Engagement over Siachin glacier has remained a dilemma for both India and Pakistan. Are the two fighting only for military prestige' Since 1984, the snow-warriors of India and Pakistan have been locked in supremacy for the control of Siachin glacier. Its inhospitable terrain has taken heavy toll of men and resources on both sides. Fiction and folklore have become mingled with Siachin warfare. Siachin being world's largest non-polar glacier is also sometimes referred to as the third pole. It is 78 kms long and situated at an altitude of 5,472 metres above sea level. Siachin glacier is the great Himalayan watershed that demarcates central Asia from the Indian sub-continent. It also separates Pakistan from China in this region.

ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT

The roots of the conflict over Siachin lie in the non-demarcations on the western side on the map beyond NJ9842 1949 Karachi agreement and 1972 Shimla agreement presumed that it was not feasible for human habitation to survive north of 9842. In 1949 after the ceasfire line agreement was signed between India and Pakistan, cease-fire line was delineated to a point north of Shyok river. A similar indeterminate Line of Control exists north east of Siachin glacier on the border with China.

Under 1963 Sino-border agreement, Pakistan ceded the 5000 sq. km Shaksgam valley to China. It lies to the north east of Siachen glacier. Article six of this agreement mentioned that the 'two parties have agreed that, after the settlement of Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, the sovereign authority concerned will reopen negotiations with the government of People's Republic of China on the boundary, so as to sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the present agreement, provided that, in the event of that sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provisions of the present agreement and the aforesaid protocol be maintained.' Intriguingly, this clause was dropped by China in 1987.

To the east beyond the Shaksgam valley lies China's vulnerable Sinkiang region. As nothing was demarcated on the map beyond point NJ9842, Shaksgam valley was a no-main's land. China also stands in possession of forcible grab of 37,555 sq. kms of Ladakh territory-Aksai Chin. It built a motorable road from Gartok in Tibet via Rudok through Aksai Chin to Sinkiang in 1958.

Since 1984, India and Pakistan have been claiming the Siachin wasteland as their territory and engaged in grabbing the more advantageous position along the line. In early eighties Karakoram ranges became special destination for many western Army expeditions. Subsequently, this area came to be shown as part of Pakistan in the maps issued by western countries. This alerted India. Pakistan claims that Siachin is part of country's northern areas. It says that this area has remained under its administrative control since 1947.

India's contention is that this undemarcated area was never under the control of Pakistan and cites Shimla agreement as a proof.

The 78 km long Siachin glacier is hemmed in between the Saltoro ridge line to the west and the main Karakoram range to the east. The Saltoro ridge originates from the Sia Kangri in the Karakoram range and the altitudes range from 18,000 to 24,000 ft. The major passes on this ridge are Sia La at 20,000 ft and Bila Fond La at 19,000 ft. India's position on Line of Control is based on the terrain configuration, which runs along the Saltoro ridge line upto Sia Kangri. Pakistan claims that the Line of Control is a straight line joining NJ9842 to Karakoram pass north of the Indian Dault Bag Ouldi outpost. The Pakistani claim does not relate to the accepted principles of frontier demarcation. It cuts across the river valleys Nubra and Shyok of Indian Ladakh, 10,000 sq km of Indian territory, which includes Siachen glacier.

Presently India holds two-thirds of glacier and commands two of the three passes. Pakistan controls Gyong La pass that overlooks the Shyok and Nubra river Valley and India's access to Leh district. Indian imperatives are that if Pakistan is allowed to control the glacier, it would endanger the security of Ladakh and also of J&K. With Chinese already in control of Aksai Chin, it is argued that the whole of northern Ladakh would be imperilled if Pakistan is allowed unfettered movement through Siachen. In long-term perspective, Indian strategists also feel that this Himalayan watershed can yield it access to resource rich Central Asian republics through the Afghan panhandle.

Through its control of the glacier, Pakistan intends not only to threaten Leh-Ladakh but also to take her border to meet that of China. It believes then it can find an alternate route to the treacherous Karakoram highway. On the face of it, Pakistan argument looks simply ridiculous. Indian occupation of Siachen can hardly threaten Sino-Pak Karakoram highway, as the highway is nearly 200 km of broken mountainous terrain away from Siachen.

Of and on Pakistan activates Siachen prior to any formal talks with India and links Siachen to the Kashmir issue. Its purpose being to focus the 'core' issue of Kashmir. By making key Siachen as a potential flash point, especially now in a nuclearised environment, it seeks third party intervention in its favour.

CONFRONTATION

By the begining of 1984, Pakistani plans for occupying Saltoro ridge and Siachen glacier were ready. India pre-empted this by launching Operation Meghdoot in April 1984. An advance unit from Kumaon Regiment was airlifted, which established Indian posts on Siachen. India gained control of the two passes Sia La and Bilfond La, which overlook the strategic Karakoram highway. Pakistan vainly tried to recapture these passes in late 1984 and 1985.

In 1986, Pakistani army received another setback. In an extraordinary act of valour and skill, Subedar Bana Singh captured 21,000 ft high Qaid Post from Pakistanis. India renamed the post as Bana Post and this earned Bana Singh India's first and only Paramvir Chakra after 1971. After this defeat, Benazir Bhutto tauntingly told late General Zia-ul-Haque to wear a burqa.

To dislodge India from Bilfond La, Pakistan raised an elite Special Service Group (SSG) commandos in 1987. It built up Khapalu garrison with eight thousand troops. General Pervez Mushraff, then incharge SSG, and now Pak Army Chief, spent his first soldier's night with SSG at Siachen. Pakistan launched the assault in September 1987 and suffered a crushing defeat.

Though Pakistan failed in its attempt to capture the Bilfond La pass but Indian also lost the strategic initiative. It failed to appreciate that takeover of Khapalu rather than the control of either Siachen or the Saltoro-ridge line was strategic to Indian security interests in the area.

Distance between Khapalu and Saltoro passes is only forty kms as crow flies. Defence strategists believe that any attack on Leh from Pakistan via Saltoro and Siachen would be logistically and humanly difficult. The likely route can be only along the Shyok river to Khardong La, which leads on to Leh. Obviously, it would have made sense strategically, if Indian army had taken over Khapalu before Pak build up in 1987, using Shyok river route, which is militarily, viable. But then, this is the sad story of India's repeated failures in appreciating strategic security interests.

In 1990 there were again skirmishes on the periphery of the glacier. In 1995 Pak SSG suffered forty casualties in an attack on an outpost by Sikh battalion. An IAF MI-17 helicopter was shot down in 1996. In 1998 there were five abortive attacks in fifteen days by Pakistan on Ashok, Malon, Fateh 5770 and other posts. Last Pak attack was on March 10,1999 some three weeks after the Lahore summit. of and on artillery fire is exchanged intermittently. Pakistan's elite commandos and soldiers of 36 Baluch Regiment have failed to gain a toehold on Saltoro crestline, Indira Col, to an anonymous benchmark NJ9842. This has forced Pakistan to shift its strategy from one of offensive to containment by forcing huge expenditure on India.

Currently Pakistan maintains three battalions, while India has seven battalions defending Siachen. Pakistan spends Rs 10 million a day, which amounts to Rs 3.6 billion a year. Indian expenditure is Rs 14.40 billion a year. So far Pakistan has spent Rs 50.2 billion, a huge drain on financial resources for a small poor country like Pakistan.

On an average, one Pakistani soldier is killed every fourth day, while one

Indian soldier is killed every second day. 1344 Pak soldiers have died on Siachen since 1984. Ninety five percent casualties have been due to extreme and intolerable weather conditions. The number of wounded is nearly twenty times more, while the number is in thousands of those traumatized.

DIALOGUE

The huge drain on resources have forced India and Pakistan to open a dialogue for a disengagement on Siachen, without prejudice to either side's actual ground position locations or its interpretation of the extension of LoC beyond NJ9842, where it was terminated in 1972.

As per India the line follows the Saltoro crestline to Indira Col, while Pakistan draws a straight line from NJ9842 to Karakoram pass. This triangle of dispute is made up of NJ9842, Indira Col and Karakoram pass. The zone of disengagement, however, would require the Indian troops to move east of Siachen glacier around its snout in the Nubra valley, while the Pakistani troops would have to pull back west to fall back positions around Goma-NJ9842. The Indian Himalaya brigade is based in Pratapur, while Pakistan's Frontier Controlled Northern Areas (FCNA) functions from Skardu. Pakistan's compulsions for talks on Siachen stem from a reality that India commands higher and more commanding posts on Sia La and Bilfond La passes.

These two passes provide access across the Saltoro ridge into Siachen from Pakistan side. As it has been unable to dislodge India, Pakistan army has settled for containing it to the Saltoro, while strengthening its build-up in adjoining Skardu, facing Kargil sector of Ladakh.

In June 1990, Pakistan after deploying additional troops close to the glacier, called for 'talks'. Army brass in Northern Command prevailed upon VP Singh, the then Prime Minister not to fall into the Pak trap on settlement of glacier. It warned that army can do little if the two strategic mountain passes, Sia Lal and Bilfond La were handed to Pakistan.

Pakistan subsequently mounted pressure through its patrons. In March 1993 in its report titled 'India and America after the cold war', prepared by U.S. think tank Carnegie Endowment Study Group called upon Indian Prime Minister to unilaterally withdraw from the contested Siachen glacier as a stimulus to 'broaden' the dialogue on confidence building measures. Earlier, two UN military observers, who had sneaked incognito into the Siachen area were pushed out by the Indian Army.

THE PROSPECT

Pakistan has been sending contradictory signals on disengagement in Siachen.

Prior to Lahore talks, Pak army Chief, Parvez Mushraff went in the company of Mr Nawaz Sharif to Siachen and said that the challenge to Pakistan security was from within. He ruled out any threat from India. But soon after the Lahore summit he backtracked on delinking Siachen from Kashmir issue and Okayed attack on an Indian post. This has raised doubts about Pakistan's real intentions. India proposes six-point formula, which includes cessation of cartographic aggression and culminating in the withdrawl of forces by both sides. Pakistan opposes it and calls for first withdrawing forces and then delineating an extension of LoC beyond NJ9842.