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June 15 - July 31st, 2001


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Monkey diplomacy
By Brahma Chellaney

With its continuing ‘war of a thousand cuts’ against India, Pakistan poses the single biggest challenge to Indian foreign policy. Yet Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee has changed course on Pakistan so often in the past three years that the policy appears numb from the repeated shocks it has suffered. An unending policy dance, with its nifty, monkey-like somer-saults, has left the Indian public dazed.

  Not many expected that India would stick to its commitment not to open dialogue with the Pakistani military junta until it halted its support to terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. But no one expected that New Delhi would jettison its commitment so abruptly and dramatically as to stun Indians and outsiders alike.

  Until last Wednesday morning, India’s policy was that it won’t even play cricket with Pakistan. By that evening, the policy had changed so totally that India was ready to lay out the red carpet to welcome the Pakistani dictator for talks without precondition. After asserting for decades that J&K is an internal matter in which Pakistan has no part, India’s invitation solely names that “outstanding” issue without mentioning its core concern over terrorism. Not even a cursory attempt has been made to explain the rationale behind the 180-degree turnabout.

  Consistency may not be a virtue in politics but it is an essential element in foreign policy. Abrupt twists and turns are detrimental to the credibility of foreign policy. A nation that shows that its policy commitments mean nothing can never secure international  respect or be taken seriously at its word. In fact, a record of frequent policy U-turns is an invitation to external pressure as it tells outsiders that the nation is weak-willed and amenable to change in any area.

  Vajpayee’s background is testament to his dedication to national security. But on Pakistan he has displayed a sigular lack of consistency. Vajpayee has oscillated on Pakistan in a manner no Indian Prime Minister has done. Given that he has a good national security team in LK Advani, Jaswant Singh and Brajesh Mishra, it is a surprise that Vajpayee lacks a clear strategy to deal with a country that defines its identity through congenital hatred towards India and whose present military ruler publicly extols jehad as a State Instrument.

  Vajpayee’s Pakistan policy has been haunted by the ‘monkey man’ long before rumours about the existence of such a creature spread alarm in the capital. How else can one explain the repeated policy flips? Try rationalizing the following somersaults:

  First came the Indian statements after the Shakti tests about the new geopolitical realities, including in relation to Kashmir. Then followed a 180 degree turn in policy with Vajpayee being smitten by the peace itch and getting himself invited to Pakistan. Contrary to the wise words of French statesman Charies-Murice de Talleyrand to avoid “too much zeal” in diplomacy, Vajpayee’s fervour overflowed as he surprised Nawaz Sharif with a hug at Wagah and recorded at Minar-e-Pakistan that “a stable, secure and prosperous Pakistan is in India’s interest”.

  This was followed by Kargil, with Vajpayee crying that he got taken for a ride by the foe to whom he went riding a bus with fanfare. Vajpayee pledged no talks and cut off all links with Pakistan, including through sports and SAARC. He also declared “zero tolerance” against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.

  Before long, however, his government changed track, holding secret talks with the pro-Pakistan Hurriyat and Hizbul Mujahideen and encouraging an ill-famed Indian corporate house to open informal lines of communication with Islamabad. A botched ceasefire with the Hizb did not deter Vajpayee from surprising the nation by declaring a unilateral Ramzan ceasefire against all Pakistan-sponsored terrorist outfits.

  For six months, the government kept telling the nation the ceasefire was working well, although official casualty figures told a different story. Even the army chief was pressed into service to win political and public support for ceasefire extension. Then one fine day the pendulum again swung to the other end: the ceasefire was called off, the KC Pant initiative was effectively sidelined, and Vajpayee had invited the mastermind of Kargil to walk the “high road with us”.

  The nation has been left gaping, not knowing when the next shock may come. Instead of countering Islamabad’s monkey tricks, the government continues to monkey with India’s Pakistan policy. In the absence of a near-term or long-term strategy to tackle Pakistan, New Delhi has taken to periodically pulling the monkey out of the  hat.

  Clearly, the latest turnabout has been driven by narrow tactical considerations than by a larger strategy, although the move is as clever as a cartload of monkeys. In inviting General Pervez Musharraf for direct talks while simultaneously ending the ceasefire, India has sought to present itself both as tough against terrorism and conciliatory towards Pakistan. Its invitation not only calls Musharraf’s bluff, but also puts him in a difficult situation with the Islamists within and outside his junta who oppose dialogue. Further, India shows itself internationally as a reasonable, responsible power.

  A smart tactical move, this dual initiative is bereft of a larger vision. India can handle Pakistan only through a calibrated, carrot-and stick approach that rewards good behaviour and imposes penalties for errant or belligerent behaviour. It is the reluctance to inflict costs that allows Pakistan to continue to bleed India. But now, by inviting Musharraf, India has taken to rewarding unrepentant, unchanged bad behaviour. Vajpayee ignored even US President George W.Bush’s advice that Pakistan should create an atmosphere conducive for dialogue.

  Vajpayee has done exceptionally well in raising India’s international profile. His team has dexterously handled the tasks of significantly expanding Indo-US cooperation and maintaining close strategic ties with Moscow. It has, however, not done well with immediate neighbours, as exemplified by its poor handling of the cold-blooded murders of 16 BSF soldiers and its reluctance to employ counterespionage assets to bust ISI cooperations out of Bangladesh and Nepal. The Sino-Pak-Burma nexus has grown stronger as India’s China policy continues to seek engagement without results.

  The lack of a clear strategy against Pakistan is costing India dearly. In the period that Vajpayee has been in office, India has already faced one Pakistani invasion, one Pakistan-engineered hijacking (with the terrorists still harboured by Musharraf) and greater ISI activity in the North-East. Under Vajpayee, Pakistan-backed terrorism has metamorphosed from a hit-and-run campaign to direct assaults on security camps and daredevil raids like on the Red Fort.

  From seeking Pakistan’s international isolation as a terrorist State to now inviting Musharraf for talks, Vajpayee has come a full circle. Farcically, he wants to restart the Lahore process with the General for whome the Lahore Declaration is an abomination. His invitation not only emulates the Lahore Declaration by singling out J&K by name, it restates his Minare-e-Pakistan notation even at the risk of getting the Indians’ monkey up. If a financially ailing Pakistan can destabilize India and prop up the Taliban, a “stable, secure and prosperous Pakistan” could certainly unravel India.

  If Vajpayee is not to repeat post-Lahore history again, he has to prepare for the summit meeting with Musharraf with realistic, hardheaded calculations. Musharraf has little political room for manoeuvre. Forced to constantly look behind his shoulders at the other generals in his junta, his hold on power remains tenuous. Vajpayee, too, has little room for making any major concession as he heads a damaged government and has little to show in combating terrorism.

  India has gambled injudiciously. It will not be able to credibly return to its earlier position of seeking to isolate Pakistan even if the summit meeting yields no progress or externally-sponsored terrorism escalates. In fact, by agreeing to host the General struggling to shake off his quasi-pariah status, India has begun the process of international legitimization of the military regime in Islamabad.

  The “smart” tactic in inviting Musharraf could backfire if India does not play its cards well. Tactics without strategy are always perilous. India’s  swinging policy pendulum and self-injurious fixation on Pakistan is a reminder of the line from the Walter Kelly strip cartoon, “Pogo”: “We have met the enemy, and he is us”.

  (Courtesy: The Hindustan Times)
 

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