Through this Pakistan seeks to ensure its enduring centrality in an evolving regional strategic dynamicin which Pakistan would have otherwise been marginalised if not outrightly ignored. The Pak military has been obsessed with concept of strategic depth. Seeking annexation of Kashmir and making Afghanistan a surrogate country is an extension of this militarized thinking.

To deter and contain India through terrorism and subversion has been a cornerstone of Islamabad's strategic design that it would be next to impossible for an India pre-occupied with domestic instability and terrorism to launch a war against Pakistan or even react to major provocations.

Elite Endorses Jihadist Mindset:

Mr JN Dixit, the former Indian Foreign Secretary, recently interacted with highest decision-making Pakistani elite in Islamabad. He disclosed that Pakistani academics brazenly justified Taliban's policies and objectives.Charge of Taliban involvement in sponsoring cross-border terrorism in J&K and Central Asia was outrightly rejected. Reacting to international censure of Taliban's domestic policies, the academicians said criticism was ill-informed and based on deliberate misrepresentations. They further argued that the world at large and India in particular was deliberately labelling the intensively spiritual and religious phenomenon of 'Jihad' to malign Pakistan. Rise of Pan-Islamic fundamentalism was described as the movement for Islamic religious resurgence in the world. Indian advocacies that Jehad in the religious sense is different from militant separatism and violence was polemically rejected. There was no intense anxiety among the Pakistan elite to restore democracy. Reacting to the internalizing of Jehadi culture by the highest decision-making elite in Pakistan, Mr Dixit remarks, "that such views were expressed by Pakistani academics who have had exposures to foreign universities and media, left one wondering about the vigour of conviction of the orthodoxy that influenced their thought processes".

Power Disparity:

Pakistan has been able to sustain its subversion in Kashmir because there is broad convergence of views among the elite, the army and the mullahs. Mr Dixit adds, "There seems to be a widespread belief in these circles that India is getting exhausted in Kashmir and that it will not ot be able to hold on to Kashmir for long and therefore political and militant pressure should be continued on India. While there is an awareness about dangers of nuclear confrontation there is a parallel feeling that the threat of such confrontation will become an incremental pressure on India on the Kashmir issue." Pakistanis are not concerned that the confrontationist policy they are pursuing is becoming economically unsustainable, politically destabilizing and diplomatically damaging. It is because they look at the campaign in Kashmir as a step towards balkanising India. Gen. Musharraf, in his address to the English Speaking Union in Karachi in April 1999, said that even if the Kashmir problem is solved, relations between India and Pakistan would continue to be hostile because Pakistan would continue to be an irritant in India's ambition to play a global role. Ayaz Amir, the Pakistani columnist argues that the real issue between India and Pakistan is of growing power disparity and the only way Pakistan can counter this is by keeping India embroiled in domestic troubles. If it is Kashmir today, it can be Assam tomorrow. Pakistan only needs to ensure plausible deniability on its actions to avoid set-piece battles while at the same time engaging India in diplomatic niceties.

Jehadi Stakes:

Arif Jamal, an expert on Jehadi groups disagrees with the assessment that the proxy-war in Kashmir has peaked with Jehadi groups looking for a way out. He observes that Jehadi activities will continue inspite of any political settlement between Kashmiri groups and Indian state or between India and Pakistan. In his view Jihadi groups have far too much at stake to put an end to their campaign and even if the Pakistani state wanted it would not succeed. This despite the fact that most of the Jehadi operations are sanctioned with Pak army's direct approval and Jehadis depend critically on the Pakistan Army for support. The army, and its agencies like the ISI, Intelligence Corps and Military Intelligence have near total control over the activities of Jehadi groups. Terrorist training facilities are all run under army supervision. Access to these facilities is tightly controlled and monitored. Jehadi cadres who disobey army instructions are subjected to brutal interrogation by the intelligence agencies and punished.

Dissecting the relationship between Pak Army and Jehadi groups, Prashant Sareen says, "Apart from training, the army provides crucial logistic support to these groups. The army decides on the kind of weapons to be used.. Probably the only area in which the army is not directly involved is in funding their activities...". Army does help these groups indirectly by allowing them to raise funds through narcotics smuggling and gun-running.

The influence and effectiveness of Jehadi groups is also determined by the Army. Of late Harkat-ul-Mujahideen was split to raise Al-Badr with predominantly Pakistani cadres. It is reported that the floating of Azhar's Jaish-e-Mohammad had blessings from the ISI. Kandhar hijacking was directly executed by Pak army for this. A substantial chunk of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen has moved over to JeM. This has been done partly because Harkat's utility was reduced and it had been bypassing ISI with backing from a section of Taliban.

Mullah-Army Convergence:

This is not to say, that Jehadi groups play subservient role to Pak army. There is a symbiotic relationship between the military and mullahs on the issue of 'Jihad'. The convergence of interests and growing public support for their activities have cemented this relationship. Hard-liners in Pak army use Jihadi groups to sideline liberals/moderates within Pakistan. By carrying out terrorist outrages in Kashmir, the Jehadists sabotage any reconciliation to serve the interests of hard-liners. The Jehadis serve as effective tool for hard-liners in the army.

Tanzeemul Ikhwan:

At the same time Jehadis are increasing their clout politically, financially and militarily. They are trying to assert. It is because a powerful section in the army has gone over to the Jehadi camp. Fed on Islamist rhetoric, the soldiery and low-rank officers are encouraged to think of themselves as soldiers of Islam. "Hindu" India is an enemy which must be destroyed in the service of Islam. This orientation of the army makes the soldiery identify itself very closely with the objectives of Jehadis. Many soldiers and officers feel that the Jehadis are doing the army's Job in Kashmir. These sections of army resist any dilution in change over the policy on Kashmir, Afghanistan and nuclear programme.

There is another area where Pak army and Jehadis are closely collaborating i.e. Islamisation/Talibanisation of Pakistan itself. A former soldier Mohd Akram Awan has floated Tanzeemul Ikhwan, a radical Islamist group for this purpose. Its headquarter, Darul Irfan is located in Munra, a small village 90 kms away from Islamabad. Here retired Pakistani army personnel train cadres for a 'future Islamic state'. The organisation is headed by Col. (retd.) Abdul Qayum, who served as an infantry officer for 32 years.

Mohd Akram Awan recently declared, "we can extend Jehad beyond our boundaries only after we have achieved our objective at home'? Tanzeemul Ikhwan has thousands of followers, majority drawn from retired military officers and soldiers. At its recent convention on December 27 at Munra, thousands of Zealots, including dozens of retd. army officers and hundreds of soldiers, camped in Khaki army tents, when Awan gave a call for storming Islamabad. Tanzeem openly declared its preference for a Taliban-type regime in Pakistan.

Zahid Hussain, the noted Pakistan journalist observes, "what makes the Ikhwan leaders more belligerent and confident is its strong network within the army. Not only does its entire leadership come from among retd. senior army officers, but hundreds of serving officers and soldiers attend the ideological training sessions". Gen. Hamid Gul, the man who has played a critical role in inducing Jehadi orientation in Pak army observes with satisfaction, "Pakistani army soldiers have always been religious, but now a growing number of officers have turned Islamist". Gul has been advocating a "soft Islamic revolution". Pakistani press agrees that the government's reluctance to curb militancy coupled with the absence of a democratic process provides a very conducive atmosphere for the extremists who are trying to fill the existing political vacuum.

Given these ground realities, the BJP-led NDA govt's initiative on Kashmir have further emboldened Jehadi-Army hardliner lobby, who feel India is tired on Kashmir.