Pakistan Collapsing?

Assumptions, Assertions, and Precautions

 April 2010

The review essay, as the title suggests, is divided into three sections. The first sec­tion focuses on the assumptions drawn apropos terming Pakistan as a failed state. The second section focuses on assertions made by scholars, on the various aspects of state-society relations in Pakistan, which according to them are the building blocks for a weak/fragile Pakistani state. The third section focuses on precautions, which experts offer as important pointers to rescue/prevent Pakistan from deteriorating further, both economically and societally.

By Medha Bisht

Assumptions – is Pakistan collapsing?

Is Pakistan collapsing? Many would say the framing of this question is a political overture as it provides the fundamental crux for various arguments that argue for more external aid to Pakistan. Ahmed Rashid draws inferences to the underlying tenor of this rationale in his article ‘Pakistan on the Brink’. Rashid comments on the crash­ing economy and the non-existent economic infrastructure unable to cater to the needs of the youth in Pakistan and points out that unless external aid is linked with a plan of action, Pakistan cannot be resuscitated. With 11 per cent of the territory being directly controlled and contested by the Taliban, Rashid points out, ‘Pakistan is close to the brink, perhaps not to a meltdown … but to a permanent state of anarchy’. He points out that the speed and conditions with which American Congress provides emergency aid to Islamabad will proportionally affect the Pakistan Government and the army’s ability and will to resist the Taliban onslaught. Rashid is perhaps not the only author to say that Pakistan is close to a failing state. According to the Foreign Policy Index of Failed States, 2009, Pakistan has been ranked tenth amongst 60 failed states. Hassan Abbas, another Pakistani expert, has defined Pakistan as a ‘weak state in essence’. Considering these evolving views in the public domain, this section attempts to delineate the key drivers which frame Pakistan as a weak/collapsing/failed state.

If Pakistan Can Defy the Odds, How to Rescue a Failing State, Hassan Abbas points out the basic elements which are counterproductive to the political health of Pakistan. These are the contested idea of Pakistan, the fragile state of democracy in Pakistan, and the India-Pakistan rivalry which has impacted the foreign policy behav­iour so much so that most of the resources, which should be used for development objectives, are being diverted to build the military capability of the state. Regarding the contested idea of Pakistan, Abbas draws attention to the two dominant discourses that have informed the identity of Pakistan as a state. The first is the one articulated by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Syed Ahmed Khan, and Dr Mohammad Iqbal, who saw in Pakistan a liberal Muslim enlightened state. The second belonged to the group led by Zia ul Haq, who redefined Pakistan by pursuing his political ambitions via appeasing religious political forces and introducing a set of archaic and very orthodox religious laws that over time empowered conservative and religious elements. The Jihad project, he opines, by the 1980s was further facilitated by the West, Saudi Arabia, and the Zia regime. Abbas, probing into the second factor, comments on the democratic his­tory of Pakistan, which he says never took strong roots because of’selected patronage, financial dishonesty and feudalism’. With the intelligence agencies and the army remaining dominant institutions in Pakistan, the authoritarian nature of the state was sustained. The constitutional experience of Pakistan, reflective of being used by vested interests, and the volatile struggle between civilian and military elements, the author argues have not dissuaded Pakistan from following a democratic path, an element which he proposes should be strengthened through various constructive interventions.

The third factor, which has predominantly shaped Pakistan’s behaviour, is its rivalry with India. Contest over Kashmir and a relationship embedded in deep mutual suspicion and regional rivalry, Abbas argues, has made Pakistan overlook its domestic priorities and the lack of educational infrastructure which he argues has given rise to various madarsas, which are providing fillip to radical elements. A similar state of affairs is seen in the health sector, which he argues is under great duress, pointing out that despite US$58 billion in foreign aid being spent in Pakistan, the health sector remains largely underdeveloped. With challenges of weak governance, mili­tancy, and economic insecurity feeding each other, the author proposes reforms which are administrative and developmental, where education and health are prioritized and promotion of progressive religious views is encouraged. He argues that relations with India should improve as it is necessary for the internal development of Pakistan. Abbas points out that as the lawyers’ movement and media in Pakistan illustrate, democratic forces are the only hope for saving Pakistan and therefore should be promoted.

In Pakistan: The State of the Union, Selig Harrison points to ethnic tensions as the potential factor which could lead to the break up of Pakistan. Referring to the historical grievances of Sindhis, Pashtuns, and Baluchs, who have all been trying to get a legiti­mate share for themselves, he writes, ‘. . . although the Baluch, Sindhis and Pashtuns comprise only 33 per cent of the population, they identify themselves historically with ethnic homelands that constitute 72 per cent of Pakistani territory … for the minorities, Pakistan (is equated) with the Punjabis and the Muhajirs, who are perceived as having occupied and annexed their territories forcibly without their consent’. The uprisings by these ethnic groups (Baluchs in 1973-1977 and 2005 and Sindhis in 1983), though, have been quelled by the Pakistan Army, and secessionist sentiments have remained dominant. Pakistan’s interventions in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) since 2002, Harrison argues, have also intimidated the Pashtuns, who as a result have become increasingly radicalized. In this milieu, Harrrison argues that ‘Pakistan is a failing if not a failed state, with more than half a country able to defy the writ of the central government’. Harrison points out that the potential reason for a break up of Pakistan in the near future could be the worsening of India- Pakistan rela­tions and the impact of the war on terror on the Pashtuns inhabiting the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) areas of Pakistan.

The uneven economic development, especially the exploitation of natural resources situated in minority provinces, is another area which is cited as critical for leading to a break up of Pakistan. How Pakistan resolves its provincial-state relations would be a test for the country in the years to come. The gross inequality between various provinces and the inequitable treatment of the minority and the resources (water, gas, distribution of tax revenues), Harrison argues, has in it ‘the principal driver of ethnic tensions’.

Assertions: manifest radicalization and politicized security forces

Pakistan is and would be facing multi-faceted challenges in the times to come. In the present, key challenges are the lack of governance outreach to the tribal areas, which in turn is manifesting growing radicalisation, and inappropriate internal security pre­paredness, which generally manifests itself in lack of political will and ineffective counter-insurgency strategies.

Hassan Abbas points to the rationale behind some of these lacunae in his policy brief, Police Reforms in Pakistan, which focuses on factors which in the past have made the Pakistani state ineffective in delivering security provisions. Noting that over 400 police officers have been killed every year in terrorist attacks since 2005, Abbas points out the poorly managed police infrastructure which in his words is ‘ill equipped, poorly trained, deeply politicized and chronically corrupt’.

Making a case for international support for police reforms in Pakistan to enhance law enforcement and counlcrinsurgency capacities, Abbas delineates the history of the Police Act 1961, which he claims is too outdated to meet the requirements of a modern democratic state. He writes that though the police department was reformed under the National Reconstruction Bureau in 2002, various amendments under the Musharraf regime were introduced to the Police Act in 2004, which led to the politici-zation of the police forces, thus taking away the operational autonomy it could have exercised in administrative and investigative spheres. One of the major problems that besets the police infrastructure, he points out, is structural, where there is a coordina­tion disjunct between the police posted in the central and provincial regions. Further, he argues that the senior command positions are often filled from the ranks of the Police Service of Pakistan, a central service, which often leads to a disconnect with the junior officers who are recruited through the Provincial Police Services. A lack of standard systems of hiring, transferring, and promotions, he points out, has further exacerbated the situation. Pointing out that the police force in Pakistan is the most corrupt institution, he underlines the glaring gap in the police to population ratio, which stands at 1:477. Hassan also underlines internal contradictions by pointing out that the infrastructure lacks training facilities, material help, and coordination between police, the civilian-run intelligence bureau, and the military-run intelligence agencies.

Mohammad Amir Rana’s brief on Taliban Insurgency in Pakistan: A Counterin-surgency Perspective traces the growth of the Taliban in Pakistan and delineates fac­tors that have enabled the Taliban to get support from the tribal population. The primary aim of this paper is to underline the approach which countcrinsurgency tactics need to adopt while fighting militancy in Pakistan. Rana does this by highlight­ing some of the key factors which have enabled the growth of the Taliban. These, according to him, are militancy landscape, cross-tribal characteristics, legitimate cause which stems from following the Dcobandi school of Islam, political structural milieu, and the lack of governance. Under militancy landscape, Rana argues that ‘the fact that there were 104 violent jihadi and 82 sectarian groups of varying strengths operating in Pakistan before September 9, 2001, gave enough ground to the Taliban for support, as many of these organisations had networks in the tribal areas’. Cross-tribal characteristics is the second important reason for the rise of Taliban as, according to Rana, different tribes in the Taliban are encouraged to form their own militias which removes any chance of one tribe dominating the other, thus negating secessionist tendencies that could jeopardize the Taliban unity. He notes that Pashtun ethnicity and religious ethos are some other reasons responsible for Taliban success. Considering legitimate cause as the third most important ingredient for the success of the Taliban, Rana emphasizes that the Deobandi school of thought in Islam provides the ideological base for all sects, thus binding them ideologically. Listing the fourth factor, he argues that the Taliban killed the Maliks, who were influential tribal elders, thus making the administrative system ineffective. In turn to address local grievances the Taliban established parallel systems of government, thus filling the vacuum in the ‘ungovemed spaces’ of Pakistan. According to Rana, the political structural milieu and the lack of governance have enabled the Taliban to gather support from the Pashtuns.

The author argues that the consolidation of Taliban groups is a big challenge for the Pakistan Government as every group that wishes to join Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has to take an oath of commitment to Shariah enforcement. The author argues that it is essential that the Pakistan Government perceive the Taliban as a serious threat and outline a national counterinsurgency approach. Any absence of such strategy and efforts to increase the necessary preparedness could weaken the country, which he notes could increase the probabilities of radicalizing the country.

Meanwhile, Zaid Haider’s paper, Discussion, Mainstreaming Pakistan’s Tribal Belt: A Human Rights and Security Perspective, elaborates on the rationale behind a ‘receding and regressive’ tribal governance system, which according to him is the main reason for the increase of radicalization in Pakistan. Noting that one in five persons in FATA attribute religious extremism in the region to flawed governance, he quotes Afrasiab Khattak of the Awami National Party (ANP), who draws attention to the question of’dismantling militant sanctuaries and taking short and long term measures to open up the areas and integrate it with the rest of the country’ if one intends to avoid the impending catastrophe. Haider provides a historical overview of the customary social and legal practices and the politics behind the lack of state writ and Pakistan’s policy of non-interference in the region. Considering that the costs of an inactive policy have been high, Haider establishes a direct correlation between mil­itancy and governance. Some of the factors giving rise to militancy, therefore, accord­ing to him are: (a) political vacuum; (b) denial and delay in justice; (c) presence of ungovemed areas; and (d) the rise of class conflict. An important distinction brought out by him is the ethnic versus class difference, as according to him, the militants organize themselves on a non-tribal basis which render clan or tribal distinctions irrel­evant in these areas, a phenomenon which has disturbed the tribal structure. Four fac­tors which according to him are the main reasons for hampering effective action on the part of the Pakistan Government are: the strategic location of the FATA; the vested interests of the Maliks and bureaucrats; tribal resistance to change; and the dire security situation in FATA, which gives rise to the belief that an enabling environ­ment for development activities in the region is missing. Often the behaviour of a state is a response to its internal constraints, and these factors well convey Pakistan’s intent and constraints to effectively cope with the FATA/NWFP region.

Precautions: suggestions towards a preventive framework

This section focuses on the preventive measures offered by the reviewed authors to save Pakistan from collapsing. The measures range from enhancing financial aid, social, political, and administrative reforms, and review of security infrastructure.

Enhancing financial aid

External aid is one of the most proposed arguments offered by scholars to save Pakistan from collapsing. Azeem Ibrahim’s Paper, US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption, discusses this point in detail. Ibrahim points out that between 2002 and 2008, the United States.’ fight against terrorism has cost US citizens as much as US$2,3 74,000,000. Arguing that aid to Pakistan is not a new phe­nomenon, he notes that between 1953 and 1961, Pakistan had received US$2 billion of aid from the United States, which rose to US$5.1 billion by 1982. Amongst the many shortcomings in the aid transfer to Pakistan, he points to the US policy of opaqueness on funds to Pakistan, misuse of development funds by the United States, a lack of agreed strategy of the use of funds, a lack of oversight mechanism on how Pakistan is using funds, and the impact of funds in impeding the democratization process. The author points out that most of the funds were not used adequately by the Pakistan military in fighting terror and that only 10 per cent of the money was for Pakistan’s development. Dividing aid to Pakistan into five specific categories, he points towards the confusing accountability structures embedded in transferring aid.

The channels to which aid is dispersed are: first, the Coalition Support Funds (CSF) which covers the extra cost to Pakistan’s military for fighting terrorism along with meeting the costs incurred by the stales fighting with the United States on the global war on terror. Second, security assistance, especially military equipment to fight terrorism. It is noted that between 2002 and 2007, Pakistan was approved more than US$9.7 billion worth of weapons sales. Third, cash transfers to the Pakistani Government. Though meant for supporting the budget of Pakistan, Ibrahim points out that once the money is received by the government, there is a lot of resistance to chan­nelize it ‘for specific uses’, a factor which has been counter-productive and is reflected in the unfulfilled development needs of Pakistan. Fourth, development and humanitarian assistance is often delinked with the actions of the military as United States Agency for International Development (US AID) acts independently of the gov­ernment. This factor, therefore, has not done much to improve the image of the United States in Pakistan. Fifth, covert funds are something which cannot be quantified, as most of the information on money spent under this category is classified. Considering this as a severe bottleneck, which has impeded accountability on aid transfer, the author suggests three ways to improve aid leverage in Pakistan. These are: (a) impose conditions only to prevent clear harm to expressed US intentions; (b) do not use con­ditions to manage institutions which are not under United States control as this would be counter-productive; and (c) draw a distinction on how Pakistan spends aid funds and monitors its financial actions. This, he says, would enable one to differentiate between the money given to Pakistan on the one hand and the resources which Paki­stan spends on its own on the other. This factor, he says, is important for improving public support for the United States amongst different quarters in Pakistan.

Apart from the accountability factor, Selig Harrison also calls for greater transpar­ency. This, he says, would reduce the power of the armed forces relative to other institutions of Pakistan. He points out that the budget for all services and for the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) should be put before both houses of parliament to enhance transparency in the political system.

Social, political, security infrastructure, and administrative reforms

It is argued that unless political, administrative, and social reforms are undertaken, Pakistan could well be on the way to a potential break up. Political reconciliation within Pakistan is thus offered as a strategy. In this context, Selig Harrison proposes that Pakistan should set the stage for negotiations with Baluchs and construction of military cantonments and checkpoints manned by Coast Guard units of the Frontier corps throughout the interior of Balochistan should be suspended. On political reforms, he writes that the 1973 Constitution should be implemented and all ambiguity concern­ing the powers belonging to the provinces should be revisited. This, he points out, could be done by eliminating the Concurrent list. He also adds that Part Five, Section 158 of the 1973 Constitution should be implemented and Part Two, Section Three should be nullified to avoid conflict with Article 70 (4), which gives autonomy to the provinces in resource exploitation. Thus, apart from arguing for the devolution of more powers, he argues that the central government should reach an agreement with Balochistan concerning the royalties to be paid for its gas, oil, and mineral resources. On administrative reforms, Harrison argues that the power of provincial governors appointed by the central government should be strictly limited by constitutional amendment in order to ensure that governors are not used by the central government to undermine the power accorded to the provinces in the 1973 Constitution.

Hassan Abbas emphasizes the strengthening of democratic forces in Pakistan for which he argues that the forces behind a vibrant civil society and the media should receive encouragement. Abbas also underlines the need for starting a consultative and legislative process, whereby he draws attention to the increasing alienation of the Balochs and the growing ethnic divide between the ANP-Pashtoon combine and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). He also adds that the education and health sec­tors should be prioritized by the government and that the threat of Talibanization should be combated on the basis of progressive ideas. He locates the role of the media as an important catalyst on this front.

For making his case on strengthening police forces in Pakistan, Abbas in Police Reforms in Pakistan argues that half of all US funds allocated for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency support in Pakistan should be given to the police and other civilian law enforcement agencies and be closely monitored. He adds that there should be strong oversight and accountability of the disbursed funds and all the four provinces of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir should receive equal importance in the allo­cation of funds through a transparent process. Hassan Abbas also proposes specialized counterinsurgency training for selected junior and middle-ranking police officers in reputed international law enforcement training institutions.

Zaid Haider, on the other hand, emphasizes a sequential but substantive approach. He points out the need for engagement and participation of the people in governance and reform processes in the FATA. Haider delineates short-, medium- and long-term measures. He suggests the urgent need to extend the Political Parties Act, so that mod­erate parties can be encouraged to participate in the political sphere. However, he cau­tions that any effort to propose a Pakistani political setup demands that government should first make an effort to earn the taist of the people inhabiting the FATA. As a short-term measure, he also argues for curbing the powers of the political agent, which he says has become symbolic of FATA’s repressive system. Haider points out that reviving the integrity of the judicial system in FATA is important and the jirga should be empowered to deliver effective justice in a time-bound manner. As a medium-term measure, Haider points out that local  representative bodies in the region should be empowered and suggests that this could be done by either resurrecting the democratic spirit of agency councils or through the formalization of tribal leadership which could counterbalance the powers of the political agent. As a long-term meas­ure, he suggests that the government in due process could conduct a referendum on the status of FATA and that through an amendment, the President’s administrative and legislative powers over FATA should be transferred to the parliament to increase political accountability and representative decision making.

Conclusion

Given these insights, it could be said that Pakistan is passing though a critical phase where internal challenges are pulling it in various directions. While one could say that this is a time for great uncertainty in Pakistan, certainly the forces that exist 2009 could greatly impact the economic, societal, security, and political contours of the state. Some of the major questions revolve around the future of growing nationalist senti­ments, equitable distribution of resources, and the manifestation of growing radicalism.

How Pakistan aims to mitigate these challenges is a question which needs to be reck­oned with. Constitutional reforms could be just one solution to provide the roadmap; much would, however, depend on the intent and will of the political leadership and the perception of elites donning Pakistan’s decision-making structures.

As stated earlier, history, internal politics, and external power involvement play a vital role in shaping state behaviour. For Pakistan, history which is embedded in its identity vis-a-vis the Indian state is perhaps the predominant factor in shaping policy choices. However, the real challenge that confronts Pakistan 2009 stems from embracing the Deobandi sect of Islam, which is shaping the mindsets of people at large, which could per­haps impact Pakistani society in the FATA/NWFP areas in substantial proportions. How Pakistan addresses the growing radicalism in the country is one aspect which could be the main driver for shaping Pakistan’s internal and external political behaviour. The legiti­mate socio-economic demands of the people, therefore, need to be met and addressed. The role of Punjabi domination of the army is shaping attitudes of the minorities who now share and aspire for fair representation and participation in the political sphere. Unless the responses are shaped to address the socio-economic grievances of the people, giving them their legitimate due and fair representation, any strategy could be misleading

The year 2009 has been a year of great uncertainty and action in Pakistan. It appears that the domestic sector in Pakistan is in need of urgent reforms. The reviewed essays throw light on some of these trends, both latent and potential. Thus it would not be an exaggeration to state that internal political reform is one way of pre­venting the Pakistani state from collapsing – an effort which is necessary and which Pakistan cannot afford to ignore any more. Contemporary Pakistan indicates that forthcoming challenges are formidable. According to one analyst, Pakistan in 2020 could very well become wealthier, better educated, and a more stable society. How­ever, it suggests that to follow a growth trajectory, Pakistan would have to reduce its sources of violence and instability, attract foreign investment, provide government services, produce new jobs, and develop human capital.

Symptoms of the disease are often removed by identifying the manifest and latent causes and the immunity of a system is often built by addressing these root causes. Most of the symptoms in Pakistan stem from its internal contradictions; any diagnosis therefore demands that internal reforms are initiated.

*(The author is a  Researcher at IDSA)

–Courtesy: Strategic Analysis