Kashmir Sentinel

LARGEST  CIRCULATED  ENGLISH  FORTNIGHLY  OF J&K

April 1st--May 31st, 2001


Back to KASHMIR SENTINEL Page
Back to PANUN KASHMIR Page

 
| Home | | April 1st--May 31st, 2001 |
CURRENT ISSUE
E-mail this page
Print this page
Feedback
Kashmir
Political Manipulation as a Factor in Alienation

Centre's Role:
 

Intense socialization of Kashmiri Muslims with communal separatist politics over a period of time gradually alienated them from the Indian mainstream. Though this remains the fundamental cause, subsidiary factors at local, regional and international level got mixed up, leading to the emergence of the terrorist uprising.
 
Recently, frequent rigging of elections and political manipulation have received attention as a factors in alienation of Kashmiris. It has been suggested that in the post-independence period of Kashmiri Muslims have never been able to exercise their political rights freely and elect a government of their choice. For this blame is laid invariably at Centre's doorstep.
 
Electoral malpractices in Kashmir cannot be seen in violation from the underdevelopment of India's democratic institutions as such. India is still evolving as a democratic polity. Kashmiris are as much victims of the political manipulation and electoral malpractices as people in the rest of the country. Though rigging has been a feature of every election in Kashmir, including those held in 1977, it is not true that Kashmiris have been denied a government of their choice. It has always been the local political vested interests, who have been responsible for gigging and political manipulation. Whenever these vested interests became unpopular, they accused the centre of resorting to political manipulation and violating the democratic rights of people. However, Centre cannot absolve itself of the responsibility for not putting enough pressure on the local government in respecting the democratic process and allowing fair play to its political rivals. The result has been that secular-oppositional politics always received a back seat in the Kashmir Valley. Its another dangerous fallout was that Centre was left with no options also. It had to tolerate the blackmail of some Muslim subnationalist outfits, because the only other choice was rabidly secessionist groupings. The Centre never encouraged an alternative to emerge. Though occasionally, the nationalist opinion did stress the importance of constitutional integration, little was done to enthuse Kashmiris by making Kashmir an integral part of Indian democracy. The people of J&K have been subjected to one-party authoritarian rule, with its legitimacy derived from manipulated elections and political manipulation. Opposition parties have not been allowed to develop because of theintimidation, political bribery and politics of defection. This is turn insulated Kashmiris emotionally and politically from the rest of India.
 
Local Leadership:

The character of the local political leadership, social psychology of Kashmiris and the constant international intervention has also inhibited the growth of a democratic system in the stater, with competitive politics as its chief virtue. The independence period national leadership committed a grave mistake in believing that Kashmir's accession to India and its continuance was possible only through Sheikh Abdullah. To quote Stanley Wolpert, Nehru believed Kashmir was his garden and Sheikh Abdullah the only gardener. Partially, the rise of political authoritarianism with Sheikh Abdullah as the supreme leader of Kashmiris could be attributed to this skewed understanding. The question of having an alternate opposition party was anathema to the then political leadership. The country's civil society and other segments of political opinion also shared this view. The Central government instructed the official and non-official media to build a larger-than life profile of Sheikh Abdullah, which projected him a great secular and a nationalist leader. The former Director of Information, late JN Zutshi is on record having said that he had special instructions from the Central government to do this. Having made this choice, the international intervention in Kashmir in the early years of independence made India more dependent on Sheikh Abdullah.

During these years absolute mandate to the Sheikh Abdullah was linked to Indian success during impending plebiscite and at UN. Indian leadership came to advocate that all pro-India forces should unite under the banner of a single party and recognize Sheikh Abdullah as the undisputed leader. Those who challenged this, were not helping the cause of the nation in Kashmir, was the new sermon to the political rivals of Sheikh Abdullah in Kashmir. Did not Nehru say to Mohiuddin Karra, the star figure of Quit Kashmir Movement (1948) that "Jab Mere Pas Khara Sikka Hai, To Khote Sike Ki Kya Zaroorar Hai" and opposed his democratic right to oppose the Sheikh-led government and its acts of ommissions and commissions.

Nehru continued to route loyalty of Kashmiri leaders to the country through Sheikh Abdullah. Central government thus came to promote the concept of one leader, one party and one community's (Kashmiri Sunnis) aspirations. In the "broader national interest", the aspirations of all minority groups in Kashmir and the people of Jammu and Ladakh were made hostage to the whims and caprices of one party—National Conference, one leader-Sheikh Abdullah and one community—Kashmiri Sunnis. This not only narrowed the options of Centre for consolidating the nationalist forces but also undermined the scope for participatory democracy in the state.

Social Psyche:

Peculiar social psyche of Kashmiris and the historical factors also contributed in shaping the rise of political authoritarianism in Kashmir. The vast Plebeian Society and the absence of a strong middle class among Kashmiri Sunnis made the situation tailor-made for the emergence of a powerful, charismatic leader. Sheikh Abdullah gave a break to the conservative politics of the traditional Muslim leadership comprising land-owning aristocracy and top religious. He appealed to the vast Plebian mass, articulating their secular and communal grievances. Sheikh Abdulah forged links with the merc antile bourgeoisie, the 'German Khojas' and the emerging Muslim middle class. He weaned away the second and lower rungs of Kashmiri religious leadership and as life president of the Muslim Auqaf Trust he came to control most of the mosques and Ziarats in Kashmir. By making the sacred shrine of Hazratbal in Srinagar as his platform, Sheikh Abdullah symbolized political and religious leadership of Kashmiri Sunnis. This approach permitted little dissent and made secularization as the code of internal political behaviour an impossible task to fulfill. Kashmiris began looking to Sheikh Abdullah as their King-emperor. In an excellent study titled, "The Rise of authoritarianism in Peripheral Societies", (Monthly Review Press), Clive Thomas has lucidly delineated factors leading to the emergence of authoritariansim e.g. Peronism in Latin America. This situation has a clear parallel in Kashmir.

Committed Bureaucracy:

Describing the scenario during the early years, Mr Balraj Puri comments, "Kashmir thus became an monolithic society led by an authoritarian leader who did not tolerate the slightest dissent. When Abdullah took over as the Head of the Emergency Administration, on 27 October, 1947, the Maharaja's administration had almost completely broken down. His party filled the administrative vacuum. The National Conference workers not only manned the 23-member Emergency Council but were also appointed government officials. Many government officials also held positions in the party. The Abdullah administration functioned arbitrarily and without any defined constitutional powers-party workers assumed the de-facto authority to arrest and punish whoever they held guilty. With unchecked political power and controlled administration, Abdullah was able to further regiment all aspects of Kashmiri life". The emergence of a committed bureaucracy was ill-suited to the growth of healthy competitive politics.

With sword of plebiscite hanging over their head, Indian leaders gave Sheikh Abdullah total license to butcher democracy in Kashmir. The seeds of a monolithic political system were sown, when in the Constituent Assembly in 1951, the National Conference "Won" all the 75 seats. In the Valley, no candidate was allowed to file a nomination paper, while the nomination papers of Praja Parishad candidates in Jammu province were rejected of filmsy grounds. The symbolic contest took place for only two seats. This drew lot of protestations, but Nehru maintained that nothing should be done to weaken Sheikh Abdullah.

Rise of Praetorian Guard:

Sheikh Abdullah's alleged hobnobbing with Anglo-American powers, culminating in his dismissal in August 1953 hampered the growth of oppositional politics further. India now needed a political leader in Kashmir, who would not only fight the international intrigue but also the separatist politics of Sheikh Abdullah. How could this be accomplished without giving total mandate of the nation to the new political leader? Faced with external and internal destabilization, the Congress leaders declared that democracy and morality in Kashmir could wait.. Instead of considering democracy as complimentary to the national interest, it was counter-posed to it. Anti-government and anti-India sentiments became synonymous for the leadership of the country. Bakshi Ghulam Mohd used most unscrupulous methods to throttle the still fledgling democracy. He raised praetorian Guard (29-15) to physically intimidate the political opponents of his regime. Leaders of national stature like Ashoka Mehta were physically assaulted when he had gone to Srinagar to inaugurate a branch of PSP in November, 1954. Instead of censuring Bakshi regime for this, Nehru accused the PSP of "joining hands with the enemies of the country—in fact more than enemies of the country". Bakshi also resorted to political bribery to neutralize his opponents.

The new political correctness was that challenging the fairness of the elections or insisting on their fairness was unpatriotic. In the assembly elections of 1957 and 1962, held under Bakshi regime, new records in electoral malpractices were set. The contest extended to 32 seats in 1957 and 41 in 1962, but this was mostly confined to the Jammu region. In the 1962 assembly elections only five seats out of 43 in the Valley were contested. Others couldn't file nominations or had to withdraw at one stage or the other.

The "uncontested elections" earned bad reputation for Indian internationally. At the behest of Nehru, PSP decided to enter the fray in 1962. Such was the terror generated by Bakshi regime that PSP had to import a candidate from Jammu for a symbolic contest in Srinagar. Mr Om Prakash Saraf, who stood on PSP ticket from Amirakadal was thrashed physically, while Thakur Devi Dass, candidate from Banihal, was attacked when he was addressing a meeting, Mr Bahauddin, the DNC candidate from Khanyar was waylaid and mercilessly beaten near the court premises on the nomination day. His companions, including his proposer were kidnapped and were released in bare condition 14 miles away (Indian Express Feb. 9, 1962). The atmosphere of fear that prevailed would be obvious from two simple indicators. Firstly, even those who voted for the opposition carried the identity slips issued by the National Conference, and secondly not a single postal ballot was cast against it. The permit system, for plying vehicles, was used exclusively to reward party men and purchase opponents. Those government servants who failed to meet the political requirements of the local National Conference bosses were penalized.

When votes were counted, opposition candidates of Poonch and their agents were under detention, while the Darhal opposition candidate had no information about the place and date of counting. Ballot boxes in most of the cases, were without seals and locks. In Jammu city alone, 10,000 objections were filed on the electoral rolls.

Bakshi's corrupt policies and political repression against his rivals alienated an important section of his party. GM Sadiq, No: 2 in Bakshi cabinet left the party and floated Democratic National Conference in 1957. The new party pleaded for a clean government and greater constitutional integration with India. The historic resolution passed at DNC Conference in Vinayak Bazar, Jammu in 1958 is a landmark in Indian nation-building process. Never before Kashmiri political leadership has been so articulate in espousing secular nation-building in Kashmir as during this conference. "The new party inspired new political talent, and made its own contribution towards the secularization and democratization of the politics of the state by exposing the corrupt and repressive acts of the Bakshi regime," observes a political commentator. The leadership and the cadre of DNC toured the length and breadth of Kashmir Valley, raising awareness of people against the secessionist politics of Plebiscite Front and the corrupt practices of Bakshi regime. At one time DNC had a cadre strength of one thousand. So unnerved was the Plebiscite Front led by Sheikh Abdullah that they described DNC as "White Dogs" and Bakshi's NC as "Black Dogs". A number of foreign journalists who visited Kashmir around this time observed that "the Bakshi-Sadiq rift had made a considerable dent in the formidable following of the Plebiscite Front".

National Press Role:

The so-called national press and the country's political leadership, which has invariable undermined the long-term nationalist interests in Kashmir read their own meanings in Bakshi-Sadiq rift. They felt alarmed over what they called "—disunity in the ranks of the nationalist forces". Nehru who visited, Srinagar said at Tourist Centre that formation of DNC was a 110 percent mistake. He used his influence over CPI leadership to disown DNC. The glimmer of hope that appeared in the form of DNC was snuffed out in 1960 and it was pressurized to reunite with the parent organisation. The event was hailed as the triumph of national interest. How distanced the national press has always been from the ground realities and the nation's stakes in Kashmir can be assessed from its comments in the wake of merging of DNC with its parent organisation. The Hindu argued that "a stray victory of there DNC in the coming elections would have been interpreted as demonstration of anti-India feeling (3 November, 1960). The Indian Express sermonized that the "function of an opposition party can be little more than academic in a state whose main task is to fight economic backwardness and age-old poverty" (3 November, 1960). Security was quoted as the ground for justifying one party system in Kashmir by The Hindustan Times (30 November, 1960). The Hindustan Times went a step ahead and commented that those who did not hail the dissolution of the DNC were "fostering narrow, parochial and fissiparous tendencies" (7 December, 1960).

In mid-sixties when Bakshi began playing the role of secular opposition, the 'nationalist lobby' again mounted pressure to "create unity among the ranks of nationalist forces". Bakshi, despite rigging was elected to Lok Sabha from Srinagar and his eight partymen were elected to the State Assembly from the Valley. Late Indira Gandhi, who campaigned against Bakshi, publicly stated at an election meeting that there was no need for an opposition party in Kashmir, expressing fears that the opposition Kashmir was likely to go astray. The state administration geared up and openly said that Bakshi had to be defeated in the national interest. Pressure mounted on Bakshi to wind up his outfit and he was readmitted into Congress. The entire national press welcomed the event as a "consolidation of the nationalist forces".

Sadiq regime also continued the practice started by Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. In 1967 elections Bakshi was in opposition. There was large scale rejection of the nomination papers of his party, detection of duplicate votes and other malpractices. When the issue of duplicate ballot papers was brought to the attention of the Chief Education Commissioner, K Sundaram, he argued that Bakshi also used to do the same and threatened to take action against those who raised the issue. The message the people of Kashmir got was that even in limited and safe choices, fair play in electoral contest was not possible.

Pakistan's defeating 1971 Indo-Pak war made Sheikh Abdullah try the option of sharing political power. His senior workers had already formed (Khariji Mahaz) and wanted to participate in the forthcoming assembly election. Sadiq regime, which represented urban Kashmiri Sunni wanted to align with GM Karra (Political Conference) and Sheikh Abdullah's Plebiscite Front to defeat the rural lobby led by Mir Qasim. The latter had already formalized a secret alliance with Jamat Islami. Mir Qasim, the new chief minister extended Political Conference and Plebiscite Front leaders from the J&K State. The members of the two secessionist organisations, who wanted to joint the political mainstream were thus debarred from taking part in elections. With Mir Qasim's patronage Jamaat Islami won five seats. For the first time in State's political history constitutional recognition and political legitimacy was conferred on Jamaat Islami. Centre, recently has, as per media reports, enlisted services of Mr Qasim, to re-establish "dialogue with Hurriyat".

Another dark day in the democracy in the state, was when flouting all democratic norms Sheikh Abdullah was installed as the Chief Minister of J&K State, through back-door in 1975.


 
Previous ArticlePrevious Article
Miscellaneous  Links
Kashmir News Network
Margdarshan
Homeland Resolution
Auschwitz in Kashmir
Why Homeland?
Facts Speak
Refugee Status
History
Legal Documents
Kashmir News Daily
Songs in Exile
Video Clips

 
Back to KASHMIR SENTINEL Page
Back to PANUN KASHMIR Page

 

Sign our GuestBook

Read our GuestBook

Contact Us
[ GuestBook by TheGuestBook.com ]
Disclaimer
Web-hosting organization and its employees are not responsible 
for the views/opinions/material expressed on this website.
© 2000-2010 Panun Kashmir. All Rights Reserved