (Retd.), too had great regards for Col Rinchen’s military skills. He says, “...I noticed the uncanny mountain sense he displayed while moving for an attack on an enemy picket. He had God given instinct to choose the most appropriate, even the most hazardous route, to surprise the very vigilant enemy. I realised his being a man who comes into his own in battles”. Col Rinchen was the youngest winner of MVC in the Indian Army or for that matter in nearly two hundred years of history of the British Indian Army. Col Rinchen belonged to a celebrated Warrior family of Sumur in Nubra Valley. One of his forefathers in eighteenth century had distinguished himself against raiders from Turkistan. STAKRE (in Ladakhi ‘Lion) title was conferred on him by King of Ladakh for this bravery. The personality of Col. Rinchen was true to the literal meaning of his name. In Ladakhi Chhewang means hero and Rinchen full of life. For her compassion, Col Rinchen’s mother is known as the mother of Nubra valley. Col Rinchen received his primary education from Mr Stanzin, a Ladakhi Christian missionary. His childhood hobbies were to make pistols, guns and bombs. He enjoyed playing with improvised weapons. For secondary education Col Rinchen was sent to Leh, where he stayed with the elitist Kalon family. It was here that he heard stories about world war I and II accounts of bravery from State Force Army Officers, who often visited Mr Kalon’s house. Col. Rinchen was the first volunteer to join the National Guards. He was then a school boy of eighth class. Rinchen himself says, “I know that the safety of my land was more important than my studies”. It was April 1948. After a period of ten days training he was sent with Subedar Bhim Chand to raise a local force in the Nubra valley known as Nubra Guards. Within a period of one month a company strength was raised and trained. They were immediately deployed in La Chhurk and Chhangmar area (between present Thoise airfield and Turtuk). Pakistani invaders had overrun Baltistan (except Skardu) and Biagdango. They were advancing along the Shyok river. Col Rinchen’s task was to defend Chhangmar and the northern bank of Shyok river. He took 28 boys with him. Over the next few days he crossed rivers and scaled different peaks to reach the enemy picket at La Chhuruk. Nubra guard party totally surprised the Pakistanis and killed all enemy soldiers holed up in the picket. Post was captured along with arms and ammunition left behind by the enemy. Of all the achievements of 17 year old Rinchen, the most decisive was his stand on the Skuru Nullah. Pakistani invaders were only ten miles away from Leh. Had Rinchen failed, Ladakh’s fate would have been different. Col Mohammad Yusuf Abadi, then Pakistani commander leading Gilgat scouts in his memoir titled Baltistan Par Ek Nazar recalls, “our intelligence revealed that our repeated attacks were foiled by the personal valour of a 17-year old boy named Chhewang Rinchen had we succeeded at Skuru, there would then have been no real obstacle to our capturing Leh.” Taru front was only eight miles from Leh. Since Lt Col Prithvi Chand had no reserves and threat to Leh loomed large, all troops were ordered to rush to Leh. Subedar Bhim Chand also left Nubra along with the arms and ammunition issued to Nubra guards. In Nubra, only the irregulars under the command of Chewang Rinchen were left to guard the Valley. They had just 20 rifles and 50 rounds of ammunition per rifle. The Pakistanis were unaware of the withdrawal of Indian forces from Nubra for nearly a month. Soon they came to know that only locals with matchlock guns were deployed in Nubra. To give an element of deception to the enemy, Rinchen’s group would come down the hill and fire on Pakistanis from the north. This would give an impression to the enemy that Indian regulars armed with .303 rifles were in hiding nearby. Withdrawal of Indian regular troops from Nubra created scare and panic among locals. They began fleeing to Leh. Col Rinchen was caught in a strange predicament. He himself recalls, “I was a witness to this mass exodus and it became unbearable for me to witness our land being offered to the enemy without resistance, virtually as a gift.” Chewang Rinchen was too great a patriot to yield so easily. He prevailed upon the local resistance leaders in Leh to motivate Nubra youth to return for the defence of their motherland. Given the shortage of weapons and ammunition, Lt. Col. Prithvi Chand was hesistant to release these to a mere 17-year old boy. Rinchen had requested for 100 rifles and some LMGs to defend Nubra. With the intervention of Mr Kalon, Col. Prithvi Chand on the assurance that no arms and ammunition will be allowed to fall in the hands of enemy, finally released 28 rifles, one sten gun and a few boxes of ammunition. Back in Nubra, Rinchen began organising the defence of Nubra, the gateway of Leh. He recalled all the Nubra Guards for duty and armed them to the extent possible, many with muzzle loading guns. Rinchen’s guards reached the village Skampuk on the banks of Skuru, a deep and fast flowing nullah. As Pakistan forces learnt about the Indian withdrawal from Nubra, they began preparations for crossing Shyok river in local boats, to reach Khardung La. Learning about this plan, Chewang Rinchen decided to ambush them while they were crossing the river. At ten O’clock in the morning, about 12 Pakistanis boarded the boat. When the boat reached midstream, Rinchen’s guerrillas opened fire. All the Pakistanis were either killed or drowned. The enemy on the opposite bank returned the fire but were totally outwitted by Nubra Guards resistance. After a while, Pakistanis withdrew towards Hundiri village on the northern bank. Rinchen left some men to guard the crossing point and himself headed towards Skuru nullah. He evacuated the civilian population of Skuru village to Thoise and enrolled all the young men in his Nubra Guards. Subsequently he destroyed the Skuru nullah bridge to thwart Pakistani plans for crossing the nullah. Meanwhile more reinforcements reached from Leh and Nubra Guards force swelled upto 300 men. The whole of Nubra valley was now galvanised for its defence. The Pakistanis misjudged this force as being the Indian Army and did not attack Indian positions for few days. It was after eight days of waiting and preparation that Pakistanis launched heavy mortar-machine gun attack. Rinchen’s men inflicted heavy casualties on them. After this setback, the Pakistanis occupied a defensive position on the opposite bank of Skuru nullah. Through deception, Rinchen wanted to give the impression of inflated strength to the enemy. He carried out raids from different points and directions. After a few days, Pakistanis launched another attack at about midnight using hand grenades. Despite casualties, Nubra Guards held their position and the attack was beaten back. Pakistanis called for further reinforcements and also wanted to capture or kill Chhewang Rinchen who had become terror for them. Sniping and shooting continued between the two sides. Soon good news reached Rinchen. It was August. Col Pritvhi Chand informed him that he had brought a platoon of newly raised 7 J&K Militia along with a company of 2/8 Gorkha Rifles under the command of Major RC Mathur. He directed Rinchen to take them to Skkuru defences and apprise them about military position. After holding the position for 23 days, Rinchen finally handed over the post to Subedar Ishar Singh of 7 J&K Militia. Gorkhas were also deployed. A few days later Pakistanis launched a major attack and captured the Skuru post. They also captured a section post of 2/8 Gorkha company. Indian troops fell back to Skampuk village. On 25 August 1948, Lt Col Prithvi Chand appointed Rinchen as a Naib-Subedar in 7 J&K Militia. He became the youngest ever JCO in the Army. For the first time he wore the Army uniform now. Rinchen was assigned the task to once again raise a full company of Nubra Guards and select 50 men to operate as Guerrillas. These specially selected men were given training in the use of LMGs, 2-inch mortar and all types of grenades. On completion of their training Rinchen was asked to take over command and undertake a number of operations. As in-charge of this group, the first task Rinchen was given was to capture the Lama House. The route to it lay through very hard terrain. Rinchen’s force eliminated the major portion of the enemy platoon (25 in number) and many ran away in their under-clothes. Among the dead was their platoon commander, Sargeant Major Mota Hassan of Gilgat Scouts. Rinchen had killed him in hand to hand fighting with a bayonet and captured his sten gun. This sten gun was later presented to the Hall of Fame at Leh and lies there. When Nubra Guards reached Pak headquarters in Lama House, they found it deserted. Meanwhile, Skuru position had fallen to Pakistanis but the troops of Indian Army ensured that Pakistanis made no further progress. Indian Army’s next attack on Pakistan position at Tarche did not succeed. Rinchen in view of his great military feats, was specially ordered to bring back the Pakistani medium machine gun, which was firing at India’s recently captured post in the Lama House. Rinchen nearly succeeded in this task. Subsequently the Nubra Guards while advancing methodically on both banks of Shyok river, occupied Chhangmar La, Chhurk and Baigdangdo. Pakistanis had occupied Black Rock picket and Takkar Hill. While Gorkhas wrested back Black Rock position Rinchen captured Takkar Hill with the Nubra Guard troops. His men inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and Pakistanis fell back to Chalunka. Pakistanis now dug in the Tebe Hill area on the South of the River Shyok. This position dominated the whole Nubra valley and the Indian advance was held up. On 22, December Chewang Rinchen was ordered to capture Tebe Hill position and to reach Tebe nullah. This was Rinchen’s last battle and the most spectacular one in 1948 Ladakh campaign. Speaking about this, Rinchen recalls, “It had been a long, exhausting and hazardous operation lasting for six days, of which nights and days were in contact”. This battle was fought in snow at the mountain top, with an altitude of 21,000 feel. At this Pakistani Post, a section strength was on duty. Rinchen took Pakistanis by surprise. With his first LMG shot, Rinchen killed 6 or 7 Pakistanis and the remaining ran into bunkers. He then shifted to 2-inch mortar and the enemy started running. After the enemy was fully pounded, Rinchen ordered a bayonet charge and set out in pursuit of the enemy. Many Pakistanis died in the assault and some wounded soldiers were captured. Rinchen’s next destination was Tebe Nullah, the Pakistani company headquarter. At midnight, when Rinchen’s force reached the company headquarters, they found it deserted. On January 1, 1949 cease-fire was declared and India lost the opportunity to recover Baltistan. At a time, when our defence of Ladakh-our northern frontier, has been threatened, it is time to pay homage to those heroes who fought for Ladakh and saved it. COL. CHHEWANG RINCHEN, DOUBLE MVC, SM, AND NUBRA VALLEY“In August, 1948 the enemy had thrown all his reserves to capture the NubraValley. Naib Subedar Chhewang Rinchen with only 28 untrained National Guards held the enemy at Skuru nullah for 23 days. In September, he was detailed to capture the enemy position at Lama House; this was an extremely difficult task and entailed four days of march through treacherous country, including crossing a mountain feature over 1700 feet. He succeeded in capturing the objective with heavy casualties to the enemy and the capture of 13 rifles and one sten gun. On 15 December, 1948, when ordered to capture a hill feature near Biagdangdo he walked through snow for three days and succeeded in forcing the enemy to withdraw. Again on 22 December, 1948, he was detailed to attack the enemy’s last position in Leh Tehsil area. It took him six days to reach his objective. He had to go over a mountain feature 21000 ft and though his platoon suffered 50 percent casualties from frost-bite, he kept his men going through his outstanding and exemplary leadership. He attacked the two enemy posts and captured them; the enemy suffered heavy casaulties. This JCO displayed exemplary courage, inspiring leadership, initiative and the ability to plan and carry out his schemes successfully under most adverse conditions.” --Citation of Maha Vir Chakra
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